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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Lucy Christine Schultz 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Creative Climate: East-West Perspectives on Art, Nature, and the Expressive Body 
 
 
This dissertation defends the need for a renewed conception of nature as seen 
through the lens of an artist. By exploring how the relationship between art and nature 
has been conceived by 19th and 20th century European and Japanese philosophers 
(including Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nishida, and Watsuji), I 
offer a way of thinking about artistic expression that recognizes the active, expressive 
character of artistic media and, more broadly, nature itself. Through an analysis of the 
embodied foundations of artistic creation, I develop a non-subjectivist account of 
expression that incorporates the climatic milieu. I maintain that the continuity between 
the embodied self and its life-world implies that the origin of creativity exceeds the will of 
the individual. This, in turn, implies that nature and the material on which art draws are 
expressive. According to this view, nature is not an indifferent realm of “mere” material 
and chemical processes distinct from the domain of culture and meaning. Rather, it is a 
creative climate from which the artist draws and to which the artist contributes. In 
conclusion, I maintain that this view has the potential to inform a more sustainable and 
ethically sound attitude towards the natural world.        
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since aesthetics was granted philosophical legitimacy by Kant in the 
culminating installment of his critical project, the Critique of Judgment, the meaning and 
significance of art has been one of the most important philosophical problems of modern 
philosophy. And, currently, understanding the human relationship to nature is becoming 
an increasingly pressing issue, within both environmental philosophy and current 
discourses of the European philosophical tradition. Though it might not be immediately 
apparent, the meaning and significance of art and the human relationship to nature are 
deeply interconnected issues, a fact evinced by Kant’s treatment of them in tandem in the 
third Critique. Beginning with the environmentalist recognition that a deeper inquiry into 
how we conceive of nature has become exigent, this dissertation explores how nature is 
conceived through the lens of the artist engaged in the creative process. By examining the 
relationship between artists and their media as recounted by particular 19th and 20th 
century European and Japanese philosophers, I offer a way of thinking about artistic 
expression that recognizes the active, expressive character of artistic media and, more 
broadly, nature itself.  
The interconnection between, and inseparability of, art and nature can be most 
clearly demonstrated by considering the artist and the act of artistic creation. However,  
the creation of art has been, and continues to be, an enigma for philosophy. Within the 
Western tradition, most of the discussions of art have been focused on the artworks 
themselves rather than the artistic process, and in some cases, discussions of the artist’s 
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significance with regard to artworks have been eschewed outright. Despite its neglect 
within discourses in aesthetics, the event of artistic creation is a highly fecund topic for 
thinking through vital philosophical problems such as the nature of perception, embodied 
action and expression, and, most fundamentally, the relationship between art and nature. 
Therefore, artistic activity deserves more careful philosophical consideration than it has 
been given.  
 The event of artistic creation raises fundamental questions about the relationship 
between art and nature because it blurs the boundaries between them. It is true that art 
and nature are often defined antithetically, and so it might seem as if they are exclusive 
categories. Historically, natural forms and art forms have been defined in 
contradistinction to each other since natural forms come into existence on their own, 
whereas art is a product of human activity. In other words, natural products arise 
“naturally,” whereas art is made. Aristotle articulates this difference as one between 
physis and téchnē. Distinguishing between art and nature on these grounds is 
unproblematic as long as human activity is understood to be fundamentally separate from 
nature. However, once human activity is seen as continuous with natural activity, this 
definition becomes less salient. Once human activity is understood as an extension of 
nature’s own life, it is reasonable to conclude that art is expressive of something 
originating within nature itself. In other words, though human beings are the creators, 
artworks may be viewed as expressions of nature because human beings are not 
ultimately distinguishable from nature. This is especially clear when the human body’s 
role in creative acts is acknowledged. The body, which is bound up with the movements 
of life and its environment, engages a material medium in order to transform it. Thus, art 
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and nature converge in the artist’s body during the act of creation. An examination of the 
artist’s bodily engagement with a medium is, therefore, an integral component of my 
inquiry.  
A close examination of what transpires during the creative process reveals how 
nature, and more specifically, material media, have the potential to become expressive 
when they are taken up by an artist. Many artists confirm this when they speak of 
following the lead of the material with which they are working during the creation of a 
piece. For instance, Michelangelo is famous for saying that he simply releases the 
sculpture that is already there within the block of stone. Typically one would expect an 
artist to begin with a conception for a piece, and then apply it to the stone. However, 
Michelangelo’s statement seems to imply that he is responding to what is suggested by 
the marble rather than imposing his own will upon it. Interestingly, we find a statement 
similar to Michelangelo’s in the Zhuangzi, a Daoist classic, in which a humble 
woodworker describes going into the mountain forest to examine the heavenly nature of 
trees. “If I find one of superlative form,” he says, “and I can see a bell stand there, I put 
my hand to the job of carving; if not, I let it go.”1 Both artists regard the material for their 
art as having its own integrity, inviting them to shape it into an artwork. The renowned 
Zen Buddhist landscape architect, Masuno Shunmyo, even goes so far to say that when 
he designs a garden he enters into dialogue with the rocks and plants to “hear what they 
themselves have to say about how they want to be laid out.”2 But what could it possibly 
mean to enter into dialogue with rocks and plants? Of course, the “dialogue” between the 
                                                
1 Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi: Basic Writings, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2003), 129. 
 
2 Robert E. Carter, The Japanese Arts and Self-Cultivation (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 63. 
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artist and his materials does not take place in language. However, the material’s appeal to 
the artist need not be interpreted as simply metaphorical either.  
Some may contend that whatever dialogue the artist perceives him or herself to be 
having with material is simply the artist’s projection. This contention, however, assumes 
a certain view in which the rich meaningfulness of human life stands over against a 
passive and indifferent physical world of mere material devoid of meaning. Certain 
Buddhist thinkers have challenged this way of thinking by recognizing the living 
character of all reality, the non-duality of the mind and body, and the dependent 
origination of the self and the world.3 Within this context, the radical interconnectedness 
of all existence and the relinquishment of the ego through the immersion of oneself in the 
field of experience offer a way to understand how the natural world permeates and guides 
the expressive activity of human beings. If we abandon the metaphysical framework that 
reduces nature to “mere” materiality and acknowledge that the very existence of life 
protests against the kind of reductive, dichotomized thinking this framework assumes, we 
can gain a better understanding of what artists mean when they say that they are impelled 
to create by the material before them. 
The idea that nature expresses itself through the artist is not new. This is precisely 
Kant’s view of genius articulated in the third Critique. However, Kant did not explain in 
detail just how nature expresses itself through the artist. Other German thinkers following 
                                                
3 For studies detailing the history Buddhist perspectives on sentient and non-sentient nature, see: Graham 
Parkes, “Voices of Mountains, Trees, and Rivers: Kūkai, Dōgen, and a Deeper Ecology,” in Buddhism 
and Ecology: The Interconnection of Dharma and Deeds, 111-128, eds. Mary Evelyn Tucker and 
Duncan Ryūken Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); and William R. La Fleur, 
“Saigyō and the Buddhist Value of Nature,” in Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in 
Environmental Philosophy, 183-209, eds. J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1989). 
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Kant, such as Schelling and Hegel, did provide more nuanced accounts of the relationship 
between art and nature in the work of genius. But, due to their adherence to the 
metaphysical tradition and the privileging of spirit over matter that it entails, they fail to 
give a satisfactory account of the continuity of art and nature, and of nature’s potential to 
become expressive.  
  Heidegger critiques the metaphysical tradition and the reign of subjectivity that it 
involves; however, his desire to avoid a subjectivist account of art led him to neglect 
what the experience of the artist has to contribute to a philosophical understanding of art. 
Merleau-Ponty, who looks to artists to exemplify his ideas throughout his oeuvre, 
provides a valuable counterpoint to Heidegger on this issue. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s 
writings on art serve as a fruitful point of comparison with Japanese aesthetic theories, 
which do not hesitate to discuss the relevance of artists. In fact, for Nishida, the foremost 
modern Japanese philosopher, artistic activity is often appealed to as an exemplary form 
of human activity in which one’s truest self emerges.  
  Merleau-Ponty is able to provide a compelling treatment of the artist and aesthetic 
perception after Heidegger due to his understanding of the self as embodied, and 
therefore in continuity with the flesh of the world. For Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, 
the self exists as being-in-the-world, a perspective which acknowledges the permeability 
of self and world through our embodiment. Understanding the self as being-in-the-world 
is another important point of resonance between modern Japanese and European 
phenomenologies, and this fundamental insight into the structure of human perception 
and experience is also essential for articulating the meaning and significance of art and 
the human’s relationship to nature. Because the self exists as being-in-the-world, both 
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nature and culture thoroughly permeate and shape our experience. Therefore, when the 
artist creates an artwork, he or she expresses both the ecological and the cultural milieu in 
which he or she exists. When a medium is taken up by an artist, its living character is 
allowed to express itself through the corporeal dialogue that takes place between medium 
and artist during the artistic process. By examining the embodied nature of artistic 
creation and the active role that media play in the creative process, I develop what I call a 
“non-subjectivist” account of artistic creation that explains how creative acts are guided 
by their medium during the creation or performance of a piece. Deemphasizing the 
artist’s subjective intentions in the creative process allows me to demonstrate how nature 
becomes expressive through the body’s dialogue with its climatic milieu. This also allows 
me to highlight the ways in which human production is responsive to nature and 
materiality, thereby demonstrating how the generation of art is an activity that is 
continuous with the expressivity of the natural world.  
In order to demonstrate the validity and significance of a non-subjectivist account 
of artistic expression, I evaluate the ways in which the artist and the relationship between 
art and nature have been conceived according to the most relevant and influential 
aesthetic theories since Kant.4 In part one, I provide an exegesis of the relationship 
between art and nature in Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. Philosophical aesthetics is 
grounded in the German tradition, and so it is important to have a firm grasp of the way 
the problems of aesthetics are articulated therein. Kant, Hegel, and Schelling each 
develop their philosophies of art in relation to their conceptions of nature. Thus, a 
                                                
4 Nietzsche is a key figure that is relevant to my inquiry. However, due to the breadth of figures I will be 
discussing, I deal with his aesthetics only in passing.   
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thorough examination of the role of art and nature in their philosophies as a whole 
illuminates the central questions guiding my inquiry.  
Part one begins with an analysis of the unifying roles aesthetics and teleology 
play in Kant’s critical project and his conception of genius in which he famously states 
that “nature gives the rule to art.” The third Critique is meant to unify Kant’s critical 
philosophy by demonstrating that the subject’s experience of natural beauty serves as a 
link between the supersensible substrate of nature and the supersensible contained in the 
concept of freedom. I argue that the important role Kant grants to natural beauty explains 
the prominence of nature in the workings of genius. Kant explains that artists cannot 
explain how they are able to produce beautiful forms because that power belongs to an 
innate talent gifted to the artist by nature. The role of nature in artistic creation also 
explains why Kant maintains that fine art must look like nature and that beautiful nature, 
in turn, looks like art. This “crossing” of art and nature points to unresolved tensions in 
the third Critique resulting from the way in which art and beauty mediate between the 
purposive intentions of artists and the unknowable purposiveness of nature in the 
workings of genius.  
In the remainder of part one, I take up the aesthetics of Schelling and Hegel and 
the philosophies of nature that they entail, and, as with Kant, the concept of genius and 
the artist’s creative process is the central focus. As German idealists and contemporaries 
of each other, Schelling and Hegel share a common vocabulary and set of philosophical 
concerns, but their conceptions of nature, art, and the relationship between the two are 
very different. The discussion of Hegel demonstrates the hierarchy of matter and spirit 
within his idealism as it reveals itself in his philosophy of nature and his aesthetics. While 
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artworks and organic life are both sensuous, material manifestations of the Idea, the Idea 
is more precisely explicit in artworks precisely because they are free from the 
contingencies of finite, organic life. I argue that despite the constraints inherent in his 
idealism, Hegel provides many insights that allow for a revaluation of nature and 
material. For example, he rejects a reductively mechanistic view of life and recognizes 
the vital need for art as a sensuous form of self-knowledge. With regard to the artistic 
process, he acknowledges the key role that media play in the genesis of art. Although, for 
Hegel, “nature” is in no way active in the creation of art, he provides a clear description 
of how material, in terms of both the medium and the subject matter, is necessary for 
artistic inspiration. He explains that an artist takes up something that is externally given 
and expresses him or herself on that. Thus, Hegel’s aesthetics and philosophy of nature 
are helpful for developing a non-subjectivist account of artistic expression, even though 
the metaphysical hierarchies of his overall system go against this view.  
In addition to Kant and Hegel, Schelling also provides many valuable insights for 
understanding the relationship between art, nature, and creativity. Schelling understands 
art to be a fulfillment of nature’s own strivings. There is an internal striving within nature 
to which the artist’s drive to create corresponds. Through the creation of art, the artist 
strives to transform this tension into a harmony. The harmony achieved in art corresponds 
to the harmony of freedom and necessity, which is also the aim of philosophy. 
Schelling’s views are valuable insofar as he provides an account of the continuity of art 
and nature in the work of genius. His account of artistic expression highlights the 
collaboration of the conscious and unconscious elements of creativity, which allows 
artworks to express more than what the artist may consciously intend. Through the 
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unconscious, nature becomes expressive in the artistic process; and this, in turn, results in 
the inexhaustibility of an artwork’s meaning. Moreover, the harmonization of freedom 
and necessity in works of art requires that a degree of opacity be preserved in them, 
otherwise they would lack the element of spirit that enlivens them. The sensuous meaning 
of artworks that is beyond articulation is complemented by the theoretical knowledge of 
philosophy. Together they exhibit the dual strivings and fulfillments of nature. In some 
ways, then, Schelling’s philosophy mediates between the positions held by Kant and 
Hegel, furthering the strengths of each.  
Despite Schelling’s insights, however, I argue that, like Hegel, the metaphysical 
framework structuring the relation between nature, art, and the human subject within his 
philosophy prevent him from providing a salient account of the expressivity of nature qua 
nature. His philosophy points the way toward an adequate account of creative expression, 
but his philosophical vocabulary and the metaphysical framework it entails prevent his 
account from being fully satisfactory. The German idealist tradition conceives of nature 
within a metaphysical framework in which the human subject stands above nature as a 
higher, more advanced kind of being. Both Schelling and Hegel view nature as a 
manifestation of the progressive development of an absolute subject in which spirit and 
matter are antithetical moments. Despite their attempts to transcend the dichotomy 
between matter and spirit, when they conceive nature as a manifestation of the 
development of an absolute subject they reinscribe the difference between them. Even 
though nature may be granted a preeminent place in relation to art (as is true for Schelling 
and Kant), or seen as a necessary aspect of the actualization of spirit (as is true for 
Hegel), nature is still understood to occupy a lower position within a metaphysical 
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hierarchy in opposition to spirit, or to an infinite subject. Thus, within these metaphysical 
systems, nature is relegated to an inferior status in relation to human life.  
Heidegger recognized the hierarchy of matter and spirit, or, in his terms, the 
sensible and the intelligible, as the problem of metaphysical thinking in general. Thus, his 
philosophy of art attempts to think of art independently of human subjectivity and 
expression. Part two explores Heidegger’s radical conception of the work of art in 
relation to some specific claims made by Merleau-Ponty in “Eye and Mind.” In the first 
section, I develop a reading of what the drawing of the rift-design entails, arguing that it 
is Heidegger’s way of describing how the work of art comes into being without appealing 
to the artistic process. I argue that what he describes using the language of Riss and 
“projective saying” is what is happening when an artist creates. I then connect 
Heidegger’s formulation with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of line and movement in 
section four of “Eye and Mind” and the writings of Paul Klee. In “Eye and Mind” 
Merleau-Ponty quotes da Vinci as saying: “The secret of the art of drawing is to discover 
in each object the particular way in which a certain flexuous line, which is, so to speak, 
its generating axis, is directed through its whole extent.”5 In the next paragraph, Merleau-
Ponty draws from the writings of Klee, saying: “the line no longer imitates the visible; it 
‘renders visible’; it is the blueprint of the genesis of things.”6 Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussions of the “logos of lines” and the “constituting power” of the “flexuous line” are 
                                                
5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, trans. Michael B. 
Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 149. 
 
6 Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” 143. 
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most helpful for elucidating how artists draw out the rift-design. Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussion of the invisible line that provides the inner configuration of things and the 
structure of their movement clarifies Heidegger’s description of the rift-design as a line-
drawing or sketch, making it more concrete, especially within a discussion of the relation 
between nature and art. The carving out of artistic forms in the drawing of the rift is the 
activity of aesthetic perception. And this drawing is enacted by the artist through the 
creation of the work—a tracing of the rift that makes both natural and artistic forms truly 
sensible in a mutually illuminating way. I conclude part two with a brief discussion of the 
theory of movement developed by the influential choreographer and intellectual, Rudolf 
Laban. I argue that his theory of movement, space, and embodied “lines of movement” 
make Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts even more salient by providing a study of 
the ways in which lines undergird the structure of the body’s movement. 
  The phenomenological approaches of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty mark an 
important advancement away from the metaphysical approach shared by the German 
idealists. The phenomenologies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, thus, serve as a bridge 
for bringing Japanese philosophy into dialogue with the Western tradition. Since the 
importance of artists’ subjective intentions are deemphasized within Japanese aesthetics, 
the theories of the self and expressive action put forth by Nishida and Watsuji offer some 
of the most insightful accounts of the artist and the creative process offered thus far, 
namely, the expressivity of artistic media—and nature more broadly—resulting from the 
body’s continuity with the world in perception and action. In order to appreciate the 
thrust of what is being advanced by these philosophers, however, they must be read in 
light of the trajectory of modern European philosophy. The overview of some of the 
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major developments within Western aesthetics in parts one and two provides the 
groundwork necessary to demonstrate what these modern Japanese philosophers have to 
contribute to the development of a non-subjectivist account of artistic expression. By 
showing the ways in which metaphysical thinking within the European tradition has 
inhibited an adequate understanding of artistic creation and the expressivity of nature, the 
original contributions of Nishida and Watsuji, whose thought responds to but does not 
share the same metaphysical heritage, are brought into relief. Furthermore, Nishida and 
Watsuji offer ways of conceiving the historicality of nature and nature’s expressivity in 
art by circumventing the dichotomy between nature and culture pervasive in the 
European philosophical tradition.  
 The focus of part three is Merleau-Ponty and Nishida’s conceptions of the body 
and how they bear upon their views of artistic expression. I argue that due to the 
continuity of the self and world established through our embodiment in the 
phenomenologies of Nishida and Merleau-Ponty, both acknowledge that a degree of 
passive receptivity is required for the genesis of art. This receptivity allows the artist to 
receive inspiration that moves him or her to creative expression, and this receptivity is 
afforded by the body’s attunement to the world through perception. For both thinkers, 
perception involves the extension of the self beyond the skin, into the field of experience. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s later work, his description of this process takes on an ontological 
significance in which the body is continuous with the flesh of the world through the 
intimate relation one has with the world through the senses. In “Eye and Mind” these 
ideas are used to talk about the artist’s engagement with the world, providing the 
ontological grounding of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics. Nishida’s account of the body is 
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similar to that of Merleau-Ponty, though his perspective is informed by certain 
fundamental Buddhist ideas that he reworks using his own philosophical vocabulary. 
Nishida speaks of an internal/external dialectic of the self-in-space whereby the artist 
knows that which is “outside” him or her through the dynamic exchange of “acting-
intuition.” In this exchange, that which performs a creative act is, in turn, shaped by that 
which is being created. He frequently uses examples of artistry to illustrate this concept, 
and these examples provide key points of comparison with the aesthetics of Merleau-
Ponty, showing the compatibility of their views of the body, perception, and creative 
expression. Through this discussion, I argue that the continuity of the self and world 
underlying their theories of perception demonstrates how the body is the site in which the 
distinction between art and nature is blurred such that artistic expression may be 
understood to originate from the world-space the artist inhabits just as much as from the 
artist him or herself. In part three, I also draw upon the work of Watsuji and some key 
dimensions of Japanese aesthetics to illustrate how climate and the materials with which 
artists work become expressive during the creative process. By combining Watsuji’s 
discussion of climate with Nishida and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of the expressive body, 
I demonstrate how the artist’s receptivity to a climatic milieu enables a material medium 
to find its own expression in works of art.  
I have chosen to take up these particular philosophers because together they 
comprise a continuous conversation over the last two centuries that exhibits a trend 
toward a positive revaluation of nature and materiality. Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
raised aesthetics to an unprecedented level of rigor, and Hegel and Schelling offer replies 
to Kant that both challenge the Kantian transcendental framework and elaborate his 
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concept of genius. The phenomenological tradition marks an important shift in 
philosophical methodology that both critiques the metaphysical systems of the German 
idealists and builds upon their legacies. Together Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty offer 
some of the most groundbreaking theories in ontology and aesthetics of the 20th century. 
Nishida and Watsuji, two of the most influential modern Japanese philosophers, were 
heavily influenced by European philosophy, and their thinking offers new and exciting 
insights into problems that have preoccupied European thinkers. Tracing and critiquing 
historical descriptions of nature, art, and art-making from Kant to Merleau-Ponty 
highlights a congenial thread in Western aesthetics, and Merleau-Ponty’s work finds its 
complement in the work of Nishida, and Watsuji. Following this course it is possible to 
recognize, within the instance of art-making, that the human and the natural are not 
opposing terms. Rather, they coincide and collaborate. Articulating a non-subjectivist 
account of artistic expression that highlights the role of the body in creative action in a 
way that is true to the experience of art-making is one of my goals. Another goal of my 
project is to present a way of understanding the expressivity of nature in light of the 
account of artistic expression I have developed. By recognizing how material, not just the 
human subject, is moved toward expression, I demonstrate the fruitful intersections 
between aesthetics and the philosophy of nature. Drawing from West and East, my 
dissertation clarifies the history and vocabulary needed in our moment to rethink the 
human relationship to nature and what art can be.
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CHAPTER II 
NATURE’S GENIUS AND THE NEED FOR ART:  
AESTHETICS AT THE LIMITS OF IDEALISM IN  
KANT, HEGEL, AND SCHELLING  
 
In his preface to The German Aesthetic Tradition (2002), Kai Hammermeister 
writes, “philosophical aesthetics as a discipline is thoroughly grounded in German 
thought and, hence, cannot be understood without a detailed knowledge of this 
tradition.”1 Examining the discipline of aesthetics is important because it provides the 
vocabulary of the discourse and the philosophical framework for how artworks are 
understood and enables us to identify the aims and scope of our inquiry. Even though 
aesthetics during the 20th century goes beyond the philosophical framework built by the 
German aesthetic tradition, revolutionary thinkers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
draw heavily on the key figures who shaped the discourse of aesthetics during the 18th 
and 19th centuries. Therefore, careful consideration of German idealist aesthetics is 
needed to understand developments in twentieth century theories of art. 
From its inception aesthetics has dealt with art and nature in tandem because they 
are both inherently material and, therefore, bound to the sensuous. Art and nature’s 
inherent materiality gives them a complicated relationship to knowledge and philosophy. 
According to the metaphysical schemas of Kant and the German idealists, there is a 
tension between scientific cognition and philosophy, on the one hand, and the material 
presentations of art on the other. At the same time, art reveals itself to be its own mode of 
                                                
1 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), x. 
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knowing, distinct from yet related to philosophy, in which meaning is embodied in a 
sensuous form. Art has meaningful significance that cannot be conveyed by philosophy.  
Though their individual theories differ greatly, each of the Kant, Hegel, and 
Schelling’s philosophies of art are developed in conjunction with their conceptions of 
nature. The ontological status of art within their philosophies is dependent upon their 
conceptions of nature. In other words, art and nature must be understood through their 
relationship to each other. This relationship can be seen most clearly through an account 
of artists’ creative activity. The working artist is the site of the convergence of art and 
nature. This is evident in Kant’s account of artistic genius. Since he privileges natural 
beauty over fine art, he claims that nature “gives the rule to art” meaning that nature 
provides the principle that guides artistic creation. This view creates unresolved tensions 
within the third Critique. Kant’s desire to unify his critical project led him to turn to 
aesthetics as a middle ground between the theoretical and practical dimensions of his 
philosophy. This middle ground opens up the possibility of sensuous meaning—a type of 
quasi-knowledge enabled by reflective judgments. However, delving into the domain of 
aesthetics and opening up the possibility of sensuous meaning reveals the limitations of 
Kant’s epistemology as a result of the entwinement of his conceptions of art and nature. 
This is by no means a failure of the third Critique. To the contrary, it bespeaks the 
philosophical richness of Kant’s discussion, the implications of which he did not fully 
draw out. Rather than solving the riddle of art’s relationship to nature, Kant lays out the 
metaphysical and epistemological problems presented by aesthetics; and these problems 
chart the trajectory of aesthetic theories to follow. 
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Kant found himself in need of aesthetics to complete his philosophy. Following in 
the wake of Kant, Hegel and Schelling demonstrate an explicit need for art within their 
philosophical systems. For both thinkers, albeit in different ways, art performs a vital 
function for the becoming and self-actualization of the absolute. Though Hegel is among 
the first thinkers to acknowledge art’s claim to truth, for him art’s adherence to the 
material and sensuous presentations of the Idea makes it inferior to the pure intelligibility 
of philosophy. Hegel provides brilliant insights into the significance of art, and the details 
of his account of artistic creation provide a more concrete description of the artist’s 
engagement with material than Kant’s discussion of genius even though Hegel rejects the 
notion that nature guides the production of art. For Hegel the production of fine art is 
guided by the historical-cultural context of the artist more so than nature. Furthermore, he 
is primarily concerned with the beauty of art (as opposed to that of nature) since his 
definition of beauty is tied to his conception of the Idea; and the Idea is most fully 
manifest in self-conscious works of spirit as opposed to natural objects. In nature, the 
Idea is alien to itself; it is only in works that are “born of spirit and born again”2 that the 
Idea becomes tangible and explicit. His hierarchical metaphysics that places material and 
sensuous meaning below the ideality of Spirit colors his conception of nature and causes 
him to deny its expressive potential.  
Schelling shares Hegel’s positive valuation of works of art, but he differs from 
Hegel in that art and philosophy are extensions of nature’s own strivings. Art is the result 
of a striving to resolve the contradictions present within nature, and Schelling’s account 
                                                
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art Vol. 1, trans. T. M. Knox. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 2. (originally published in 1835, four years after Hegel’s death); Vorlesungen 
über die Ästhetik (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch der Wissenschaft, 1970), Werke 13, p. 14.) 
[Hereafter cited as VüÄ followed by page numbers.] 
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of artistic creation acknowledges the role nature plays in creativity in ways similar to 
Kant. Furthermore, Schelling understands art to be coequal with philosophy for the most 
part; for him there is no question of “the end of art” in the Hegelian sense. For Schelling, 
art and philosophy are each necessary and complementary actualizations of the absolute 
which is itself manifested in and through nature. Despite his positive appraisal of the 
importance of nature in the creation of art, however, Schelling’s understanding of nature 
itself is couched within a metaphysical framework that relies on a certain conception of 
the absolute. Therefore, his conception of nature still fails to do justice to the expressive 
capacity of nature qua nature.     
 In different ways, Kant, Hegel, and Schelling demonstrate the need for art and 
aesthetics. Sensuous materiality has an important role to play in the fulfillment of 
philosophy and the generation of meaning. Art’s reliance on bodily engagement with 
material media in the creative process shows us how nature is an integral component of 
artistic creation. The discussions of the artist and artistic activity in the philosophies of 
Kant, Hegel, and Schelling provide insights into the relationship between art and nature 
in the creative process. However, their metaphysical and epistemological commitments 
limit the ways in which nature can be understood. In the following discussion, the value 
and importance of the aesthetics of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling will be elaborated, and the 
limitations of their views will be critiqued in order to demonstrate the need to go beyond 
the German idealist paradigm for understanding the creation of art and the nature of 
artistic expression. 
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1. Genius and the “Crossing” of Art and Nature in Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) is considered by many to be the work that 
founds philosophical aesthetics insofar as it proves that questions of beauty and art are 
more than ancillary areas of interest; rather, they occupy a fundamental domain of 
philosophical inquiry. However, the third Critique does much more than provide a theory 
of art. In addition to providing a systematic treatment of the experience of beauty and the 
sublime in art and nature, Kant addresses the possibility of teleological judgments with 
regard to nature’s purposiveness and attempts to unify the practical and theoretical 
elements of his critical philosophy. The third Critique is “an exploration of the faculty 
that is meant to guarantee the unity of reason.”3 The faculty that Kant finds to unite 
reason and complete his critical philosophy is the power of judgment, particularly 
reflective judgment. Since reflective judgments are not governed by concepts, they are 
able to bring together disparate aspects of the architectonic constructed by the first two 
Critiques. Kant’s desire to unify his philosophy leads him to adopt a particular view of 
the relationship between art and nature, which he articulates most clearly in his account 
of the workings of genius. In this section I will demonstrate how Kant’s attempt to 
provide a comprehensive account of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and 
morality leads him to adopt a particular view of creativity. Then I will show how his view 
of creativity involves internal contradictions that reveal the limits of his epistemology and 
his conceptions of art and nature.  
                                                
3 Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, 21.  
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In the introduction to the third Critique, Kant explains that the theoretical and 
practical domains are governed by different principles, namely the “concepts of nature 
and the concept of freedom.”4 After completing the first two Critiques, Kant was faced 
with the problem of how to reconcile the disparity between these two principles.5 Having 
dealt with pure and practical reason respectively in the first two Critiques, a gap was left 
open between theory and practice, or nature (the sensible) and freedom (the 
supersensible). According to Hammermeister, “The third Critique is Kant’s attempt to 
bridge this rift through the advancement of judgment as a faculty that mediates between 
sensuality and cognition on the one hand, and between sensuality and moral action on the 
other.”6 Summarizing the unifying role the third Critique plays in his systematic 
philosophy, Kant writes “an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of 
nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that 
no transition between the sensible to the supersensible […] is possible.”7 However, 
despite the gulf between the sensible and the supersensible, he claims that they are 
nonetheless connected. It is possible for the supersensible to influence the sensible, and 
we find evidence of this in our experience of nature and art, even though we cannot have 
direct knowledge of it. 
                                                
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1987), 9; Kants gesammelte Schriften Vol. 5 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), 171. [All citations to 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment will provide the reference to Pluhar’s translation followed by the 
corresponding page numbers of volume five of the Akademie edition of Kants gesammelte Schriften 
(abbreviated Ak.)] 
 
5 Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, 21. 
 
6 Ibid., 21-22. 
 
7 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 15; Ak. 176. 
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[T]he concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense the purpose 
enjoined by its laws. Hence it must be possible to think of nature as being 
such that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize with at least the possibility 
of [achieving] the purposes that we are to achieve in nature according to the 
laws of freedom. So there must after all be a basis uniting the supersensible 
that underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom 
contains practically, even though the concept of this basis does not reach 
cognition […]8   
 
At the supersensible level, freedom and nature are united; and our being rational, moral 
agents admits of the possibility that our freedom be actualized in harmony with nature’s 
laws. In “Bridging the Gulf: Kant’s Project in the Third Critique,” Paul Guyer, who in 
much of his work attempts to reinforce the unity of Kant’s critical philosophy, stresses 
the connection between reflective judgments and the conditions of the possibility of 
morality. Summarizing his position, Guyer writes: 
The task of the third Critique will then be to show how both aesthetic and 
teleological experience and judgment provide sensuous confirmation for what 
we already know in an abstract way, but also need to feel and make palpable 
to ourselves, namely the efficacy of our free choice of the fundamental 
principle of morality in the natural world, and the realizability of the 
objectives which that choice imposes on us […]9 
 
From this it begins to become clear why aesthetics provides Kant with the opportunity to 
link the theoretical and the practical dimensions of his philosophy. Aesthetics provides a 
theory of the “sensuous confirmation” we require. As the science of the sensible, 
aesthetics is the domain in which the sensible and the intelligible become most 
intertwined and concrete. And yet, it is precisely because aesthetic experience is limited 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Paul Guyer, “Bridging the Gulf: Kant’s Project in the Third Critique,” A Companion to Kant, ed. Graham 
Bird (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 425. 
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by the sensible (and is not itself cognition governed by concepts) that it is able to do the 
work that Kant needs to bridge the gulf between theory and practice, nature and freedom. 
 It is significant that aesthetics is the domain to which Kant turns to unify the 
theoretical and practical dimensions of his critical philosophy. Art lies at the intersection 
of theory, practice, nature, and cultured taste. Moreover, aesthetics occupies a middle 
ground between scientific cognition—the site of meaning for Kant—and the material side 
of experience connected to sensation and nature. Thus, aesthetics opens up the possibility 
of sensuous meaning, though Kant’s epistemological paradigm prohibits him from 
articulating what art conveys in precisely those terms. The new territory mapped out in 
the third Critique opens up aesthetics’ potential to illuminate fundamental philosophical 
insights into the human’s place within nature, and his theory of fine art as the work of 
genius proves to be a crucial hinge point in the development of that insight.       
The vital role aesthetics plays in Kant’s philosophy raises it to an unprecedented 
level of philosophical rigor. In order to unify his philosophical system, Kant must 
establish the independence of aesthetic judgments by freeing them from the reign of 
concepts, and in doing so he highlights their philosophical significance. By severing 
beauty from cognition Kant establishes aesthetic judgments as an independent mode of 
relating to objects that is distinct from scientific cognition. This, even though it was never 
Kant’s explicit aim, allows aesthetics—the power of judging beauty and the sublime—to 
be valued as its own philosophical discipline intertwined with metaphysics and 
epistemology. 
Kant’s establishment of aesthetic judgment as a power independent from 
scientific cognition is a result of his delineation of a new category of judgment—
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reflective judgment. Reflective judgments do not refer to objects of cognition, but rather 
to the mental powers of the subject. As reflective judgments, judgments of taste are not 
governed by concepts like determinate judgments are. When making a determinative 
judgment, the understanding subsumes a presentation of sense under a concept. This 
involves the harmonization of the imagination’s unification of a sense presentation with a 
concept provided by the understanding. A reflective judgment involves a different kind of 
harmonization, one that remains active and unresolved. When one judges something to be 
beautiful, the imagination and the understanding enter into “free play” in which the form 
of the object unified by the imagination suggests many concepts to the understanding, yet 
none that are adequate to the presentation. If a concept adequate to the form were to be 
found, the movement of the faculties would cease. But when judging beauty, the faculties 
are “quickened” by the form such that the faculties remain in free play and yet still find 
an accord. This accord of the quickened faculties is accompanied by the feeling of 
pleasure (§9); the pleasure is precisely the feeling of the harmony of the faculties as 
prompted by a given sense presentation and is presumed to be universal, though 
necessarily subjective. In other words, beauty, though it is tied to a given form presented 
to the senses, does not characterize objects themselves; rather, it characterizes a 
subjective experience. And yet aesthetic judgments lay claim to universality since the 
harmonization of the faculties is presumed to occur the same in everyone.  
Even though aesthetic judgments are subjective for Kant, they are still dependent 
on a physical presentation, and this denotes the necessary sensuousness of aesthetic 
experience. The harmony of the faculties in the experience of beauty only occurs while 
the sensory presentation is happening since it is prompted by the particular form of the 
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object. In other words, one can only judge a thing beautiful if one has seen the object for 
oneself. The form of the object we judge as beautiful has the form of purposiveness 
without having an actual purpose. Something about the proportions of the lines, shapes, 
pitches, and so forth, appears purposive, and this form of purposiveness brings the 
faculties into an accord that persists and causes us to linger over the object in enjoyment 
of the pleasure we experience with it. The fact that our faculties harmonize in this way 
when we see or hear different things indicates, for Kant, that it is as though these objects 
were created with the purpose of giving us pleasure, which reveals a kinship between 
ourselves as free, rational beings and the perceived purposiveness of nature. This point is 
crucial for understanding how Kant attempts to use aesthetic and teleological judgments 
to unify his critical project.   
The experience of nature holds the key to unifying Kant’s critical philosophy. 
More specifically, it is our ability to judge the purposiveness of nature that enables the 
unification of the theoretical and practical domains. In fact, Kant states that the “principle 
of purposiveness” is a transcendental concept (neither a concept of nature nor of 
freedom) that guides reflective judgments.10 Both aesthetic and teleological judgments 
hinge on our ability to judge the purposiveness of nature, whether it be in terms of the 
form of purposiveness (in judgments of taste) or the causation behind the generation of a 
natural object (in teleological judgments). However, since teleological and aesthetic 
judgments are reflective rather than determinate, neither provides any knowledge of the 
purposiveness of nature. Rather, they reveal something about the nature of subjectivity’s 
cognitive powers, namely, the faculty of judgment itself and its relationship to nature and 
                                                
10 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 23; Ak. 184. 
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the supersensible.  Even though it is impossible to have knowledge of the purposiveness 
of nature in itself, our ability to make teleological judgments enables us to attribute 
purposes to nature by way of an “analogy with the causality in terms of purposes, without 
presuming to explain it in terms of that causality.”11 In teleological judgments we adduce 
the purpose of an object’s existence through an analogy with an understanding of 
causality derived from our own subjective experience. In other words, we judge nature as 
having been created according to a purpose, even though it is impossible for us to have 
knowledge that this is the case. Thus, we “think nature as technical” in the sense denoted 
by the Greek téchnē,12 meaning that we think of nature as having been crafted. This will 
be important when we consider the relationship between art and nature in Kant’s 
conception of genius because it points to the limitations of his conceptions of these terms 
and reveals an unresolved tension in his understanding of creativity.  
The structure of the analogy involved in teleological judgments parallels our 
perception of the purposiveness of form in aesthetic judgments. In both cases, there is an 
analogy set up that compares relationships inherent to the subject to forms of nature. In 
teleological judgments, the purposiveness we project onto natural objects sets up an 
analogy between the causal intentions we experience and relationships among elements 
of the natural world. In judgments of taste, an analogy is made between the subjective 
conditions of our ability to judge the beautiful (the harmony of the faculties) and the 
perceived purposiveness of natural forms. Teleological and aesthetic judgments share this 
same basic structure because they are reflective judgments that indicate principles 
                                                
11 Ibid., 236; Ak. 360. 
 
12 Ibid. 
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governing the use of our mental powers as prompted by our study of the world (as 
opposed to providing us with knowledge of objects). In other words, teleological and 
aesthetic judgments reveal something about our minds’ relationship to the world rather 
than revealing truths about the world itself. As mentioned above with regard to aesthetic 
judgments, our minds’ relationship to the world is one of felt compatibility and 
belonging. Our ability to experience beauty when prompted by the form of purposiveness 
indicates, for Kant, that it is as though nature were formed in such a way in order to 
harmonize our faculties and give us pleasure, and this reveals a kinship between 
ourselves as free, rational beings and the perceived purposiveness of nature.  
The kinship we feel between ourselves and nature in aesthetic judgments is 
related to Kant’s claim that beauty has the significance of symbolizing morality. Kant 
asserts that aesthetic judgments lay claim to universality because they are governed by 
the supersensible in us, and the “morally good is the intelligible that taste has in view 
[…] for it is with this intelligible that even our higher cognitive powers harmonize.”13 
However, it must be made clear that the “intelligible” here is not a definitive concept. 
Rather, it refers to the moral and rational inclinations of our cognitive faculties. The 
standard of judgments of taste appeals to the a priori in ourselves such that we are our 
own legislators of taste in the same way that we are self-legislating “regarding the power 
of desires” when exercising our moral capacity.14 Because our self-legislating taste 
accords with nature, and, in fact, needs sensuous material to prompt aesthetic judgments, 
                                                
13 Ibid., 228; Ak. 353. 
 
14 Ibid., 229; Ak. 353. 
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it becomes clear how the critique of aesthetic judgment ties Kant’s theoretical and 
practical philosophy together. In the experience of beauty 
judgment finds itself referred to something that is both in the subject and 
outside of him, something that is neither nature nor freedom and yet is linked 
in the basis of freedom, the supersensible, in which the theoretical and the 
practical power are in an unknown manner combined and joined into a unity.15  
 
Kant is arguing that there is a fundamental link between the supersensible substrate of 
nature and rational, moral law, which is evinced by the accord established between the 
forms of nature (that appear purposive) and the harmonization of our cognitive powers. 
The connection between taste, morality, and the supersensible substrate of nature 
indicates why natural beauty, as opposed to the beauty of art, is of greater importance to 
Kant. It also sheds light on the importance of nature in the work of genius. Kant famously 
says that “it must be nature in the subject that gives the rule to art” (§46).16 Fine art must 
be the work of genius, meaning that it must be the product of innate talent. An artist 
needs training, but ultimately it is innate, natural ability that gives rise to beautiful art. 
“Genius is the innate mental disposition through which nature gives the rule to art.”17 
This claim is consistent with Kant’s earlier reasoning that holds that aesthetic judgments 
may not be ruled by concepts. The genius intuits the demands of beauty. Beautiful art 
cannot be achieved through the application of rules; it can only be created through 
inspiration that comes from somewhere beyond the artist’s ken, and Kant attributes this 
source to nature. 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid., 175; Ak. 307.  
 
17 Ibid., 174; Ak. 307. 
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Genius itself cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about its 
products, and it is rather as nature that it gives the rule. That is why, if an 
author owes a product to his genius, he himself does not know how he came 
by the ideas for it; nor is it in his power to devise such products at his 
pleasure, or by following a plan […]18 
 
In Kant and the Claims of Taste, Guyer argues that since neither creating nor judging 
artworks may be explained through reference to concepts, nature must in some ways be 
the source of both. Guyer explains that “with this assumption Kant then links the 
harmony of the faculties to the supersensible.”19 Guyer interprets this linkage as an 
attempt to provide a metaphysical grounding for the universality of judgments of taste. 
Usually concepts are the source that provides universality. However, since aesthetic 
judgments are reflective, Kant points to a supersensible substrate rather than concepts to 
establish the universality of aesthetic experience.20  
  Lara Ostaric also clarifies that the “nature” active in the genius refers to the 
supersensible substrate, explaining how this accounts for why the genius cannot have 
complete knowledge of how the creation of art takes place.  
Creation, on Kant’s view, unlike imitation, consists of a special unity of free 
human activity and nature, where ‘nature’ primarily signifies the Idea of 
                                                
18 Ibid., 175; Ak. 308. 
 
19 Paul Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), 341. 
 
20  From this we can see how Guyer’s reading of Kant supports his interpretation in his later work, Kant 
and the Experience of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) in which he seeks to 
demonstrate the consistency of Kant’s critical philosophy. Here Guyer argues that Kant’s conception of 
the range of responses had to aesthetic objects goes beyond the narrow formalism suggested by certain 
sections of the “Analytic of the Beautiful.” Guyer’s interpretation is an effort to reinforce the connection 
between aesthetic judgment and practical reason put forth (somewhat inconclusively) by Kant. According 
to Guyer, Kant “showed how the uniqueness of aesthetic response and artistic creation could be 
reconciled with the vital role of the aesthetic in the larger morality of mankind.” One of Guyer’s chief 
purposes in the book is to show how “the intrinsic and independent value of aesthetic experience” and the 
“primacy of practical reason” are “not merely compatible but interdependent” (2). 
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nature’s supersensible substrate. Therefore, nature is not just another aspect 
of, but rather something that transcends, creative subjectivity.21 
 
The role that nature plays in creativity must be beyond the artist’s ken due to its link to 
the supersensible substrate. This idea is also important for understanding Kant’s claim 
that art must look like nature discussed below. 
Even though nature guides the production of art in the work of genius, there is, of 
course, a difference between products of nature and products of genius even though 
nature is at work in the genius motivating his or her artistic sensibility. Art is something 
made; therefore it involves concepts. When an artist sets out to create a painting, for 
example, he or she has it in his or her mind what a painting consists of and what is 
needed to bring it about. If the artist is working from life, then he or she will have in 
mind the concept of the thing being painted, be it a house, landscape, still life, or human 
form. There will be techniques for achieving perspective, colors, and lighting that are true 
to life. The techniques the painter uses can be taught because they operate as rules 
guiding composition. However, in order for the work to have spirit, that is, the ability to 
“quicken” the faculties and pique one’s interest, it must be a product of the innate talent 
of genius gifted by nature, which refers, ultimately, to the supersensible.  
Within the workings of genius, the “nature,” or supersensible, in the subject 
collaborates with the artist’s technical skill to produce beautiful forms. There is a unity of 
conscious intentions and unconscious inspiration. Through the collaboration of nature 
and taste, the genius is able to communicate meaning via a sensible presentation that 
cannot be totally captured in words. Thus, art somehow exhibits meaningful content in a 
                                                
21 Lara Ostaric, “Kant on the Normativity of Creative Production,” Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 75-107. 
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way that is beautiful, that is, in a way that harmonizes the faculties through the 
presentation of the form of purposiveness without a purpose. In other words, works of 
genius utilize a sensuous means to present conceptual content (aesthetic ideas) that 
cannot be contained by the concepts that it evokes. This conceptual content is united with 
sensuous forms that are composed as a result of the artist’s careful attention to the 
attunement of his or her faculties. The attunement that the artist feels is one that accords 
with natural beauty. The beauty of art and the beauty of nature are the same beauty 
insofar as they both involve the same play of faculties. However, natural beauty is given 
priority because artistic beauty is ultimately derived from nature (as it refers to the 
supersensible in the subject). That is why Kant insists that the nature in the subject, 
“through the attunement of his powers,” is the source of the rule that guides the 
production of art. The mental powers that govern taste collaborate with a naturally 
endowed proclivity for generating beauty in a way that is profoundly meaningful.  
The collaboration of natural talent and taste in the genesis of fine art leads to what 
John Sallis calls a “crossing” of art and nature.22 Since judging natural beauty and artistic 
beauty involve the same attunement of the faculties, Kant proclaims that art looks like 
nature, and nature looks like art. Even though artworks are created with intentions and 
involve concepts and the application of techniques that function as rules, “the academic 
form must not show.”23 In order for the work to be beautiful it must not appear belabored 
as if it came about painstakingly (though Kant acknowledges that artists do, in fact, often 
meticulously create their works). Rather, it must have the look of effortlessness as is if it 
                                                
22 John Sallis, Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), 27. 
 
23 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 174; Ak. 307. 
 
 31 
were born naturally. Thus, “fine art must have the look of nature even though we are 
conscious of it as art.”24  
Despite the circularity, or “crossing,” of artistic and natural beauty, there is an 
important difference between aesthetic judgments directed at nature and those directed at 
art that parallels the dual aspects of innate talent and technical skill in the workings of 
genius. When we judge artworks, we not only judge their beauty, we also judge their 
perfection. Since artworks do involve purposes, part of our assessment of them depends 
on how well they achieve those purposes. When discussing this point, the crossing of art 
and nature occurs again in an interesting way. Even though concepts are not supposed to 
come into play in aesthetic judgments of nature, Kant acknowledges that in some cases, 
considerations of how well something conforms to its objective purposiveness does 
influence our judgment of it. But when this occurs, “We then judge nature no longer as it 
appears as art, but insofar as it actually is art (though superhuman art), and [so we make 
a] teleological judgment that serves the aesthetic one as a foundation and condition that it 
must take into account.”25 Recalling the discussion above, when we make teleological 
judgments we think of nature as having been crafted with a purpose in mind. Thus, we 
think of nature as having its own téchnē through which it brings about its forms. 
However, it is of crucial importance to make clear that Kant does not assert that 
organisms are the products of an intelligent design—that would be making a determinate 
judgment out of what must remain a reflective judgment. In other words, we cannot claim 
knowledge of the objective purposiveness of nature even though our cognition requires us 
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to conceptualize nature as if it had been created according to purposes. “There is clearly a 
big difference,” Kant says,  
between saying that certain things of nature, or even all of nature, could be 
produced only by a cause that follows intentions in determining itself to 
action, and saying that the peculiar character of my cognitive powers is such 
that the only way I can judge [how] those things are possible and produced is 
by conceiving, [to account] for this production, a cause that acts according to 
intention, and hence produces [things] in a way analogous to the causality of 
an understanding.26  
 
Kant’s view is that “we are absolutely unable to form a concept of [how] such a world is 
possible except by thinking of it as brought about by a supreme cause that acts 
intentionally.”27 In other words, even though we cannot assert that the world is, in fact, a 
product of creative intentions, the character of our cognitive powers leads us to think of 
nature as “divine art.” Hence, Kant claims that nature, when it is beautiful, looks like 
superhuman art, and fine art looks like nature.  
The intersection of aesthetics and teleology points to interesting tensions within 
Kant’s views on creativity that have implications for his conceptions of art and nature. Of 
course, nature cannot be art by definition. As something made with certain purposes in 
mind, art is antithetical to nature. Even though Kant believes we cannot help but think of 
nature as if it were the product of creative intentions, if he were to actually assert that 
certain natural forms “are products of divine art,” he asks, “how can I still include them 
among products of nature, when it was precisely because nature cannot produce such 
things in terms of its own laws that I had to appeal to a cause distinct from it?”28 Art and 
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nature are supposed to be exclusive categories. However, Kant demonstrates that they 
cannot be disentangled.  
The crossing of art and nature suggests that the activity of genius in the 
production of art is an extension of nature’s own activity. But this sets up a problematic 
tension between the “nature outside of us” and the nature active in the innate talent of 
genius. Eva Schaper explains:  
[T]he sense in which nature enters into the production or creation of works of 
fine art is the sense in which we as human are in our capabilities and gifts part 
of nature. The contrast between natural beauty and the beautiful in art is the 
contrast between that which is found in the world—in nature outside us—and 
that which is intentionally created by artists who are especially gifted by 
nature.29  
 
This remark highlights how the concept of genius complicates Kant’s clear definition of 
art as something made, as opposed to natural objects, which come into being on their 
own. Since artistic creativity depends on the nature in the subject, nature, insofar as it is 
linked to the supersensible in us, is actually responsible in part for the artist’s creative 
activity. Thus the products of genius exhibit a naturalness that leads Kant to make his 
claim that art must look like nature and that beautiful nature looks like art.  
The crossing of art and nature becomes more complex when we turn to Kant’s 
remarks about aesthetic ideas in relation to fine art. Kant points out that some works of 
art may satisfy our taste, though they do not spark our interest due to their lack of spirit. 
The “spirit” of artworks can only arise if the nature in the artist guides the artist’s creation 
making it a work of genius. Kant defines spirit [Geist] “in an aesthetic sense” as “the 
animating principle in the mind […] that imparts to the mental powers a purposive 
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momentum.”30 He equates spirit in this context to the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas. 
Kant cites the original meaning of the Latin genius as “the guardian and guiding spirit 
that each person is given as his own at birth, and to whose inspiration those original ideas 
are due.”31 Together these ideas point to a perplexing intertwining of the concepts of 
nature and spirit in art and the activity of genius. On one level, nature is at work in genius 
as the rule giver. But, at the same time, this nature in the subject is also what gives the 
genius the ability to produce aesthetic ideas that quicken the mind and endow artworks 
with spirit. Thus, genius may be analyzed as a site where nature and art converge. The 
artistic genius exercises a power gifted to him or her by nature, so in some respects nature 
is responsible for what enables fine art to be made. And since having spirit is what 
differentiates truly beautiful art, nature is also what endows artworks with spirit.   
Asserting that nature, or the supersensible, guides artistic activity—which Kant’s 
conception of genius surely does—could be interpreted as attributing purposiveness to 
nature.  That is to say, acknowledging the role that the nature in the subject plays in 
artistic activity makes it seem as though Kant is suggesting that nature is somehow active 
in the genius during the creation of fine art. This assertion may be maintained if we 
understand it in light of Kant’s desire to link the supersensible substrate of nature with 
the supersensible contained in the concept of freedom. Earlier it was noted with reference 
to Guyer’s work that Kant’s effort to unify his critical philosophy led him to take up 
aesthetics since art and nature are the domains in which we may enjoy sensuous 
confirmation of the connection between our free agency and the laws of nature. Genius, 
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as the site of the crossing of art and nature, unites nature’s perceived purposiveness and 
our inclinations towards beauty (which symbolizes morality according to Kant). Thus, the 
workings of genius exhibit the unification of the two conceptions of the supersensible 
pertaining to nature and freedom.     
The way Kant’s two conceptions of the supersensible are united in the workings 
of genius is demonstrated when we consider the principle of nature’s purposiveness in 
relation to artistic creativity. Ostaric argues that the convergence of nature and spirit in 
genius can be identified with the principle of nature’s purposiveness (the principle 
appealed to in teleological judgments). “Because a genius’s nature, her sensibility, is 
spontaneously commensurate with a genius’s cognitive capacities, the ‘animating 
principle’ of a genius’s cognitive faculties, i.e. a genius’s spirit, can rightly be identified 
with the principle of nature’s purposiveness.”32 What is perplexing about this is that the 
genius’s spirit is that which is beyond the artist’s subjective consciousness, and as such is 
identified with nature’s purposiveness. As in the Latin notion, the spirit that gives rise to 
the artist’s inspiration is something given to him or her by nature. Thus, nature’s 
purposiveness corresponds to the genius’s creative capacity, which seems to indicate that 
nature is indeed the genius’s creative force. But, again, suggesting that nature is creative 
challenges the separability of art and nature, and the suggestion that the spirit of genius is 
identifiable with nature’s purposiveness further confuses to the distinction between them.  
Within this discussion, what is referred to as nature’s purposiveness must not be 
taken as a determinate judgment about the actual purposiveness of nature. Teleological 
judgments are decidedly reflective. Therefore, to say that the genius’s faculties can be 
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identified with the principle of nature’s purposiveness means that we are making a 
reflective judgment about the purposiveness of the nature in the genius. Pointing out this 
connection also helps to explain why genius cannot be taught. If the workings of genius 
and nature’s purposiveness are linked, then that which guides the genius’s creative act is 
beyond cognition because we cannot have knowledge of nature’s purposiveness. In other 
words, the purposiveness we attribute to nature (but cannot have knowledge of) is 
somehow giving the rule to art through the genius in a way that the genius cannot 
explain; and the cognitive gap in which the supposed purposiveness of nature operates is 
what enables the products of genius to look like beautiful nature (as having a 
purposiveness without a purpose).       
The tensions revealed by the crossing of art and nature within Kant’s view of 
creativity have significant implications for understanding Kant’s aim for the third 
Critique to unify his critical philosophy. Kant appeals to nature as the source that guides 
artistic creation because the creation of art cannot be governed by concepts. But, by 
definition, art cannot be a product of nature. Yet, according to Kant’s conception of 
genius, somehow in artistic creativity the artist taps into nature’s own creative origins and 
perceived purposiveness. But to call nature “creative” is already to blur the boundary 
between art and nature. On the one hand, creativity denotes an intentional will, that is, a 
purposiveness. On the other hand, creativity appeals to nature to explain how art can 
come about without being determined by concepts, which allows it to exhibit beauty—the 
form of purposiveness without a purpose. The problem is that creativity implies 
intentionality, and intentionality requires purposes that are governed by concepts. Yet, the 
creation of beauty cannot be done according to concepts, and the severance of beauty 
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from concepts is necessary for Kant to link the practical and theoretical dimensions of his 
philosophy.  
Aesthetics offers Kant a means to bridge the gulf between nature and freedom, 
and the genius is the site in which this link is most explicitly made. By articulating the 
role of nature in the creation of art, the distinction between art and nature is broken down. 
The crossing of art and nature that results from Kant’s attempt to unify his critical 
philosophy reveals something about the strangeness of creativity—that it involves 
purposes while, at the same time, it is expresses things that are not consciously intended. 
By occupying a middle ground between scientific cognition and the sensuous side 
of experience connected to nature, aesthetics opens up the possibility of sensuous 
meaning—a type of quasi-knowledge that involves concepts but is not exhausted by 
them. Creativity operates upon this middle ground mediating between concepts and the 
supersensible substrate of nature. Somehow in art, nature becomes expressive and 
material has meaning. However, to say this goes beyond the epistemological strictures of 
Kant’s critical philosophy. Despites its self-imposed limitations, the third Critique 
demonstrates the importance and necessity of aesthetics. Kant’s rich discussion of genius 
lays out the problematic of the relationship between art and nature in creative activity in a 
way that allowed future thinkers to further his inquiry. Though Kant does not fully 
explain the riddle of creativity, his exploration of the problem paves the way toward a 
deeper understanding of the role of nature in the genesis of art. 
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2. Rethinking Genius and Materiality in Hegel’s Aesthetics 
 
The crossing of art and nature through the workings of genius in Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment points to a puzzling connection between purposiveness and “naturalness” in 
artistic creativity. While Kant does not solve the puzzle of creativity, he opens up the 
problem for future thinkers in a valuable way. Hegel’s accounts of art, nature, and artistic 
creativity follow in the Kantian tradition; though, the relationship between art and nature 
within Hegel’s aesthetics is dramatically different from Kant’s position. Hegel’s 
aesthetics and philosophy of nature do not involve the same kind of crossing that occurs 
in the third Critique. Rather, the hierarchy of spirit over matter organizing Hegel’s 
absolute idealism allows him to articulate the difference between art and nature in a way 
that reflects the internal consistency of his system overall. Although Hegel’s aesthetics 
and philosophy of nature are more transparently consistent, this consistency comes at the 
expense of the richness of the concept of nature within his system. In other words, the 
hierarchy of spirit over matter that allows for the consistency of his dialectic results in the 
impoverishment of his concept of nature. However, the implications of his idealism are 
not solely negative. On the positive side, he understands nature as a vital part of the 
development of spirit in which it is embodied in material. For him, material is an 
extension of spirit that exhibits its strivings. Thus, material is not considered to be merely 
dead, inert substance.  Despite his non-reductive view of material, however, his dialectic, 
in which the external materiality of nature is antithetical and inferior to the inwardness of 
thought and the universality of spirit, still privileges the ideal over the material. This 
privileging, which is apparent in his aesthetics as well as his philosophy of nature, 
 39 
prevents him from acknowledging the expressive potential of nature, broadly speaking. 
Though, interestingly, in his account of artistic practice he does acknowledge the 
important role that the material with which an artists work plays in the process of art-
making.     
Even though Hegel’s accounts of art and nature involve a hierarchy that devalues 
nature and material in relation more spiritualized forms of thought and existence, Hegel’s 
account of the creative activity provides a more concrete description of an artist’s 
engagement with a material medium and subject matter than Kant’s account of genius. 
Furthermore, Hegel’s recognition of tie between art and truth, or the Idea, is important for 
the philosophies of art developed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Thus, a close 
examination of the relationship between art and nature in Hegel is important for 
understanding the way in which artistic creativity comes to be understood in the 20th 
century.   
As mentioned, the fine arts trump natural beauty for Hegel since he deems nature 
to be a “degradation of the Idea” in the respect that it is the Idea external to itself. It is 
necessary for the Idea to become materially manifest; however, not all material 
manifestations are equal. Organisms and organic life in general are the first occasions in 
which the Idea becomes explicitly manifest, and it is only with the emergence of 
intelligent life—human beings—that spirit emerges as such. And yet, when we look 
closely at what Hegel has to say about the human body in his lectures on aesthetics, it 
becomes clear that spirit is more fully manifest in works of art than the actual human 
organism. The body, still immersed in the finitude of nature, bears the contingencies of 
materiality. While an artwork is bound to the material, it is able to display the infinity of 
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spirit by making the medium of which it is composed shine with soul throughout its 
entire surface, tone, and so on.  
By taking up the status of nature in Hegel’s aesthetics I will critique the hierarchy 
of the sensible and the intelligible evident in Hegel’s placement of art below philosophy 
in the development of absolute spirit and his preference for the beauty of art over the 
beauty of nature. Though Hegel’s philosophy of nature has the potential to revise the 
reductive assumptions about nature and provide an account of sensuous meaning, he still 
problematically relegates nature to an inferior status in relation to spirit and it products. 
In the cases of both art and nature, their adherence to materiality is what relegates them to 
a lower point in his culminating dialectic.  
The point of my discussion, however, is not a mere rejection of Hegel. On the 
contrary, the upshot of my analysis is an elucidation of materiality in his philosophy and 
a sketch of what I think an adequate conception of nature must entail. By taking up the 
issue of materiality in Hegel’s aesthetics and his philosophy of nature, I will show that 
there is much to be gained from further critical study of his work in these areas, but that, 
ultimately, art and nature are not granted adequate positions in his system due to their 
adherence to materiality, which, for him, makes them inferior. It is my assessment that by 
placing nature below spirit and art below philosophy in his developmental hierarchy, he 
fails to do justice to the importance of the role of nature in the creative process and the 
value of sensuous meaning in works of art.  
Before proceeding in my analysis of the status of material in Hegel’s philosophy, 
it is important to acknowledge how his philosophy of nature has been understood in light 
of interpretations of his idealism. There are two broad trends in Hegel scholarship that 
 41 
may be referred to as the metaphysical and nonmetaphysical readings. In Petrified 
Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy Alison Stone explains, “Broadly, 
‘metaphysical’ readings contend that [Hegel’s] philosophical system sets out to describe 
the structures of the world as it really is. By contrast, ‘nonmetaphysical’ readings hold 
that Hegel’s system explicates a set of categories through which we must confer 
intelligibility upon our experience.”33 Robert Pippin gives the most well-known 
nonmetaphysical reading in Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. 
Simply put, Pippin interprets Hegel as continuing the project of Kant’s transcendental 
logic, disclosing “the conceptual conditions required for there to be possibly determinate 
objects of cognition in the first place.”34 As Stephen Houlgate notes, “For Pippin’s Hegel, 
therefore, metaphysics and ontology give way to transcendental logic: for being can be 
understood only by examining the categories through which it is necessarily 
conceived.”35 According to nonmetaphysical readings, then, on Stone’s interpretation, 
Hegel’s philosophy of nature “is no longer a series of descriptions of objectively existing 
structures; it is now a set of categories for thinking about empirical phenomena.”36  
On the other side, Houlgate is a prominent proponent of the metaphysical reading. 
Against Pippin’s interpretation, Houlgate argues that the identification of thought and 
being proclaimed in various places throughout Hegel’s corpus entails the presence of 
structures in nature that are typically confined to the category of thinking. Citing passages 
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from both the Logic and the Encyclopedia Logic, he argues that “the words ‘concept,’ 
judgment,’ and ‘syllogism’ name structures in nature, and so in being itself, not just 
forms of human understanding and reason. They are, therefore, ontological as well as 
logical structures—structures of being as well as categories of thought.”37 When one 
reads Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics and his philosophy of nature, two areas of his system 
that deal directly with material existence, Houlgate’s metaphysical interpretation proves 
to be more consistent with Hegel’s own position. For Hegel, the Idea must become 
actual, meaning that it must take on physical existence, and nature and art are two of the 
most basic ways in which the Idea becomes manifest. Thus Hegel’s position may be 
described as a type of objective idealism in contrast to the subjectivism of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism that restricts him from making such ontological assertions. 
Despite being an “idealist” Hegel does acknowledge the necessary existence of 
material independent from thought. In light of this, William Maker makes the radical 
claim in “The Very Idea of the Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel Is Not an Idealist” that 
Hegel holds a realist conception of nature, which exempts him from idealism full stop.38 
Maker argues that though Hegel may be considered a critical and methodological idealist, 
he is decidedly not the kind of idealist who takes all of reality to be thought or derived 
from thought. He claims that the systematicity of Hegel’s thinking necessitates the reality 
of nature apart from thought, and that nature, the other of the Idea, must be radically 
other and not thought-like in essence. While Maker’s argument makes a valid point and 
prevents a simple conception of idealism from being imposed on Hegel, he does not 
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adequately account for the rationality of nature and the ideality emergent from it which 
construes nature in a manner more consistent with the other acknowledged idealist 
elements of Hegel’s thought. The position put forth by Errol E. Harris, in “The 
Philosophy of Nature is Hegel’s System”39 provides a more accurate stance by defending 
Hegel against the supposed contradiction of his treatment of nature as an absolute 
idealist. Against the narrowly idealistic readings of Hegel that reject the relevance of the 
philosophy of nature, Harris argues that the inclusion of nature within Hegel’s system is 
consistent if one recognizes that in the dialectical movement from logic to spirit via 
nature, mind is continuous with and emergent from nature, and nature is a necessary 
moment establishing the dialectical “other” of the Idea. Contrary to Maker, Harris’s 
interpretation is more convincing because it portrays the internal consistency of Hegel’s 
position as a systematic thinker and reflects more accurately the language Hegel uses to 
describe nature and materiality.  
Art and nature, like all things according to Hegel, are determinations of the Idea. 
He explains, “[T]he Idea should realize itself externally and win a specific and present 
existence as the objectivity of nature and spirit. The true as such exists also.”40 Like art, 
nature embodies the Idea in material. Within the hierarchy of Hegel’s system, however, 
art and nature are distinguished based on how concretely they embody the Idea. The Idea 
is present in nature only implicitly, which is why Hegel deems it inferior to art. Though 
art and nature are similar in that they are both characterized by their objective, external, 
material existence, the Idea becomes explicit only through conscious expressions of 
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spirit. The Philosophy of Nature forms the second volume of The Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1830), following the volume on logic and preceding the 
Philosophy of Spirit or Mind [Geist].41 As the intermediate part of his system, nature 
occupies a transitional phase in which the Idea becomes alien to itself in space and time. 
While art is a form of absolute spirit in which the Idea becomes concretely realized, 
nature is the Idea in the form of otherness; it is the Idea external to itself.42 Thus, nature, 
as the “degradation of the Idea,” is the Idea “in disparity with its own self.”43 As such, 
nature is “unresolved contradiction” because its members do not know their 
interconnection and exist indifferently from one another. However, since nature is 
nevertheless an expression of the Idea, it exhibits a striving, a movement toward the 
freedom of ideality. As life develops and becomes more complex, the organism achieves 
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greater unity with itself and progresses toward self-consciousness. With the emergence of 
organic life comes the receptivity of sensation and eventually the unity of soul and the 
inwardness of thought. In the most completely organized and integrated organisms—
human beings—spirit finally comes on the scene and begins to apprehend itself as such 
through its social institutions and cultures. 
Even though Hegel understands nature to be a degradation of the Idea in contrast 
to more concrete forms of spirit, he acknowledges that the earth, as the cradle of life, is 
necessary for spirit’s very existence. Moreover, there are passages where Hegel expresses 
reverence for the earth. He writes, “we must give the place of honour to the earth we live 
on. […] We have now come therefore to stand on the earth as our home, and not only our 
physical home but the home of Spirit too.”44 He views the Earth as a “terrestrial 
organism” and refers to things like hot springs and volcanoes as its organs. He writes, 
“just as springs are the lungs and secretory glands of the earth’s process of evaporation, 
so are volcanoes the earth’s liver.”45 Contrary to other reductive perspectives, Hegel 
views the earth itself to be imbued with life. He writes, “I regard mountains, therefore, 
not as gatherers of rainwater which penetrates into them; on the contrary, the genuine 
springs which generate rivers like the Ganges, Rhone, and Rhine have an interior life, a 
striving and a stirring, like naiads.”46 These passages make clear that Hegel rejects a 
reductive, merely mechanistic view of nature. Instead he believes that the earth itself 
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resembles an organism, and its geological and meteorological features exhibit the 
movements of life.   
Though Hegel’s philosophy of nature offers a perhaps surprisingly positive 
account of material being, his enthusiasm for the earth as the home of spirit is tempered 
by the status he assigns to nature in relation to the arts within the context of his aesthetics. 
In general, Hegel’s dialectic exhibits a pattern in which the manifestations of spirit are 
ordered according to their concreteness, but his understanding of what concreteness 
means is somewhat counterintuitive. Paradoxically, for Hegel what is immediate and 
simple is abstract, and what is more cerebral and ideal is correspondingly more concrete. 
In progressive order, the most concrete forms of spirit are art, religion, and philosophy. 
As a sensuous presentation of the Idea, art is the first instantiation of absolute spirit, 
which is surpassed by religion and philosophy as more fully actualized and universal 
forms of self-knowledge. As a sensible presentation, the ideal content of artworks can 
only be expressed through a material medium, and according to Hegel, the reliance on a 
medium amounts to being encumbered by the contingency of materiality. In contrast, 
philosophy is supposedly free from such contingency because it is the free movement of 
thought in accordance with reason. Therefore, philosophy, being supposedly unbounded 
by materiality, presents the Idea in its highest accordance with itself. 
  The pattern of the dialectic’s movement toward concreteness is also present 
within the hierarchy Hegel grants to the arts themselves. The arts in which the material 
dominates the presentation are lower on the hierarchy than those that come closer to the 
freedom of thought. Architecture, being the most determined by the laws of physics and 
the material from which it is built, is the first, most abstract form of art, while poetry, as 
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the art form most expressive of spirit’s inwardness unrestrained by materiality, comes 
closest to philosophy. Sculpture, painting, and music occupy the middle of the hierarchy 
respectively since each one is increasingly more apt for expressing the inwardness of 
thought and the ideal content of the concept.    
The metaphysical hierarchies organizing Hegel’s aesthetics are most apparent in 
his discussion of beauty. In order for the Idea to express its truth, it must become actual 
and available to the senses. According to Hegel, beauty is the sensuous presentation of 
the Idea in which the presentation’s form is in complete harmony with its ideal content. 
He explains: 
Now when truth […] in its external existence is present to 
consciousness immediately, and when the Concept remains 
immediately in unity with its external appearance, the Idea is not 
only true but beautiful. Therefore the beautiful is characterized as the 
pure appearance of the Idea to sense.47 
 
Artworks and products of nature are beautiful when their sensuous presentations of the 
Idea are the most free and unified with their content.48 Though both nature and art may be 
beautiful, Hegel distinguishes between the beauty of nature and the beauty of art on the 
same grounds that he distinguishes between art and nature metaphysically. Since the Idea 
is only present in nature implicitly, natural beauty is deficient. On the other hand, artistic 
genius transforms material into art, making it shine with the vibrant radiance of soul. 
Hegel famously says that art “has to convert every shape in all points of its visible surface 
into an eye, which is the seat of the soul and brings spirit into appearance.” Thus, “art 
makes every one of its productions into a thousand-eyed Argus, whereby the inner soul 
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and spirit is seen at every point.”49 A beautiful artwork achieves a perfected unity in 
which all of its physical components come together to make its conceptual content 
concretely appear. In this way it achieves the complete unity of form and content, and 
thereby presents truth to the senses beautifully. Natural forms, on the other hand, have 
not been refined by artistic intent. Therefore, according to Hegel, they do not display the 
infinity of spirit. Rather, they are sunk in the finite, ever-becoming cycle of birth and 
decay. That is why he claims that in nature the concept is only “foreshadowed” and not 
concretely manifested.50 The failure of natural beings to fully express their concept 
externally results, for Hegel, in the deficiency of natural beauty and the need for art.51 He 
explains: 
Thus it is from the deficiencies of immediate reality that the 
necessity of the beauty of art is derived. The task of art must 
therefore be firmly established in art’s having a calling to display the 
appearance of life, and especially the spiritual animation (in its 
freedom, externally too) and to make the eternal correspond with its 
concept.52 
 
Though the arts are tied to their material media, the beauty of art is superior to the beauty 
of nature, according to Hegel, since art ensouls material, allowing the spirit of life to 
shine forth through its entire surface.  
To further demonstrate the difference between nature and art and the superiority 
Hegel grants to art, we can refer to what he says about the human body. The human body 
provides a key insight into Hegel’s understanding of nature because of its unique 
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ambiguity. Our bodies, of course, are decidedly physical and depend on material 
resources to survive. And yet, bodies enable the existence of spirit—the Idea cannot fully 
actualize itself except through an ensouled body. Therefore, the human body is unique in 
that it is both a natural being and an explicit manifestation of the Idea. Hegel writes, “we 
must not take the identity of soul and body as a mere connection, but in a deeper way, i.e. 
we must regard the body and its members as the systematic articulation of the concept 
itself.”53 With this, one is led to ask afresh: what is the difference between the human 
body and a work of art since both are concrete manifestations and appearances of the 
Idea? The need to understand their distinction is amplified since in the introduction to his 
lectures on aesthetics Hegel actually uses the body as an analogy for explaining the 
special significance of artworks.  
[T]he spirit and the soul shine through the human eye, through a 
man’s face, flesh, skin, through his whole figure, and here the 
meaning is always something wider than what shows itself in the 
immediate appearance. It is in this way that the work of art is to be 
significant and not appear exhausted by these lines, curves, surfaces, 
carvings, hallowings in the stone, these colours, notes, word sounds, 
or whatever other material is used; on the contrary, it should disclose 
an inner life, feeling, soul, a content and spirit, which is just what we 
call the significance of the work of art.54 
 
Despite this analogy, Hegel does make the difference between the human body and the 
work of art clear when discussing the deficiency of natural beauty. As noted, Hegel likens 
an artwork to the thousand-eyed Argus in which every point emanates the gaze of spirit. 
The body, however, being sunk in the finitude of nature cannot achieve this total unity. 
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However far the human […] body makes its life appear outwardly, 
still nevertheless the poverty of nature equally finds expression on 
the surface by the non-uniformity of the skin, in indentations, 
wrinkles, pores, small hairs, little veins, etc. […] From this point of 
view the soul with its inner life here too does not shine through the 
entire reality of the bodily form.55    
 
Thus, it is clear that the apparent “imperfections” of the body’s material finitude falls 
short of the infinity and freedom of the Idea’s expression in art. Hegel understands nature 
as a degradation of the Idea, an embodiment of spirit that must be superseded by its 
distillation and refinement in art. Hence, it may be concluded that Hegel does not value 
nature in and of itself, but only as the means through which spirit is enabled to exist. 
The metaphysical hierarchies governing the relationship between art and nature in 
Hegel’s thinking are also evident in his discussion of the artist and artistic activity. While 
Kant’s analysis of artistic genius occupies an important position in his aesthetic theory, 
Hegel’s treatment of the artist within his lectures on aesthetics is quite short and indicates 
that he is largely unconcerned with artists’ individual creative processes. Hegel 
acknowledges that consideration of the artist and his “inspiration” is necessary, although 
he does so reluctantly. He writes, “strictly we need to mention this aspect [the artist and 
his talent] only to say of it that it is to be excluded from the area of scientific discussion, 
or at least that it permits of a few generalities only.”56 Hegel does indicate within this 
discussion that artistic creativity is “an enterprise which, so far as the form of knowing is 
concerned […] is the precise opposite” of philosophical reflection.57 This comment 
                                                
55 Ibid., 146; VüÄ: 194. 
 
56 Ibid., 280; VüÄ: 362. 
 
57 Ibid., 282; VüÄ: 365. 
 
 51 
implicitly reflects Hegel’s general stance on the relationship between art and nature. 
Though he does not directly state his reasons for asserting that artistic production cannot 
be treated scientifically, his understanding of nature is no doubt a significant factor. 
Given the link commonly made between nature and the workings of genius and the 
intimate link between art and nature in his own philosophy, Hegel’s view that nature is 
the Idea in disparity with its own self inevitably shapes how he develops his account of 
artistic activity. Since nature is the Idea external to itself, according to Hegel, the activity 
at work within artistic genius is outside the realm of philosophy due to its supposed 
dependence on the “nature” in the artist. Instead of appealing to nature, Hegel’s 
philosophy of art analyzes artistic production within the context of culture and the 
historical era in which an artist lived. His speculative philosophy shifts the emphasis 
away from individual artists creating artworks to stages in the development of spirit more 
broadly. His understanding of the individual within the context of his philosophy of spirit 
implies that the artist is moved by cultural-historical factors more so than what he would 
deem some elusive “nature” present within the subject as Kant suggests.  
Rather than looking to nature or a supersensible substrate beyond the artist’s ken 
like Kant does, Hegel’s discussion of genius emphasizes spirit as the source of artistic 
activity. He states that “the work of art springs from the spirit” and so “it has a subjective 
productivity as its cause.”58 Even though Hegel’s account differs from Kant’s with 
respect to the role of nature in creativity, their positions are similar in that they both 
understand the creation of art to involve a collaboration of the artist’s conscious, rational 
intellect and an aspect of the artist that transcends his or her individual subjectivity. For 
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Kant this aspect is nature in the form of the supersensible, whereas for Hegel it is the 
sensuous material of art. Though Hegel deemphasizes the role of nature in the artistic 
process due to the status he grants it within his system, the way he incorporates material 
in his discussion of the role of media in the creative process could be interpreted as a 
more concrete account of the role of nature in the genesis of artworks than Kant’s. 
Far from attributing works of artistic genius to the nature in the subject, Hegel’s 
own account of genius describes it as the “productive activity” of giving external form to 
the artist’s (rational) imagination.59 He rejects the notion that the artist is unaware of what 
he does during the creation of a piece and clarifies the limited extent to which natural or 
innate ability is necessary for genius.  
[T]he artist must fashion his work not in the exclusively spiritual form of 
thought but within the sphere of intuition and feeling and, more precisely, in 
connection with the sensuous material and in a sensuous medium. Therefore, 
this artistic creation, like art throughout, includes in itself the aspect of 
immediacy and naturalness, and this aspect it is which the subject cannot 
generate in himself but must find in himself as immediately given. This alone 
is the sense in which we may say that genius and talent must be inborn.60 
 
It is important to note that Hegel’s reference to material refers both literally to a material 
medium (such as paint, stone, or sound) and the content of an artwork’s meaning. So, for 
Hegel, to say that genius or talent is inborn means only that the artist is naturally inspired 
to create art by the immediately given sensuous content of the world and has a natural 
proclivity for shaping the material according to his or her inspiration. He writes, “the 
genuine artist has a natural impulse and immediate need to give form at once to 
everything that he feels and imagines. This process of formation is his way of feeling and 
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seeing, and he finds it in himself without labour as the instrument proper an suited to 
him.”61   
Hegel’s analysis of the artist is insightful in that he recognizes the role that the 
material, as both the medium and the content, has for the formation of artworks. Even 
though he highlights the dimension of the artist’s natural proclivities, he explains that 
artistic inspiration is reliant on material given externally. Inspiration cannot come simply 
from the artist’s subjectivity.  
From this point of view, the position the artist is in is that he enters, with a 
natural talent, a relation with an available given material; he finds himself 
solicited by an external incentive […] by an event to give form to this material 
and to express himself in general on that. Thus the occasion for the production 
may come entirely from without, and the one important requirement is just 
that the artist shall lay hold of an essential interest and make the subject matter 
become alive in itself.62   
 
It is significant that he claims that an artist’s impetus to create “may come entirely from 
without.” This implies that whatever an artist seeks to express arises not from his or her 
own subjectivity, but from the artist’s engagement with a particular subject matter or 
material. For Hegel, genius is precisely the ability to work with a medium to give 
external form to an aspect of truth that resonates in him or herself.  
Even though external incentive and material are required to inspire the artist, once 
the artist is in the process of making the piece  
nothing is to be held back in his subjective inner heart; everything must be 
completely unfolded and indeed in a way in which the universal soul and 
substance of the chosen subject-matter appears emphasized just as much as its 
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individual configuration appears completely polished in itself and permeated 
by that soul and substance in accord with the whole representation.63  
 
With this Hegel is describing how the artist must free him or herself in the act of creation 
such that the universality of what is to be presented through him or her may be achieved 
by following the demands of the piece in its unfolding. The artist must thus “forget his 
own personality” and “immerse himself […] entirely in his material, so that, as subject, 
he is only as it were the form for the formation of the theme which has taken hold of 
him.”64 Through this process the artist invests the material with his or her subjectivity 
thereby imbuing it with the ideal content of spirit. The finished product, if it is to be an 
exemplar of beauty will emanate spirit throughout its entirety, making it akin, as Hegel 
says, to a thousand-eyed Argus. 
Hegel’s description of the production of art highlights the ways in which external 
material becomes imbued with spiritual content, that is, the Idea and the radiance of soul. 
Through the process of his own creation the artist transforms material into a meaningful 
work of art that bears forth spirit. In other words the artist ensouls material by lending his 
or her rational imagination to something externally given. The artist works over what is 
given bringing the content to fruition. The artist’s talent lies in his or her ability to 
produce an external object that accords with the ideal content animating the work. 
Similarly to Kant, he claims that the possibility of artistic execution “must be there as a 
natural gift; otherwise a purely learnt proficiency never produces a living work of art.”65 
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Art’s connection to material is what ties it to nature, and that is part of what 
prohibits it from being dealt with “scientifically.” In the creative process the body works 
with a material medium inspired by a natural inclination to give form to what is felt. In 
Hegel, we can see again how the artist, as an embodied creator, is the site in which nature 
and art converge. Hegel’s emphasis on the materiality of art and his remarks on the body 
in comparison with works of art suggest ways in which the body implicitly enters into his 
account of creative acts. He writes, “while the medium of philosophy’s production is 
thought, art’s is actual external configurations. Therefore the artist must live and become 
at home in his medium.”66 Hegel does not mention the artist’s body here, but the body is 
clearly implicated in what he says. Rather than engaging in the internally reflective 
activity of pure thought, which is what Hegel understands philosophy to be, the artist 
lives in his or her medium. A medium, of course, is something sensuous, experienced 
through the body. To be at home in his or her medium, the artist must experience it as an 
extension of him or herself. Even though Hegel does not describe it in those terms, that is 
what is entailed in forgetting one’s personality and immersing oneself fully in the 
material being worked with. The artist, animated by the material at hand, creates a 
sensuous presentation of the Idea through his or her body’s engagement with a medium. 
The body, which is itself the unity of the concept and material, produces objects that 
exhibit the same kind of unity, though ones that have been perfected by the conscious 
workings of spirit. Works of art, for Hegel, are “born of spirit and born again,” but it 
takes an embodied love of a medium for an artist to give birth to art.        
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The relation between nature and spirit articulated by Hegel in his aesthetics and 
his placement of art below religion and philosophy within the progress of absolute spirit, 
in addition to the hierarchy he establishes within the arts themselves, demonstrates a 
pattern in his philosophy in which materiality is made antithetical and inferior to the 
spiritual—the hallmark of metaphysical thinking. In spite of this, Hegel provides valuable 
insights into what occurs during the creative process and the important role that media 
play in the production of art. By examining the relationship between art and nature in his 
aesthetics, I have shown that there are resources in Hegel’s philosophy to combat 
reductive views of nature and materiality. However, his philosophy alone does not 
provide a satisfactory account of the vital necessity of nature because the pattern of his 
dialectic reinstates the problematic metaphysical hierarchies that devalue the sensuous 
and the material underlying the reductive concept of nature. This hierarchy also 
reinforces the problematic polarization of art and nature, which conceives them as being 
mutually exclusive categories. Though Hegel’s philosophy of nature does offer some 
promising avenues to explore, it fails to provide an adequate foundation to radically 
overturn the devaluation of nature prevalent throughout modern thinking, since he deems 
materiality and sensuous presentations of the Idea to be inferior to what he describes as 
more spiritually realized knowledge. An adequate conception of nature must be able to 
account for the continuity of the spiritual and the material without reifying the distinction 
between them into an evaluative hierarchy. Dialectical thinking has the tools to 
deconstruct this hierarchy, though Hegel himself does not employ them to those ends. 
Schelling provides an account of nature and art that offers an alternative view that takes 
the framework of absolute idealism to its limits.  
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3. Schelling on Nature’s Strivings and Fulfillments in Art and Philosophy 
 
Schelling’s Naturphilosohie and early writings on art, including certain 
discussions within the System of Transcendental Idealism, both resonate with and 
challenge aspects of the aesthetics of Kant and Hegel. Schelling, like Hegel, privileges art 
over natural beauty. However, unlike Hegel, Schelling’s understanding of art is much 
more tied to nature insofar as nature itself is deemed poetic. Nature is a key element of 
the expressive power of artworks, thus Schelling is much closer to Kant on this point. As 
a result, Kant and Schelling’s theories of creative genius bear much in common. Along 
similar lines, Schelling shares Kant’s appeal to nature and aesthetics as the unifying 
element of his thought. However, as I shall explain, Schelling is critical of what he sees 
as the shortcomings of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel’s philosophies, and he offers a unique 
perspective on the relationship between art and nature that foreshadows the positions put 
forth by thinkers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Though he is an integral member 
of the German idealist tradition, as his thinking matures it reveals paradoxes about the 
status of nature within an idealist framework, paradoxes he was never able to resolve. 
For Schelling, philosophy and art can be understood as extensions of nature, and 
nature can be understood as a manifestation of the Absolute. It must be pointed out, 
however, that any characterization of Schelling’s philosophy as a whole is problematic 
because his thinking changes as it develops throughout his life. In addition to the shifting 
nature of Schelling’s thought, comprehension of his position on particular issues requires 
a significant degree of interpretation. Thus, rather than confining ourselves to the project 
of parsing the details of what Schelling may have thought at certain points throughout his 
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career, we may use his philosophy as a medium for thinking through the intersections of 
art, nature, and philosophy—the core issues around which his thought resolves. As Bruce 
Matthews argues, the development of Schelling’s philosophy enacts the kind of organic 
growth that Schelling sees in the development of self-consciousness throughout natural 
and cultural history. Thinking along with Schelling we find resources for understanding 
the continuity of art and nature and, ironically, the limits of the German idealist 
paradigm.    
The way Schelling conceives of the relationship between art and philosophy is 
tied to his conception of nature. Philosophy and art are complementary modes through 
which nature reconciles the tension within it that spurs its evolution forward. This means 
that philosophy and art can be understood as extensions of nature. In Schelling’s Organic 
Form of Philosophy, Matthews reads Schelling’s oeuvre as being organized around one 
fundamental idea, that is, philosophy, if it is to be truly positive and concrete, must itself 
take on an organic form. This means that, for Schelling, philosophical knowledge must be 
generated by life’s own natural impulses as he understands them. Drawing on Schelling’s 
claim that life is to be understood as the schema of freedom, Matthews asserts that 
Schelling’s “first predicate of philosophy must speak to the self-organizing nature that is 
our world.”67 Continuing, Matthews writes:  
The unifying power of organic form is precisely what Schelling means to 
express through the term Identity, whose relational structure is incapable of 
being reduced to the linear mechanics of logic, since it exhibits the same 
property of reciprocity indicative of the dynamic feedback that structures 
life’s capacity for self-organization.68 
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Art becomes a key feature of this self-organization because it is through art that the unity 
of freedom and necessity is realized. But what is so radical about Schelling is his 
insistence that philosophy go beyond theoretical knowing such that we actually realize 
our oneness with nature through our own creative acts. Matthews writes, “This is 
something that we will only be capable of doing, however, if we become open to the 
other of logos, with its obscure language of mythos, which speaks with the voice of 
nature as it ‘sensualizes truth.’”69 This is only possible when the telos of philosophy 
harnesses “the disclosive power of logos and mythos.”70 From this we can see the 
decisive role art and nature have to play for Schelling and their need to be coupled with 
philosophy if the highest aims of each of these are to be achieved.  
Schelling’s desire to articulate a philosophical system that transcends the limits of 
pure theory is evidenced early on in his break with Fichte. Though he was heavily 
influenced by Fichte, the impetus of Schelling’s own philosophy is an effort to rectify the 
shortcomings he found in the Fichtean project, namely Fichte’s failure to adequately 
account for the existence of the world external to the I. Critiquing Fichte, Schelling takes 
what seems to be a rather phenomenological position, arguing that, even though the I is 
always present for any experience and knowledge to occur, the I finds itself immersed in 
a world that exists without having been thought of or produced by it. Schelling thus 
argues for the necessity of a world prior to and external to consciousness. The I 
essentially marks consciousness’s coming-to-itself. It is a realization that arises from out 
of a previous lack of self-consciousness. Therefore, “this coming-to-itself which is stated 
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in the ‘I am’ presupposes a having-been-outside and having-been-away from itself. For 
only what has previously been outside itself can come to itself.”71 So, even though the I is 
ever-present for itself once it is realized, it can only be established by being grounded on 
something having been prior that it was not. Schelling asserts that philosophy’s task is to 
remember what the I has undergone in its pre-individual being and trace the history of its 
development to its highest achievements.72 With this we get a very general idea of what 
Schelling is after in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), which he admits is 
really an attempt to make the Fichtean system comprehensible.  
Schelling claims that neither transcendental philosophy nor the philosophy of 
nature is adequate by itself. Rather both are needed as aspects of a comprehensive 
system. This may be taken to be a reflection of the critique he made of Fichte’s neglect of 
the external world, and that the philosophy of nature is an addition that will make up for 
this neglect. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie marks his first attempt at elaborating his 
system independently of Fichte. The driving concept behind its development is the 
infinite subject. Schelling’s project is to give an account of the process this infinite 
subject goes through on its way toward the full realization of itself. This is not altogether 
unlike what he set out to do in the System of Transcendental Idealism, and bears much in 
common with Hegel’s philosophical approach, especially as it is formulated in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1806). Schelling’s method consists in showing the necessary 
relation/identity of the subject and object. The subject is infinitely self-positing, thereby 
making itself into objects, and the movement of this positing progresses and “exhausts 
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itself” as it achieves higher and higher levels of actualization.73 The philosophy of nature 
traces the development of the subject through the phases of this process, in which it takes 
on material form as different objects and life forms, that is, as the subject is taken up into 
higher “potencies” of subjectivity as a result of achieving higher levels of objectivity. 
Once the subject has become fully objective at a given stage, it breaks into a higher level 
of realization as A squared. Once this process exhausts itself and the subject has become 
fully objective again, then another breakthrough happens, raising the subject to another 
power, A cubed. Once the transition is finally made to A quadrupled, human being 
appears.74 At this point the infinite, free subject is realized, and there is something about 
this subject that cannot become objective. The various potencies—A squared, A cubed, 
and so forth—coincide with increasing intensifications of the subject’s full being. At the 
bottom, or beginning, is material being, and at the top, or end, is pure spirit.75 
This process of realizing an infinite subject in material characterizes Schelling’s 
general understanding of nature’s striving toward greater self-actualization and 
realization of the harmony between freedom and necessity. Eventually, this striving 
results in the creation of art in which the sought after harmony is ultimately realized. 
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However, in this harmony tension is nonetheless preserved. There is something about the 
free, infinite subject that cannot become objective, though Schelling maintains that art is 
a mode of the expression in which spirit is made increasingly manifest in material. 
Because there is something about the free subject that cannot be made objective, there is 
something enigmatic about the artwork that makes it more than a mere object. Spirit 
shines through it as if one could see the creator in it.76 At the highest realization of the 
subject, there is still a fundamental dissonance that remains between the infinite and the 
finite even when the harmony between freedom and necessity is achieved. The fullest 
manifestation of this dissonance in art is performed by tragic poetry. What culminates in 
tragedy is present throughout the entire movement of nature and is thus brought to a 
climax therein.  
Joseph Esposito in Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature explains that 
nature is fundamentally at odds with itself, and this internal tension within nature is the 
driving force of its becoming. According to Schelling, nature is both the product and the 
productive act that produces itself. However, there must be an ulterior force within it that 
slows it and requires it to strive against itself, preventing the process of its becoming 
from completing itself immediately.77 Quoting Schelling, Esposito explains that we must 
assume that “there is a ‘primordial sundering in Nature itself’.”78 This internal tension, or 
“primordial sundering,” is preserved in the enigmatic quality of artworks, that is, the 
                                                
76 Ibid., 128. 
 
77 Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature (London: Bucknell University Press, 
1977), 83, 84. 
 
78 Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature, 84. 
 
 63 
particular way artworks display the subjective objectively. This internal tension is 
enacted dramatically in tragedy.  
In his essay “Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, or Main Propositions 
of the Philosophy of Art According to Principles of Transcendental Idealism,” Schelling 
describes how the genesis of art is continuous with the dynamic strivings of nature 
articulated within his Naturphilosophie. The contradiction inherent within nature 
described above is shown to be the source of the artist’s creative drive. Like Kant, 
Schelling refers to the genius as the producer of art in which the nature in the human, in 
the form of an unconscious striving, combines with conscious intent to produce artworks. 
Schelling gives a detailed account of the creative process in which the contradiction in 
human being, namely, that of freedom and necessity, finds a sort of equilibrium or 
resolution in art (Greek tragedy being the principle art form Schelling has in mind). 
Schelling explains that artists are driven to create in order to “satisfy an irresistible 
impulse of their nature”, and this “impulse originates in a contradiction.”79 The artist is 
compelled to produce art by a felt inner contradiction, “a contradiction that seizes upon 
the ultimate in him, the root of his entire existence.”80 This contradiction is innate to the 
genius as a tension within his or her nature, that is, the nature in the genius. Since the 
contradiction is innate, the move toward art happens involuntarily, though the creation 
itself is a free activity. This simultaneously free and involuntary activity explains the 
conscious and unconscious aspects of the creative process. Schelling maintains that “it 
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can only be the contradiction between the conscious and the unconscious in free action 
that sets the artistic impulse into motion, just as, once more, it can only be given to art to 
satisfy our infinite striving as well as to resolve the ultimate and most extreme 
contradiction in us.”81 
As stated above, the artist’s impulse to create is the feeling of the contradiction 
between “the conscious and the unconscious in free action,” and when this contradiction 
is resolved, there is a feeling of harmony. This feeling may be interpreted to be an 
observation on how an artist knows a piece is complete.82 The artist feels the satisfaction 
of the resolved contradiction, and through this feeling the artist knows the piece is 
finished. Though “Every aesthetic production starts from the feeling of an infinite 
contradiction,” the production of the piece comes to a close when an “unconscious 
infinity” has been achieved which is the “synthesis of freedom and nature.”83  
Schelling’s account of how genius works is very close to Kant’s in that it is not 
something that can be taught. Rather, it “can only be inborn by the free gift of nature.”84 
For Schelling, the concept of genius is necessary to explain the artist’s ability to perform 
the logically impossible—that is, the reconciliation of contradiction. There is an element 
of the uncontrolled in art, something at odds with freedom. This “obscure unknown 
power” is what “adds the element of perfection, completion, or objectivity to the 
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fragmentary work of freedom.”85 But it is only in conjunction with free acts that this 
power “realizes non-intended ends.” This element adds a certain tension to the creative 
process such that what is united in production “eternally flees from itself,” and this is 
what is signified by the concept of genius.86  
The impulses of nature at work in the operations of genius that take place on an 
unconscious level are experienced as an “outside power” that guides artistic creation. 
Thus, the creative process involves an embodiment of the unconscious strivings taking 
place within nature described above. Hammermeister provides a lucid explication of this 
process that is worth quoting at length. 
While nature in its production begins unconsciously and ends in 
consciousness, namely, that of man, the artistic activity reverses this process 
by beginning consciously and continuing without consciousness. While the 
artist certainly decides to create a specific work and to make plans for it, the 
execution demands that an additional force beyond the control of the artist 
enter into the work. It is precisely the definition of genius—and all artistic 
production depends on genius—that the unconscious element joins the 
conscious effort. The true artist, after he has begun his work, is then visited by 
an outside power that adds the objective moment to the product, that is, that 
which transcends the merely personal and consciously drafted.87 
 
We might compare Schelling’s account of the creative process to Hegel’s description of 
artistic production in which the artist becomes completely immersed in the work during 
its creation. Schelling’s account is much different from Hegel’s, however, since for Hegel 
there are no elements of the unconscious or an “outside power” involved. For Schelling, 
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the unconscious in the subject corresponds to nature and so his account is much closer to 
Kant’s. As Hammermeister explains: 
[E]very work of art conjoins two elements: one that Schelling calls “art” 
[Kunst] and that signifies art in the sense of […] skill, practice and imitation 
of an established tradition […]; the other that Schelling labels “poetry” and 
that refers to the unconscious moment that enters the work of art not as a 
result of the effort of the artist but, instead, as the reflex of “grace” (System 
459).88  
 
Schelling’s appeals to an outside power and grace at work in the genius have religious 
overtones that suggest a transcendent force is responsible in part for artistic inspiration. 
Moreover, deeming nature itself poetic recalls the crossing of art and nature discussed 
with regard to Kant. Dale Snow discusses Edward G. Ballard’s89 claim that both Kant and 
Schelling understand nature as analogous to an artist. Quoting Ballard, Snow writes: 
Kant’s effort to understand how human values are attainable and possible in a 
determined physical universe therefore leads him “to hold that the doctrines in 
philosophy derived from both the mechanistic analogy and the artistic analogy 
are coherent and possible within the same intellectual framework.” One way 
to understand Schelling’s complex relation to Kant is to see him as having 
taken what Ballard calls the “artistic analogy” more seriously.90  
 
For Schelling, art is an extension and intensification of the becoming of an infinite 
subject because nature, which is this subject’s primordial manifestation, is itself 
originally poetic. Building on Kant’s much weaker notion that our minds cannot help but 
conceive of nature as if it had been created purposefully, according to Snow, “Schelling 
is willing to see nature itself as somehow rational and orderly and possessed, in Walter 
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Schulz’s words of analoga to spirit.”91 When, for Schelling, the nature in the genius 
becomes expressive through the collaboration of skill and grace, the Absolute becomes 
concretely manifested in works of art.   
The realization of non-intended ends through the collaboration of unconscious 
strivings and deliberate effort is also what prevents the meaning of an artwork from being 
fully articulated even though art achieves a higher realization of the Absolute. The 
inexhaustibility of an artwork’s meaning, however, is not a shortcoming of art as it would 
be for Hegel. For Schelling art is able to manifest the Absolute precisely because its 
meaning cannot be exhausted; and the inexhaustibility of the meaning of art is due, again, 
to its ability to incorporate the subject’s unconscious history and the active drives 
animating nature. As Andrew Bowie explains, “The work of art’s basic character is an 
‘unconscious infinity’ […] because the meaning of the work cannot be exhausted, even 
though it is manifested in an object, and does not depend on the conscious intent of the 
artist.”92 As part of the coming to consciousness of the I, art is a product through which 
the I comes to understand itself more fully. Bowie points out that the unconscious history 
that makes consciousness possible “must also be integrated into the articulation of the 
Absolute.”93 However, this history “can only be known via its result, not as itself.”94 
Continuing, Bowie writes, “What is being sought is a way of understanding the identity 
of the subjective and objective, conscious and unconscious, spirit and nature, which must 
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not be conceived as theoretical knowledge.” In other words, expression of the Absolute 
must not be confined to scientific understanding; it cannot be purely theoretical because 
the ideal is incomplete if it is not accompanied by the real. According to Schelling and 
“the early Romantics, with whom Schelling was in close contact in Jena,” art is one of the 
primary ways in which this understanding might be achieved.95 Art is capable of gasping 
what theoretical knowledge cannot because it is able to incorporate the unconscious 
history of consciousness into tangible, sensuous products. Schelling adopts Kant’s 
account of artistic expression in which “the genius crosses the Kantian divide between 
the subject and nature in itself by being ‘the talent (gift of nature), which gives the rule to 
art.”96 As a result of the special relationship between mind and nature in the work of 
genius, art is able to manifest the Absolute.  
The resolution of the conflict between the conscious and unconscious, and 
freedom and necessity in the work of art reveals the superior standing Schelling grants to 
art. At the end of the “Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy” he turns to the 
relationship between art and philosophy, claiming that “art is the sole true and eternal 
organon as well as the document of philosophy.”97 It is in art, not philosophy, that the 
Absolute is realized. In art, the unconscious history of nature is actually presented, 
whereas in philosophy, it is merely described. That is why Schelling claims that 
philosophy, once it is completed, will led back to the “universal ocean of poetry from 
which it started out.”98   
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Schelling’s position on the relationship between art and philosophy, however, 
shifts in his later work. Hammermeister claims that “[A]rt loses its privileged status in 
Schelling’s thought shortly after the completion of the System, although for some time it 
remains on par with the philosophical concept or comes in behind it as a very close 
second—a position that resembles closely that of Hegel.”99 In the introduction to the 
Philosophy of Art (1859), Schelling maintains that art and philosophy are both absolutely 
necessary and require each other to be most fully themselves. Philosophy and art 
correspond to the ideal and real respectively, but the ideal is incomplete without the real 
and vice versa. It is true that art manifests the absolute concretely, but it takes the 
philosophy of art for that reality to be comprehended. “Insofar as the ideal is always a 
higher reflex of the real, the philosopher necessarily possesses an even higher ideal reflex 
of that which in the artist is real.”100 Though this suggests a hierarchy of philosophy over 
art, one need not interpret it that way since both perform vital movements that cannot 
occur separately. Speaking of the artist, Schelling writes, “The subjective element within 
him passes over again to the objective element, just as in the philosopher the objective 
element is constantly taken up into the subjective one.”101 In the foreword to his 
translation of the Philosophy of Art David Simpson notes that, “While Reason is the ‘full 
expression of absolute identity as such’ (28), only art can express or represent the 
synthesis (Indifferenz) of knowledge and action, of that which is known in thought with 
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that which can take on form in the world.”102 In some ways, then, philosophy and art 
complete each other by performing complementary modes of real and ideal realization.  
Since art and philosophy are both equally necessary, the Absolute cannot be 
expressed entirely rationally within philosophy. We have seen how nature exhibits a 
developmental process in which it becomes an increasingly complex and concrete 
manifestation of the harmony between freedom and necessity. This process is also 
reflected in the progress of history, and it is on this point that we can make a clear 
distinction between Schelling and Hegel’s conceptions of the Absolute. Dale Snow 
explains that “Hegel’s entire philosophical endeavor takes place within the framework of 
the advance of reason towards complete rationality.” For Schelling, Snow explains, this is 
not the case. 
Schelling presents freedom as a drama uniting freedom and necessity, 
subjective and objective elements, in a way in which and must remain less 
than transparent, even to the author of the drama. Thus even history is in a 
sense a work of art, for in order for freedom to be possible, it must contain 
more than its author could ever have consciously intended.103 
 
As explained above, the creative process involves the collaboration of the conscious and 
unconscious dimensions of the person. Therefore, artworks are able to exhibit the 
unconscious history of the subject in what is created. However, this exhibition is not one 
that can be fully grasped in theoretical knowledge, and so art is not transparent in the way 
philosophy purports to be. When considering the development of history, preserving an 
element of opacity is required for the preservation of freedom. Snow writes, “in order for 
                                                
102 Douglass W. Scott, introduction to The Philosophy of Art, by F. W. J. Schelling (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), xii. 
 
103 Snow, Schelling at the End of Idealism, 122. 
 
 71 
freedom to be preserved, its ultimate ground can never be totally revealed.”104 Because 
nature is not overcome but remains active in works of art, their meaning can never be 
fully delineated. Though art is saturated with meaning, as sensuous the meaning remains 
dense and evades the complete clarity of reason.       
  Schelling’s acknowledgement of the limits of rational knowledge and the need for 
art to complement philosophy have led some to suggest that he had become disillusioned 
with idealism by the end of his career. Snow maintains that Schelling finds an alternative 
to idealism in the formulation of his “positive philosophy.” Schelling “had conclusively 
demonstrated, at least to himself, that it was impossible to return to a pre-idealistic 
metaphysics as it was to remain within the worldview of idealism; the need and desire to 
go beyond idealism gave rise to what he later came to call the positive philosophy.”105 
Bowie describes positive philosophy as a project seeking to go beyond negative 
philosophy, which “explicates the forms of pure thought that determine what things are, 
to a conception which comes to terms both with the fact that things are and with the real 
historical emergence and movement of consciousness.”106 This entails being able to 
account for the evolution of being itself through its emergence in history. In other words, 
Schelling was ultimately seeking a philosophy that went beyond mere description in 
which being is reified. He was seeking a dynamic, living embodiment of truth. Thus, as 
mentioned above, Matthews claims that Schelling’s philosophy is organized around the 
fundamental idea that philosophy itself must take on an organic form.  
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It is unclear, however, that an “organic” philosophy that recognizes the limits of 
reason is completely at odds with idealist metaphysics. While it may be true, as Snow and 
others have argued, that Schelling’s late thought exhibits a desire to go beyond the 
German idealist paradigm, his thought as a whole remains caught up in a conception of 
life founded upon some Absolute, whether it be with regard to theology or the philosophy 
of nature. Despite his focus on the evolving, self-organizing character of nature, art, and 
philosophy, his thinking consistently appeals to an infinite, transcendent subject at the 
core of reality. And yet, Schelling’s deep recognition of the need to account for the 
reality of nature already problematizes how his thinking might be metaphysically 
characterized. The inner dynamic of nature described by Schelling in this 
Naturphilosophie, in which the infinite gradually makes itself increasingly objective, 
suggests that his idealism is perhaps better understood as a “real-idealism” since “in it 
idealism itself had a realism as its basis.”107 This is important to keep in mind when 
thinking about his philosophy of nature generally, since his emphasis on the realist basis 
of his idealism is what distinguishes his system from that of Fichte and marks a decisive 
return to nature.108 The realist basis of Schelling’s idealism highlights the extent to which 
nature must be objectively real despite its being a product of an infinite subject. However, 
what it means for nature to be “objective” in this context is a matter of some debate. 
Robert J. Richards in The Romantic Conception of Life (2002) notes that Bowie interprets 
Schelling as being opposed to any objective realist conception of nature. Richards quotes 
Bowie as saying that Schelling does not see “‘scientific investigation in terms of a 
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representation of the objective truth about nature. […] A world of pure objectivity is and 
will remain inconceivable for Schelling (pp. 39-40)’.” Richards disagrees with Bowie, 
arguing that “On the contrary, for Schelling, the world of nature is completely 
objective—it is, after all, an object and product of mind.” The disagreement between 
Richards and Bowie hinges upon the various connotations of the word “objectivity.” As a 
product of mind, it is counterintuitive to refer to nature as objective. However, insofar as 
Schelling’s view affirms the material actuality of nature (and, thus, can be considered a 
type of realism), it is appropriate to talk about nature’s objectivity, albeit in a very 
particular sense that runs contrary to the usual connotations of the word. Bowie claims 
that “any realist conception of the approach to the absolute truth about nature” is doomed 
to fail “due to our inextricable role as part of what is to be investigated.”109 This claim is 
true insofar as we will never have complete scientific knowledge of nature according to 
Schelling. As explained, his conception of the Absolute does not entail the same degree 
of transparency as does Hegel’s. This claim is somewhat distorting, however, since it 
downplays the facticity of nature independent from our understanding of it. From a 
metaphysical standpoint, it is true that nature and mind are inherently linked for 
Schellling—indeed, nature may be considered a product of an absolute mind within his 
Naturphilosophie. However, this does not nullify the fact there is an objectively real 
natural world that we can have either correct or incorrect ideas about. Similarly to the 
debates about Hegel’s idealism pointed out above, Schelling’s position requires that we 
acknowledge the material reality of nature even though it is understood as a manifestation 
of an infinite subject.  
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 This debate is important because it bears directly on how “the Absolute” should be 
understood within Schelling’s philosophy. In The Invisible Remainder: An Essay on 
Schelling and Related Matters (1996), Žižek presents an argument that challenges the 
notion that nature is an emanation of an absolute subject according to Schelling. He 
claims that since in the development of nature consciousness apprehends itself as having 
an evolutionary past that it is not aware of, this suggests that “Spirit itself is originally not 
‘within itself’ but ‘outside itself’.” 110 Consequently, “the true question is not how we can 
progress from the mere notion of God to God’s actual existence, but the exact 
opposite.”111 In other words, we cannot begin with the notion of a preexisting Absolute 
and then go on to explain how the world is a manifestation of it. Rather, “what comes 
first, what is always-already here, is the experience of a ‘senseless,’ pre-predicative, pre-
semantic existence, and the true problem for philosophy is how we can accomplish the 
passage from this senseless existence to Reason.”112 Žižek explains that this inversion in 
which “Reason is originally ‘ecstatic,’ outside itself,” marks the point “where Schelling 
parts with philosophical Idealism which is not ready to admit the dependence of logos on 
its Ground.”113 Žižek goes on to show what is really at stake in the relation between 
idealism and an understanding of nature in which material, not an absolute subject, is the 
true ground. 
Idealism is fully justified in its claim that one cannot reduce Culture, the 
domain of spiritual Meanings, to a simple prolongation of nature – to a more 
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differentiated, ‘intelligent’, means of biological survival: Spirit is an End-in-
itself for whom its physical and biological environs serve as its Ground. The 
paradox one must sustain, however, is that the universe of ‘spiritual’ products 
is none the less rooted in its ground. The present threat of a global ecological 
catastrophe provides the ultimate proof: the universe of human culture hinges 
on the unstable balance of our ecosphere.114 
 
Schelling is aware of the paradox that nature presents. Understanding how Spirit, the 
infinite, is emergent from the finite, the material, is impossible without acknowledging 
that an Absolute already exists subtending the ground of finitude. And yet, the existence 
of Spirit is utterly dependent on a material environment. Put another way, Schelling’s 
desire to account for the full implications of the depths of the inseparability of freedom 
and necessity, the spiritual and the material, the subjective and objective, leads him to the 
limitations of philosophical idealism for grasping the reality of nature and the meaning of 
art. As Heidegger explains, “Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this 
whole age of German philosophy. He is that to such an extent that he drives German 
Idealism from within right past its own fundamental position.”115      
 In this discussion I have shown how Schelling’s conceptions of art and philosophy 
are tied to his conception of nature. Nature, as a dynamic process of development in 
which consciousness comes to grasp itself more and more fully, leads to the generation of 
art and philosophical discourse. His account of genius describes the ways in which nature 
becomes active in the creative process allowing the artist to express more than he or she 
consciously could intend. Coupled with the theoretical knowledge articulated by 
philosophy, art achieves the ultimate telos of nature in which the Absolute is embodied. 
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What is significant about Schelling is his demand that we think nature more fully, 
recognizing our indebtedness to it in our highest pursuits. In attempting to think nature 
within the framework of idealism, however, the paradoxes of the metaphysical distinction 
between spirit and material are brought to a head. Despite the positive contributions 
Schelling’s philosophy makes to rethinking the relationship between art and nature, his 
position is couched within a limiting metaphysical framework. Though Schelling himself 
became aware of these limitations, his thinking never quite broke free of them. The 
development of his thought points the way beyond metaphysical thinking, but it will take 
future thinkers, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—who were very much influenced 
by Schelling—to take us there.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE DRAWING OF THE WORLD AND EARTH IN  
HEIDEGGER AND MERLEAU-PONTY 
 
Kant and the German idealists developed paradigms of aesthetics that articulate 
the place of art in relation to knowledge and the material being of the natural world. The 
metaphysical and epistemological frameworks shaping the aesthetics of Kant, Hegel, and 
Schelling are the culminations of the development of modern thinking in which the idea 
of the self-conscious subject’s distinction from the material world arose and became 
reified. According to Heidegger, the very concept of aesthetics is founded upon the 
metaphysical distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, which is, itself, 
dependent upon the view that subjectivity—the domain of conceptual thought—is 
fundamentally distinct from nature—the realm of sensuous materiality. In “The Age of 
the World Picture,” he explains that one of the five “essential phenomena of the modern 
age is the event of art’s moving into the purview of aesthetics.” From the standpoint of 
aesthetics “the art work becomes the object of mere subjective experience,” and 
“consequently art is considered to be an expression of human life.”1 As founders of the 
discipline of aesthetics, the accounts of art provided by Kant, Hegel, and Schelling and 
the conceptions of genius that accompany them reinforce the distinction between the 
sensible and the intelligible, and the subject and the material world, even though, in the 
cases of Hegel and Schelling, they are attempting to overcome these distinctions. 
Heidegger’s approach to the question of art purposefully avoids discussing what 
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individual artists contribute to the formation of artworks in order to give a more 
fundamental account of the “happening” of art in relation to the revelation of truth. 
In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger puts forth his revolutionary thesis 
that the work of art opens up a world. The work of art actively performs the clearing and 
concealing of beings “as the becoming and happening of truth.” In addition to a detailed 
inquiry into the nature of art, “The Origin of the Work of Art” brings together a number 
of key themes in Heidegger’s later work in relation to his ontology. Artworks cannot be 
discussed without also addressing the nature of truth, language, and the disclosure of 
being in general because they are the fundamental ways in which being is disclosed. 
Heidegger tells us in the addendum to the essay that this entire work “deliberately yet 
tacitly moves on the path of the question of the nature of Being,” and our inquiry into the 
nature of art may be “completely and decidedly determined only in regard to the question 
of Being.”2 Heidegger’s theory of art is, therefore, an integral part of his ontology.  
Within the context of this essay, the clearing and concealing of beings that opens 
up a world is described in terms of the active striving of drawing the rift between world 
and earth. The “rift” or “rift-design” (Riss) is a key notion that links together language, 
art, and truth with regard to the question of being. The rift, which Heidegger likens to a 
line drawing or sketch, describes the structure of the emergence of form and meaning, the 
tangible means through which being is disclosed in the strife of world and earth set in 
motion in the work of art. The concept of the rift is a vital touchstone that allows 
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Heidegger to articulate the origin of the work of art and the speaking of language without 
relying on the subjectivity of the artist.  
As part of his ontology, Heidegger’s philosophy of art attempts to articulate how 
art opens up a world. But since artworks are the creations of individual artists—a fact that 
Heidegger never denies—this may prompt one to ask, as Karsten Harries does, “how then 
is the artist’s establishment of a world in the work of art to be thought? What here is his 
or her contribution? Is the artist, too, not always bound to and by his world? What world 
then does he or she create?”3 This way of putting the question is problematic because it 
implies that artists actually create worlds when they create art. Julian Young explains that 
this way of interpreting “The Origin of the Work of Art” has led some to suggest that 
granting artists the power to create worlds is “a thinly guised plea for the overcoming of 
European nihilism through the coming into being of a brave new world to be established 
by the Hitler-created artwork.”4 In Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art, Young calls this 
interpretation the “Promethean” view and maintains that it misconstrues Heidegger’s 
position. He argues that the Promethean view forgets that for Heidegger “‘world’ is the 
same as ‘thownness’ which every human being (Dasein) […] finds itself already in.”5 
The artwork’s ‘opening up’ of world is, then, not Promethean creation but rather 
‘thematizing’, ‘making expressly visible’.”6 Moreover, the Promethean interpretation 
assumes the very standpoint that Heidegger wishes to move past, that is, the view 
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pervading modern thinking in which the work of art is taken to be an expression of a 
subject. Heidegger writes, “Modern subjectivism, to be sure, immediately misinterprets 
creation, taking it as a self-sovereign subject’s performance of genius.”7 The view that art 
is an expression of a “self-sovereign” subject exhibits the kind of thinking that assumes 
that a subject is ultimately separable from its world. For Heidegger, the artist is not the 
origin of the work. Rather, the works themselves perform the opening up of worlds. Even 
though the artist is needed to make the artwork happen, the artist does not create the 
world he or she inhabits. Given Heidegger’s rejection of the artist as “the origin” of the 
work of art, the Promethean reading loses its force. 
Though Young’s rebuttal is cogent and consistent with Heidegger’s view, the 
artist’s relation to the world opened up by the work he or she creates remains unclear in 
Heidegger’s work. Gregory Bruce Smith, summarizing a position similar to Young’s, 
acknowledges the ambiguity of Heidegger’s position with respect to artists’ relationships 
to their work. Smith remarks that, for Heidegger, “Great art is not a conscious act, it is 
‘granted’ to the artist by an act of grace that emanates from a mysterious source.”8 This 
view appears to have something in common with the conceptions of genius articulated by 
Kant and Schelling. However, in Heidegger’s case the mysterious source is not nature or 
an absolute subject, but the essence of art, which for Heidegger equates to originary 
language, that is, poetry, according to his particular understanding of it. 
Although, for Heidegger, artists themselves do not perform the world-opening 
activity he attributes to the work of art, he does acknowledge the role of artists’ creative 
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processes in the performance of the work, or the active striving, of art. The creation of 
artworks may be understood both literally and figuratively as the drawing of the rift-
design. In other words, the creation of works of art is the “drawing” of the world from 
earth. Referring to Albrecht Dürer’s famous remark that the artist “wrests” from nature 
the art that lies hidden within it, Heidegger states, “‘Wrest’ here means to draw out the 
rift and to draw the design with the drawing-pen on the drawing-board.”9 The meaning of 
the act of drawing as it is employed here may be understood in two senses. One is to 
draw something out of its source like water from a well. The other is the artistic activity 
of making a line drawing with pen or pencil. These two meanings work together to 
describe how the work of art performs the clearing and concealing of beings, that is, the 
happening of truth. Through the artistic act of drawing—through the creation of the work 
of art—the world is drawn out, that is, opened up and set forth. 
Heidegger, himself, does not make clear exactly how the “drawing” of the rift 
performs the opening up of world. Although he admits that artists are needed to perform 
this drawing, his imperative to avoid reinstating a subjectivist, aesthetic account of art 
prevents him from explaining how the drawing of the rift actually takes place in the 
artist’s creative process. In the following section I will provide an interpretation of what 
drawing the rift means in relation to the act of artistic creation by examining Heidegger’s 
concept of Riss in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and his essays on language. Then, I 
will turn to Merleau-Ponty, who frequently looked to artists for philosophical inspiration, 
as well as the writings of Paul Klee and the influential choreographer and dance theorist, 
Rudolf Laban, in order to illustrate more clearly how Heidegger’s concept of drawing the 
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rift-design may be understood. By reading Heidegger alongside Merleau-Ponty and the 
writings of artists, I propose a non-subjectivist account of artistic creation that 
demonstrates how artistic activity belongs to the world and things just as much as it does 
to individual artists. Artworks are generated in response to the dynamic, living character 
of being, a dynamic that artists are attuned to and take part in. 
 
1. The Drawing of the Rift in Heidegger 
 
The concept of the Riss introduced in “The Origin of the Work of Art” appears at 
critical points in other important essays of Heidegger’s later period such as “Language” 
(1950) and “The Way to Language” (1959). In “The Way to Language” Heidegger 
emphasizes the dimension of language that speaks by showing.10 The rift-design is the 
structure of what language reveals, that is, shows, in its speaking. Heidegger’s likening of 
the rift to a kind a line-drawing or sketch evokes the visual connotations of what it means 
“to show.” He writes, “The rift-design is the totality of traits in the kind of drawing that 
permeates what is opened up and set free in language. The rift-design is the drawing of 
the essence of language, the well-joined structure of a showing.”11 In “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” Riss is introduced to characterize the strife between earth and world in an 
artwork, which is also linked to the speaking of language. In this essay, what it means for 
language to show in the act of saying becomes clear in the last section, “Art and Truth.” 
Inquiring into the nature of art has led Heidegger to proclaim that poetry is the essence of 
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art, and art is the “becoming and happening of truth.” In this context the saying of 
language takes on a more concrete significance by being linked to the work performed by 
art, that is, the striving of world and earth. Heidegger writes, “Projective saying is poetry: 
the saying of the world and earth.”12 In the drawing of the rift-design, the earth and world 
are said, that is, shown or brought forth into the open. This saying is projective because it 
is the drawing out of world from earth. The projective saying of world and earth is the 
speech of language itself as an act of showing. It is in the drawing of the rift-design that 
world and earth are set-into-work, and their strife actively brings about the clearing and 
concealing of beings. 
There are multiple senses of Riss implied in Heidegger’s application of the term 
that reveal more of the ontological implications behind the relation of speaking and 
showing.  William S. Allen explains that Riss literally means “ ‘rift,’ ‘tear,’ or ‘crack,’ 
but is also found in the terms sketch (Aufriss), outline (Umriss), and design (Grundriss). 
Together these valences of meaning emphasize the fact that in separating the world from 
the earth we draw out its configuration, and in sketching this out we set apart its ground. 
The sketch and the tear are two sides of the same line.”13 Allen argues that the translation 
of Riss as rift fails to carry the meaning that Heidegger intends for it in his later writings. 
Instead, he prefers “draw-ing” as a more adequate translation because it connotes the 
sense of drawing something out of its source (as in drawing blood, for example) as well 
as the sense of drawing a sketch or outline. 
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In the essay “Language” Heidegger speaks of the rift as the “rending that divides 
and gathers.”14 The rift draws the “dif-ference.” Here he also likens it to a pen drawing or 
sketch. Within this essay the rift is introduced through Heidegger’s reading of Georg 
Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening,” with particular reference to the line “Pain has turned 
the threshold to stone.” Understanding this line requires understanding the role of the rift 
as a kind of sketch. With regard to pain in reference to this line from the poem he writes, 
“Its rending, as a separation that gathers, is at the same time that drawing which, like the 
pen-drawing of a plan or sketch, draws and joins together what is held apart in 
separation.”15 An outline of a figure creates a border between the figure and its ground. 
The line is the border where the figure and its ground meet; therefore, the line is both 
what separates and joins the figure with its ground. The rift of the dif-ference brings 
beings into the open the same way line creates positive and negative space, allowing the 
figure to stand out against its background. Heidegger tells us, “The rift of the dif-ference 
makes the limpid brightness shine. […] The rift of the dif-ference expropriates the world 
into its worlding, which grants things.”16 Lines draw the Gestalt of figures, making them 
visible, just as the pain of the rift lets things shine forth into the open.  
Discussing what the pain of the rift means within the context of Heidegger’s essay 
“Language,” Leonard Lawlor explains that the pain “being experienced is not a feeling 
relative to a human being or a body of a human being; it is not a subjective state of mind. 
What is being experienced is the fundamental ‘rift’ or ‘tear’ (Riss) in being itself, that is, 
                                                
14 Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Alfred Hofstader (New York: 
Perennial Classics, 2001), 202. 
 
15 Heidegger, “Language,” 202. 
 
16 Ibid., 203 (emphasis added).  
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it is the experience of the difference that joins in disjointure.”17 This important 
observation helps to elucidate how the drawing of the rift may be understood as an 
ontological event within the context of the “The Origin of the Work of Art.” The drawing 
of the rift-design as described in “Language” parallels the drawing of the rift between 
earth and world in “The Origin of the Work of Art” whereby figures are outlined and set 
forth. Also, the pain that characterizes the rift in “Language” implies the same 
connotations as does the strife in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Strife is the primal 
conflict of world and earth in which world is opened up and earth juts out. This conflict 
performs the clearing and concealing that sets truth to work in the work of art. “Truth 
establishes itself as a strife within a being that is to be brought forth only in such a way 
that the conflict opens up in this being, that is, this being is itself brought into the rift-
design. The rift-design is the drawing together, into a unity, of sketch and basic design, 
breach and outline.”18 The establishment of a figure occurs as the strife between earth and 
world because it involves clearing and concealing simultaneously. Moreover, clearing 
cannot occur without concealing, and vice versa. Strife connotes the manner through 
which this dual movement of drawing the rift occurs. As Lawlor points out, however, the 
connotations of pain and strife in the drawing of the rift do not belong to individual 
subjects; they belong to the ontological disclosure of truth.   
Joseph J. Kockelmans in Heidegger on Art and Artworks also connects Riss as it 
is used in “Language” to how it is used in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” He explains 
that the fissure that draws the world and earth “into the source of their unity” and “draws 
                                                
17 Leonard Lawlor, Early Twentieth Century Modern Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2012), 137.     
 
18 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 61; UK: 71. 
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up the basic features for the clearing and concealing of beings” anticipates what 
Heidegger will later “unfold as the ontological difference which in the domain of 
language comes-to-presence as the dif-ference (diaphora, Unter-Schied) between world 
and thing.”19 The visual and tangible shaping of the conflict of world and earth carried 
out in the drawing of the rift-design creates Gestalt, or the unique character and forms of 
things.  
The strife that is brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth and thus 
fixed in place is figure, shape, Gestalt. Createdness of the work means: truth’s 
being fixed in place in the figure. Figure is the structure in whose shape the 
rift composes and submits itself. This composed rift is the fitting and joining 
of the shining of truth.20  
 
In the figure the strife of world and earth finds repose, but in repose the strife is not 
quieted. Rather, “repose occurs in the concentrated agitation of this conflict.”21 Similarly 
to the peal of stillness in language’s primal calling from out of silence, the strife of world 
and earth in the figure carries this same intensity. The concentrated agitation of the figure 
in repose echoes the line from Trakl’s poem “Pain has turned the threshold to stone.” The 
rift of the dif-ference that draws the outline of figures carries out the same activity of 
fixing the figure in place in the work of art. Turning to stone and fixing in place are the 
activities of the rift-design spoken of by Heidegger in these different contexts as pain and 
strife.  
                                                
19 Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Artworks (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 
175. 
 
20 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 61-62; UK: 71. 
 
21 Ibid., 56; UK: 63. 
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Whenever a figure is composed by the rift-design it is also placed within a frame. 
“What is here called figure, Gestalt is always to be thought in terms of the particular 
placing (Stellen) and framing or framework (Ge-stell) as which the work occurs when it 
sets itself up and sets itself forth.”22 When a figure is fixed into place it is also put into 
place. As we have said, a figure can only appear against a background, and so the fixing 
in place of a figure needs a frame like a kind of horizon that gives it a setting. A setting as 
a kind of frame always has an historical significance for Heidegger. Again, since the 
work of art is to set up a world, the setting in place of a figure and the framing that it 
involves can be understood as a kind of world formation. The world one inhabits is a 
configuration of meanings in a given time. It is what we take for granted as already laid 
before us, determining what is sensible and meaningful within a community. Young tells 
us that “‘world’ is the background, and usually unnoticed understanding which 
determines for the members of an historical culture what, for them, fundamentally, there 
is. It constitutes, as it were, the entry conditions, the ground plan, the ‘being of beings,’ 
which something must satisfy in order to show up as a being in the world in question.”23 
A world must itself be grounded, and so it must be set back into the earth. Thus, the 
setting up of a world involves strife with the earth in which being is simultaneously 
cleared and concealed. 
As stated, the setting up of a world through the establishment of a figure can 
involves a kind of framing, Ge-stell. In the addendum to “The Origin of the Work of 
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Art,” Heidegger connects his notions of Riss and Ge-stell with the unfolding of history 
and the “destiny of Being.” 
In accordance with what has so far been explained, the meaning of the noun 
‘Ge-stell,’ frame, framing, framework […] is thus defined: the gathering of 
the bringing forth, of the letting-come-forth-here into the rift-design as 
bounding outline (peras). […] Now the word ‘Ge-stell,’ frame, which we used 
in later writings as the explicit key expression for the nature of modern 
technology, was indeed used in that sense of frame. […] That context is 
essential, because [it is] related to the destiny of Being.24  
 
Our modern world is characterized by an intensification of “enframing” that has hardened 
the separation between ourselves and the worlds we inhabit. The “enframing” of world in 
the modern worldview is taken up explicitly by Heidegger in “The Question Concerning 
Technology” (1955) and “The Age of the World Picture” (1938) to discuss the 
framework of metaphysics and the emergence of the human being as subject that stands 
over against the world.25 For Heidegger, the framework of metaphysics and the 
emergence of the human being as subject go hand-in-hand and may be traced back to the 
philosophy of Descartes who, Heidegger believes, marks the beginning of the modern 
era.26 The enframing of the modern age results in “art’s moving into the purview of 
                                                
24 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 83; UK: 97-8.    
 
25 In “The Question Concerning Technology” and “The Age of the World Picture” Heidegger makes some 
important remarks about nature and art that warrant discussion. In “The Question Concerning 
Technology” Heidegger tells us that physis is a kind of poiesis, or “bringing-forth,” like that performed 
by the artist. Technology, too is a kind of revealing like that which is happening in nature and art. 
However, the revealing performed by modern technology is not poeisis. Rather, “the revealing that rules 
in modern technology is a challenging [Herausforden], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand 
that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” Heidegger’s discussion of technology and 
the valuation of nature as “standing-reserve” in this essay has inspired much of the work done in 
environmental philosophy in relation to his work, especially deep ecology, and is closely linked with his 
critique metaphysics and calculative thinking. 
 
26 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 127.  
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aesthetics” whereby art “becomes the object of mere subjective experience” and “is 
considered to be an expression of human life.”27 As explained above, this reasoning 
makes clear why Heidegger deemphasizes the role of the artist in “The Origin of the 
Work of Art.” Rather than thinking about art as a product of human expression, 
Heidegger provides an account of art as an ontological event and the happening of truth.  
Although Heidegger rejects the notion that artworks are artifacts of human 
expression, the establishment of a Gestalt and the opening up of world through the fixing 
in place of a figure within a frame in drawing of the rift is the result of a creative act. The 
question still remains, however, as to how the artist is involved in this process. If art is an 
ontological event, then how is human creativity to be understood? Interestingly, despite 
his criticism of thinking about creation in terms of artistic genius, Heidegger refers to a 
quote by Dürer previously mentioned on the relation between art and nature in the 
creative act. He writes, “Someone who was bound to know what he was talking about, 
Albrecht Dürer, did after all make the well known remark: ‘For in truth, art lies hidden 
within nature; he who can wrest it from her has it.’” Heidegger then immediately links 
this statement to the drawing of the rift. As stated above, Heidegger interprets Dürer’s use 
of “wrest” here to mean “to draw out the rift and to draw the design with the drawing-pen 
on the drawing-board.”28 Heidegger claims that “there lies hidden in nature a rift-design, 
a measure and a boundary and, tied to it, a capacity for bringing forth—that is, art.”29 He 
then nuances the meaning of Dürer’s statement to clarify that whatever art may be lying 
                                                
27 Ibid., 116. 
 
28 Hofstadter includes the original German of this line in a note to show the various etymological traces of 
Riss it includes: “Reissen heist hier Herausholen des Risses und der Riss reissen mit der Reissfeder auf 
dem Reisbrett.”  
 
29 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 68; UK: 80. 
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hidden in nature “becomes manifest only through the work [of art].” This is an important 
clarification because it indicates that neither nature nor the artist is the source of art; 
rather, it is the work itself that allows art to be seen in nature’s forms.30  
 According to Heidegger, neither the artist nor nature is the source of art. Rather, 
creative acts somehow transpire through the mutual collaboration of the artist and forms 
prefigured in nature. However, the role of the artist in the creation of art still remains 
unclear. Immediately before his rejection of genius as the origin of art, Heidegger 
employs a natural image to describe artistic creativity, thus emphasizing the non-human 
origin of creation. He writes, “All creation, because it is such a drawing-up, is a drawing 
as of water from a spring.”31 However, this drawing needs the artist in order to be carried 
out. Thus, Heidegger’s account of the drawing of the rift, while rightfully avoiding 
attributing creativity to the artist’s subjectivity, leads to a fundamental ambiguity in the 
origin of art. Commenting on this problem, Michele Haar writes: 
Despite suggesting a deeper, ontological antagonism, the Riss, the rending-
stroke, is still not what unites and separates Earth and world as coming from 
being itself. The rending which wrenches forth being and brings it to light 
initially seems to come from an artistic act of power, even if this act is in 
response to the overpowering character of being.32 
 
Though the source of the artist’s inspiration may in some way be ascribed to nature, the 
artist is needed to perform the drawing of the rift. Given the close tie between 
Heidegger’s views on art and language, we could make an analogy between the creation 
of art and the speaking of language. Just as human beings are needed to bring “the 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. Reginald
Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 107.  
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soundless saying” of language into the “resonance” of speech, the artist is needed to bring 
the soundless saying of the rift into the resonance of the work of art. As Haar explains, 
“The Earth, for Heidegger, is a secret sketch of forms. […] The artistic sketch is drawn 
from nature […] ‘Creation’ as ‘drawing’ makes possible features of nature visible which 
certainly do not exist in outline before their revelation by the work.”33 Haar concludes 
that Heidegger shares with Dürer the “apparently post-Romantic idea of an art in nature,” 
in contrast with Nietzsche’s position, which holds that the Will to power imposes forms 
onto a preexisting chaos. Haar explains that with Heidegger, art is the disclosure of forms 
secretly prefigured in nature that have not yet been sketched-out and made manifest.34  
Though the work may bring out something prefigured in nature, it is only through 
the creation of the work that a world comes to life and the earth juts out and becomes 
earth. A similar idea was articulated by Merleau-Ponty thinking along with Schelling in 
his lecture course on nature. Merleau-Ponty explains that, for Schelling, the relationship 
between art and nature forms a constructive circle in which we must “pass endlessly from 
intuition to reflection and from reflection to intuition.”35 In other words, nature leads to 
art and art leads back to nature in an ongoing cycle. At one point Merleau-Ponty 
expresses this idea by saying, “We are the parents of nature of which we are also the 
children.”36 For an analogy, Merleau-Ponty recalls Schelling’s image of the satellites of 
Mercury. “[W]e cannot see these satellites with the naked eye, but once we have seen 
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35 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the College de France. ed. Dominique Seglard, 
trans. Robert Vallier (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 47.  
 
36 Ibid., 43.  
 
 92 
them with a telescope, then we can see them with the naked eye.”37 The point is that 
nature comes first, but it is not until it is given voice and expressed in art (understood in 
the widest sense) that nature is realized as such. There are numerous Gestalts to be found 
in nature, but they must first be drawn out; and it takes an artist to perform this drawing. 
We could say, following Heidegger’s interpretation of Dürer’s statement, that 
artistic creation builds upon and takes its inspiration from what already “lies hidden in 
nature.” Even though, for Heidegger, the origin of art is the work itself, the creative act 
draws upon what is found in nature, upon something prefigured as Haar explained. 
Therefore, for Heidegger, as well as for Merleau-Ponty as we shall see, the origin of 
artistic creativity is not reducible to the artist’s will or imagination, nor do artists simply 
reenact what is already given in nature.  
In this discussion we have seen that Heidegger seeks to understand art as the 
opening up of a world, but that he desires to do so without relying on terminology 
belonging to the metaphysical tradition. This leads him to avoid talking about art as a 
product of a human subject. While he does acknowledge that art is bound to nature and to 
the earth, for him, art must be understood in terms of truth, that is, the disclosure of being 
through poetic “saying” or showing. Thus, Heidegger’s discussion of art offers a unique 
account of creation as the drawing of the rift. However, this leaves the artist in an 
ambiguous position. How exactly are we to understand what individual artists contribute 
to the work performed by the artworks they create? Heidegger does not provide an 
answer to this question. If we want to understand the role of the artist in the drawing of 
the rift more precisely, we must go beyond Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty, who also 
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attempts to understand the creation of art from a post-metaphysical perspective, though 
he does so by taking up the artist’s perceptual engagement with the “flesh of the world” 
via the body. 
 
2. Merleau-Ponty and Klee on the Emergence of Art from Nature in the Artist’s 
Body  
 
In his essay “Eye and Mind” (1960), Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, explores the 
nature of artworks in relation to ontology. He also, like Heidegger, highlights the 
significance of line and movement in relation to form, although he does so in dialogue 
with various artists such as Leonardo da Vinci and Paul Klee. Merleau-Ponty’s insights 
into the nature of line, movement and form in relation to these artists’ works, including 
their writings, help to elucidate Heidegger’s rather esoteric formulation of how the 
drawing of the rift occurs through artistic activity. By looking at the writings of da Vinci 
and Klee in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with their ideas and artworks in his 
discussion of line, I will show how the study of natural forms and the activity of drawing 
as these artists understand it can be interpreted as the opening up of world through the 
“drawing of the rift” in Heidegger’s sense. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body in 
relation to the world will be essential for understanding the role of artists in the formation 
of works that open up worlds. I will close with a discussion of the influential dance artist 
and theorist Rudolf Laban, whose philosophy of movement allows the ideas about line 
and form discussed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to be understood in relation to the 
body in profound and interesting ways.  
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Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about perception, nature, art, and the body came to 
shape the overall character of his ontology. In attempting to find a middle way between 
the dichotomies of subject and object, mind and body, and spirit and matter 
characterizing metaphysical thinking, Merleau-Ponty develops an ontology in which the 
supposed interiority of the subject and exteriority of the world are deconstructed to the 
point where they occupy the same space. Thus, spatiality itself can be understood as the 
depth of the visible and the dehiscence of fleshly being. Following this insight, 
perception can be understood as neither a passive reception of the world via the senses 
nor a projection of the human mind onto an indifferent, inert landscape. Rather, 
perception and things arise in conjunction with each other according to the tones and 
rhythms of nature’s own formations. The artist, who has a highly cultivated attunement to 
form, shapes how we perceive nature by the creation of artworks. It is not simply that the 
artist represents nature in an artwork; the worlds opened up by artworks affect the way 
we perceive nature itself. Moreover, the intimate connection one has with the natural 
world as an embodied being means that the creative acts of artists are rooted within and 
arise from what is more than human. In other words, Merleau-Ponty puts forth a 
philosophy in which art is continuous with nature on account of the body’s continuity 
with the flesh of the world in creative perception and expression.  
Going beyond Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body provides 
the foundations for a theory of creativity that accounts for the fundamentally ambiguous 
position of the artist between nature and the artwork. As Ted Toadvine explains, in 
Phenomenology of Perception nature is presented as “our interlocutor in a corporeal 
‘dialogue,’ as a correlate of the perceiving body that remains ‘co-natural with the 
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world.”38 The body is the site of the reflective self that stands over against nature as well 
as the “anonymous body” that is co-natural with the world. The anonymous body is pre-
reflective and endows us with a “primordial faith” in our ability to perceive the world as 
it is given. The body is in a seamless continuity with the world, but perception on the 
level of reflection stands over against it.39 Our reflective self, the cogito, derives its being 
from the anonymous body, but the pre-reflective is only accessible through the mediation 
of reflection, and so there is within the self a tension between ourselves as unique 
individual subjects and bodies already bound up with an intersubjective natural world. 
Although there are these two layers to the subject, this should in no way be taken as a 
suggestion that these levels are exclusive to one another. Merleau-Ponty characterizes the 
self as a “fold” in being,40 implying a distinction between the self and world, but a 
distinction within one sole fabric.  
The entwinement of the perceiving body and the world developed in the 
Phenomenology of Perception figures prominently in Merleau-Ponty’s essays on 
painting, as it is the key to understanding artistic expression. In fact, Merleau-Ponty’s 
interest in Cezanne, which he developed in detail in his essay “Cézanne’s Doubt” (1945), 
had already been expressed in Phenomenology of Perception. Galen Johnson writes, 
“Merleau-Ponty, in the Phenomenology, quoted Novotny’s analysis of Cezanne’s art as 
the attempt to paint the ‘pre-world,’ the physiognomy of things in their sensible 
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configuration as they effortlessly arise in nature.”41 The corporeal dialogue between the 
self and world is ongoing in artistic expression. In fact, Merleau-Ponty recognizes the 
special insight afforded by artists throughout his corpus.42 Johnson writes, 
The painter lends his or her body to the world to bring forth a metamorphosis 
of the visible, an imaginative expression of the mute meanings and richness of 
the prereflective world. Merleau-Ponty joins a line of philosophers originating 
in Schelling and coming forward through Nietzsche to Heidegger who accord 
special prominence to artistic work in tracing the ribs and joints of being.43 
 
In “Eye and Mind” painting becomes an opportunity for an ontological inquiry in that it, 
Johnson continues, “undertakes a study of modern painting in order to develop his 
philosophy beyond phenomenology and beyond structuralism toward a new post-
Cartesian ontology of visibility and invisibility.”44 Merleau-Ponty’s shift toward an 
ontology of flesh involves an emphasis on depth which highlights the aspects of distance, 
thickness, and reversibility enfolded within being. It is along these lines that numerous 
parallels can be found between the philosophy of painting developed in “Eye and Mind” 
and the chiasm of the sensing and the sensed in the posthumously released The Visible 
and the Invisible (1961). 
The body’s continuity with the flesh of the world means that the world is opened 
up via the chiasmatic intertwining of the one who senses and the world that is sensed, and 
                                                
41 Galen Johnson, “Introductions to Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Painting,” in The Merleau-Ponty 
Aesthetics Reader (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 9. 
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the artist’s perception enacts a particularly fecund chiasm integral to the formation of our 
world and our apprehension of nature. It must be stressed that the artist does not recreate 
the world existing “outside” by rendering a representation of it. It is through the creation 
of the work that the world and nature become visible as such. Merleau-Ponty expresses 
this point in “Eye and Mind.” 
The painter’s vision is not a view upon the outside, a merely “physical-
optical” relation to the world. The world no longer stands before him through 
representation; rather, it is the painter to whom the things of the world give 
birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible.45 
 
The artist’s vision is essentially creative, but the artist’s vision belongs to the visible 
itself. It is a “concentration or coming-to-itself” of visibility, albeit a visibility that only 
exists in and through creative perception and action. As embodied, perceiving beings, we 
are part of the flesh of the visible; and because our bodies and the flesh of the world are 
of the same fabric, we inhabit the depth required for vision such that we are none other 
than the field we are immersed in.  
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception and the ontology that develops out of it 
have a corresponding theory of expression in which nature itself becomes expressive 
through works of art. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the relation between human 
expression and nature provides a robust account of what is only intimated by Heidegger. 
Heidegger suggests through his quotation of Dürer that art lies prefigured in nature’s 
forms. Merleau-Ponty’s writings on art in relation to his ontology of flesh, especially 
when supported by artists’ writings, give a sophisticated account of how nature becomes 
expressive through artists’ creative activity.  
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Merleau-Ponty’s writings on art in relation to ontology offer a way of thinking 
about how artistic expressions arise in conjunction with nature’s own sense, forms, and 
patterns. The depth of the visible is the place of the world’s flesh, and depth, like flesh, is 
necessarily relational. The opening up of the visible that enables its visibility can only 
take place through the chiasmatic relation of the flesh in which that which sees is also a 
visible body. The body is the site of the opening, or dehiscence, of a world whereby 
forms take shape and become meaningful things for us. Our task is to understand how the 
interaction between the seer and the seen manifests form through creative acts. The 
difficulty of this task lies in unraveling the mystery of vision itself, how it arises from the 
visible world while also being that which manifests the visible world. One could also 
state the problem as follows: How does nature guide the creativity of artists, and how 
does the artist’s vision allow us to perceive nature more fully? In other words, how does 
art “give birth” to the “coming-to-itself of the visible”? Understanding this problem 
requires that we inquire into the creative visions of artists, for it is in the creative event 
that there is a “continual rebirth of existence.”46  
 Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s inquiries into the nature of art share this basic 
orientation, though they develop their views on this matter using different vocabularies 
and sets of concepts. As I have noted, Heidegger does not deal directly with the creative 
activity of artists. Instead, his view insists that the origin of artworks is art itself through 
“truth putting itself to work.” Thus, he does not give a concrete explanation of the 
creation of works of art. And so we must ask, as Haar does: “What indeed does the artist 
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do as a creator (Schöpfer)? The creator must draw (Schöpfen) upon the reserve of being 
which is open to him.” 47 Referring again to the statement by Dürer, Haar continues:  
But the Heideggerian interpretation which identifies Dürer’s “nature” with 
being does not seek to know how, “concretely” or practically this wresting is 
effected. The work is given. The artist’s “psychology” matters as little as the 
empirical biography of thinkers.48 
 
It is true that the particular personality or psychology of an artist is not what is most 
essential for understanding how art comes into being in relation to nature. However, an 
investigation into the creative process does not necessarily entail this. Although Merleau-
Ponty discusses Cezanne’s psychology in “Cezanne’s Doubt,” he makes clear that “a 
person’s life does not explain his work.” “The truth is that that work to be done called for 
that life.” While there may be something interesting about the idiosyncrasies of a 
particular artist’s way of working, that is not the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s engagement 
with Cezanne’s practice as a painter. It is Cezanne’s preoccupation with how the world is 
disclosed through the process of painting as an activity of seeing that interested Merleau-
Ponty. Cezanne’s painting, while it surely involves his personal psychology, is not a 
product of his psychology. Rather, Merleau-Ponty explains, “The meaning Cezanne gave 
to objects and faces in his paintings presented itself to him in the world as it appeared to 
him. Cezanne simply released that meaning [… he] simply expressed what they wanted 
to say.”49 As a painter, Cezanne lived in order to make art that gave expression to things 
as they revealed themselves to him. This is why he told Emile Bernard that he desired to 
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make art and nature “the same,” and, as Merleau-Ponty points out, “Of nature, [Cezanne] 
said, ‘the artist must conform to this perfect work of art’.”50 Merleau-Ponty’s engagement 
with the work and thought of particular artists is motivated by his inquiry into the same 
fundamental philosophical questions driving Heidegger. Though, by engaging the actual 
experiences of particular artists, Merleau-Ponty was able to probe how the so-called 
wresting of art from nature comes about concretely through artistic practice. 
 Along with Cezanne, Paul Klee was a key inspiration for Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics. 
Johnson notes that the writings of Paul Klee were where Merleau-Ponty “found some of 
the most germinating insights for ‘Eye and Mind.’”51 This is not surprising, as Klee is 
one of a select group of artists who carried out studies of nature and wrote extensive 
reflections about his artistic practice. Jürg Spiller compares Paul Klee to Leonardo da 
Vinci in that they were both detached from “the central features of the historical 
tradition” in which they were working.52 Through their independent practices, they 
sought more than a perfected work of art. Rather than being concerned with the art object 
itself, both Klee and da Vinci investigated the artistic process and kept extensive notes 
observing the structures of natural forms and the various components of art-making, 
including the mechanics of perspective, the expressiveness of line, and color theory. 
Spiller notes that both Klee and da Vinci recognize that “the artist’s approach or creative 
manner is an independent and complete way of existing in reality and of understanding 
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it.” Moreover, while the artist’s creative manner is one among multiple speculative 
methods,  
[Klee and da Vinci] are led to investigate that particular character […] of the 
artistic approach, always bearing in mind, however, that this must develop 
over the whole field of experience. For this reason, Leonardo’s mode of 
thought like that of Klee, covers every aspect of being [… T]here is no 
moment or aspect of being which can be considered foreign or irrelevant to 
the experience which is acquired in artistic creation.53 
 
In light of this, Klee and da Vinci’s reflections upon their artistic practices provide a 
window into the unique aspects of the world disclosed through the artist’s creative 
comportment, a window that inspired Merleau-Ponty. In “Eye and Mind” Merleau-Ponty 
seeks the ontological foundations of aesthetic experience, and Klee’s insights were well 
suited to aid Merleau-Ponty in his pursuit. Describing the artistic attitude as he 
understands it, Klee writes: “What artist would not like to live where the central organ of 
all space-time motion, call it brain or heart of creation as you will, activates all functions? 
In the womb of nature, in the primal ground of creation, where the secret key to all things 
lies hidden?”54  For Klee, “Art plays in the dark with ultimate things and reaches them.”55  
 Klee’s focus on the creative process is significant because it illuminates a particular 
approach to nature that is unlike other modes of engagement. Moreover, the artist’s 
engagement with nature involves a constructive element that contributes to the object of 
study. Spiller notes that, “Klee translates into the constructive realm insight about growth 
and mobile processes gained from nature. […] It is in the formative process that the 
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duality of nature study and constructive compositional approach achieves creative 
harmony and synthesis.”56 In nature study the artist observes the subtleties of form and 
the movement that structures the functioning of form. In the constructive compositional 
approach, the artist brings out the order that naturally exists therein making it visible 
through an artistic rendering. Nature study and constructive composition achieve 
harmony and synthesis in the creative process because they are dual aspects or poles of 
the creative process itself. The study of nature is required for being able to perceive the 
structure of form, but in order for that form to take on the significance that it bears, the 
artist is needed to gather what is learned from the study into a work that interprets it 
through an artistic rendering.     
Klee uses a parable of a tree to characterize the artist’s relation to the world 
around him or her through nature study and constructive composition. “The artist,” Klee 
writes, “has busied himself with this world of many forms and […] has in some measure 
got his bearings in it; quietly, all by himself.”57 He “orders the flux of phenomena and 
experience,” gaining an orientation that Klee likens to the “complicated order” of “the 
roots of a tree.” The artist is the tree trunk, and the work is the “crown” or canopy of 
leaves.  
From the roots the sap rises up into the artist, flows through him and his eyes. 
[…] Seized and moved by the force of the current, he directs his vision into 
the work. Visible on all sides, the crown of the tree unfolds in space and time. 
And so with the work. No one will expect a tree to form its crown in exactly 
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the same way as its roots. We all know that what goes on above cannot be an 
exact mirror image of what goes on below.58 
 
All the artist “does in his appointed place in the trunk of the tree is to gather what rises 
from the depths and pass it on. He neither serves nor commands, but only acts as a go 
between. […] He himself is not the beauty of the crown; it has merely passed through 
him.”59 This parable depicts the artist as a conduit through which “the flux of phenomena 
and experience” becomes ordered according the artist’s way of perceiving. The work is 
an interpretation that provides order and form to what arises naturally in the world.  
It is not simply the case, however, that the artist imposes order onto a chaotic or 
meaningless materiality. Rather, the artist gathers together what he or she finds given in 
experience and translates into the language of an artistic medium, thereby simultaneously 
distilling or “drawing-out” what is prefigured in experience and transforming it according 
to the artist’s style, that is, his or her interpretive vision where “vision” is understood in 
the widest sense. “We [artists] learn to see the law that flows beneath. We learn to see the 
prehistory of the visible.”60 Thus Klee writes: “‘As creation is related to the creator, so is 
the work of art related to the law inherent in it.’ The work grows in its own way […]”61 
The work grows in its own way, but the work’s coming-into-being is inseparable from 
the artist who is creating it. The tree is one organism inseparable from the soil, sun, 
water, and air that support it. In the creative process, the artist is the site where the 
“roots,” that is, the complicated order of the flux and flow of experience, grows into the 
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canopy, the work’s unfolding. In order to understand the mystery of how the work grows, 
we need to better understand how the implicit order of things collaborates with the artist’s 
attentiveness to and engagement with that order, so that it may manifest itself in a new, 
meaningful, and timely way. This is precisely the mystery that Merleau-Ponty was 
preoccupied with in his essays on aesthetics and that Heidegger indirectly spoke of as the 
drawing of the rift-design. 
  So far I have shown how Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body’s role in creative 
activity is essential for understanding the ambiguous place of the artist between art and 
nature. With the help of Klee, we have begun to see how the artist draws out nature’s 
forms and transforms them into art. But what about the significance of line in the event of 
this drawing? Heidegger’s account of the drawing of the rift emphasizes the importance 
of line in the establishment of form. The rift-design as a sort of line-drawing draws out 
world from earth by fixing a form in place. In creating a work, artists “wrest” from nature 
a configuration prefigured in it thereby bringing a Gestalt into existence that has the 
power to frame a world and bring it to life. But how does the literal activity of drawing 
perform this wresting of art from nature? How does the artist’s sketch open up a world? 
To answer theses questions we must investigate the nature of line and the role it plays in 
the creation of form in relation to movement, since line is first of all what the artist 
draws.   
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3. Moving, Drawing Lines 
 
“Eye and Mind” opens with a quote from a conversation between Cezanne and 
Gasquet that reads: “What I am trying to translate to you is far more mysterious; it is 
entwined in the very roots of being, in the impalpable source of sensation.” As this 
epigraph suggests, in the essay Merleau-Ponty interrogates elements of visual arts such as 
depth, color, and line in order to develop his account of perception and the senses in 
relation to his ontology. Johnson points out that for Merleau-Ponty, “painting is closer to 
the palpable life of things than science or philosophy.”62 Thus the arts, and painting in 
particular, provide a medium for deepening our encounter with the visible and “the 
impalpable source of sensation.” In addition to depth and color, line proves to be a key to 
the primordial opening and presentations of things. While Merleau-Ponty critiques the 
conception of a “mechanical, prosaic line,” Johnson notes that he also “expresses a new 
appreciation for the ‘flexuous line’ as a constituting power.”63 While Merleau-Ponty is 
critical of Descartes’s emphasis on engraving and line-drawing over and above painting 
on the grounds that color is merely “an ornament,” Merleau-Ponty does acknowledge the 
centrality of line when it is an ally to color. He writes, “We shall see that the whole of 
painting is present in each of its modes of expression; there is a kind of drawing, even a 
single line, that can embrace all of painting’s bold potential.”64 Further demonstrating this 
point, he notes that it should not be surprising that often “a good painter can also produce 
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good drawings or good sculpture.” This is not because the techniques are similar; they are 
actually quite different. Rather, it proves that “there is a system of equivalences, a Logos 
of lines, of lighting, of colors, of reliefs, of masses—a nonconceptual presentation of 
universal Being.”65 Thus, he explains that “the effort of modern painting” has not had to 
choose “between line and color.” It has directed its effort “toward multiplying the system 
of equivalences.”66 The artists who have cultivated a sensitivity to this “system of 
equivalences” reside close to heart of the visible whereby these modes of expression are 
entwined “in the very roots of being,” where line, color, surface, and depth work together 
to disclose our textured world of meaning.  
As opposed to the prosaic line that is taken as “a positive attribute and property of 
the object itself,” da Vinci spoke of a more supple and subtle “flexuous line” that 
animates a form. It constitutes the structure of the object, though it cannot be precisely 
located. Merleau-Ponty quotes da Vinci’s Treatise on Painting: “The secret of the art of 
drawing is to discover in each object the particular way in which a certain flexuous line, 
which is, so to speak, its generating axis, is directed through its whole extent.”67 Along 
with da Vinci, Merleau-Ponty notes that Bergson observed an “undulating line” that 
“‘could be no one of the visible lines of the figure,’ and yet ‘gives the key to the 
whole.”68 Lines are essential to the constitution of form. “They are always between or 
behind whatever we fix our eyes upon; they are indicated, implicated, and even very 
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imperiously demanded by things” although “they themselves are not things.”69 In her 
study “The Conception of Line in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty,” Sue Cataldi coins the 
term “in-line” to describe the invisible line that provides the inner structure of an object, 
as opposed to an outline, which marks its outer boundary. “Even more emphatically than 
Heidegger,” Cataldi writes, “Merleau-Ponty was trying to wedge us away from a 
conception of line as an encasement or a conception that regards outlines as ‘positive 
attribute’ of objects.”70 Though outlines are one type of line that is important for how we 
see and understand form, in-lines, Cataldi argues, are more essential to the way forms 
take shape in the active sense. “[A]n artist must first bring the outside out-lines out from 
out of the inside in-lines. Again, the primary emphasis here is on something taking shape 
and not on something having shape.”71 As opposed the prosaic line, flexuous in-lines are 
the generating axes of things. They have a “constituting power.” Making this point 
Merleau-Ponty draws from Klee’s writings, saying: “the line no longer imitates the 
visible; it ‘renders visible’; it is the blueprint of the genesis of things.”72  
Having cultivated a sensitivity to form, the artist sees a landscape and the things 
inhabiting it as shot through with in-lines and outlines to be translated into a work of art. 
Characterizing the artist’s way of being-in-the-world, Klee describes in a whimsical way 
how an artist with cultivated perception experiences the landscape and its scenery.73 The 
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wavy motion of the surface of water, the series of arches making up a bridge, a farm field 
traversed with furrows, the spiral movements of a child’s curly hair, or the zigzag streak 
of lightning can all been seen to be structured by line. Klee’s notebooks, as well as da 
Vinci’s, include an abundance of sketches showing how a given form may be understood 
as a more or less complex set of intersecting lines. David Rosand, in his book Drawing 
Acts, highlights how important seeing form in terms of line was for da Vinci in particular. 
He explains that: 
[F]or all his deep pictorial concern with aerial perspective, sfumatura, and 
chiaroscuro, he still could conceive of the world as a dynamic linear system. 
“The air is full of infinite lines,” he wrote (about 1492), “straight and 
radiating, intersected and interwoven, without their displacing one another; 
and they represent for every object the true form of their cause.”74 
 
The landscape and atmosphere as well as the various individual forms populating them 
partake in a network of in-lines and outlines. The entirety of space can be expressed as a 
complex linear configuration, though not through a mere three-dimensional geometric as 
the traditional “prosaic line” would have it. Rather, the depth of the visible, to use 
Merleau-Ponty’s language, vibrates with flexuous in-lines that extend beyond the 
surfaces of things, connecting objects with each other and the space they inhabit, like the 
warp and weft of the flesh of the world.     
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the invisible flexuous line spoken of by da Vinci, 
or of the blueprint that provides the inner configuration of things spoken of by Klee, 
illuminates Heidegger’s description of the rift-design. Cataldi even suggests that 
“Merleau-Ponty’s thought on line on the visual arts, influenced though they were by 
Klee, Cezanne, Matisse, Bergson and even da Vinci, appear to also to have been 
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prefigured by Heidegger’s discussion of the Open in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’.”75 
The flexuous in-lines or blueprints of form articulated by Merleau-Ponty, following Klee, 
are analogous to Heidegger’s rift-design. Cataldi explains that “Analogously, but more 
abstractly in Heidegger’s essay, the rift-design created by the primal conflict does not 
imitate being, but renders being—the being of the artwork and the being of the truth fixed 
within each original prefigured opening.”76 The carving out of artistic forms in the 
drawing of the rift is the activity of drawing world from earth. This drawing enacted by 
the artist through the creation of the work is a tracing of the rift that open up a space in 
which line as a self-generating movement takes on form. Clear echoes of Heidegger can 
be heard in “Eye and Mind” where Merleau-Ponty writes: 
[T]he line is no longer a thing or a representation of a thing. It is a certain 
disequilibrium contrived within the indifference of the white paper; it is a 
hollow opened up in the in-itself […] The line is no longer the apparition of 
an entity upon a vacant background, as it was in classical geometry. It is, as in 
modern geometries, the restriction, segregation, or modulation of a pregiven 
spatiality.77  
 
The hollow opened up by a “segregation, or modulation of a pregiven spatiality” is 
directly analogous to the Open created by the drawing of the rift as dif-ference in 
Heidegger. Furthermore, the disequilibrium that is created in the establishment of a figure 
upon paper or canvas also echoes Heidegger’s description of the active repose at work in 
the fixing in place of a figure within a frame. A figure fixed in place is not without 
movement; the strife of world and earth in the figure is heightened in the repose. As 
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quoted above, Heidegger writes, “Repose occurs in the concentrated agitation of this 
conflict.”78 Merelau-Ponty expresses this idea more precisely when he writes, “Just as 
painting has created the latent line, it has made for itself a movement without 
displacement, a movement by vibration or radiation.”79 Klee recognized that line has its 
own dynamic energy. As fixated movement, it is “charged” with a certain vibration that 
gives it an active quality. In his notebooks Klee included a few different examples of 
lines with different energy qualities. Some are flowing and melodious, others are jagged 
and rhythmic, while others are freely wandering. Accompanying the sample lines, he 
writes, “The most highly-charged line is the most authentic line because it is the most 
active.”80  
  Throughout Klee’s writings we find an emphasis on movement. He is concerned 
with the functionality, or operation of form—how it works. He is interested in the active 
nature of form, and, therefore, how form is structured by movement. “Genesis as formal 
movement,” he explains, “is the essence of the work of art.” In other words, genesis is the 
movement that actively trans-forms. Line is integral to movement. It is the pathway for 
movement and its trace. The genesis of form is also the genesis of line. Klee writes: “The 
primordial movement, the agent, is the point that sets itself in motion (genesis of form). A 
line comes into being.”81A drawing is the trace left of the artist’s movements. The motion 
in the body exhibits the same patterns that exist throughout nature. The artist sees 
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movement, line, and shape in the landscape and the forms that inhabit it. The artists 
reenact the movements of the forms, embodying them through their own styles, and 
sketch out life. Klee continues: “All becoming is based on movement. […] The pictorial 
work springs from movement, it is itself fixated movement, and it is grasped in 
movement (eye muscles).”82 The perception of line and movement in the world by the 
artist is translated into a work of art, which is itself a record of the artist’s strokes. Once 
the work is completed, the viewer then reenacts the movements of the lines drawn by the 
artist in their viewing of the piece, embodying line on yet another level. Rosand also 
recognizes how movement is involved at all levels of drawing, both for the artist and the 
viewer.  
Drawing, as we have been emphasizing, is the record of a physical act. Its 
invitation is, on a primary level, to the body of the viewer, whose own 
response will necessarily involve a somatic dimension. […] Following the 
linear patterns of a drawing, supplying continuity to the open gaps between 
points and lines, we engage the very energies and impulses that went into its 
making.83  
 
This circuit of repeating patterns of movement may be carried further once the 
movements of the artwork lead the viewer to recognize them in the world and things from 
whence the artists originally drew them. This, in turn, allows us to experience the lines 
permeating the field of experience. 
There are many manifestations of line that go beyond the clear examples of it in 
the art of drawing and painting. Phrases in music can be considered lines similar to the 
way we refer to lines of poetry. Line is an apt metaphor for speaking about these 
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phenomena because they exhibit the basic structure of line, though in a non-visual way. 
While the centrality of movement in form is true across all the arts, this is most obviously 
the case in the art of dance whose medium is the moving body itself. The Hungarian-born 
revolutionary dance theorist, Rudolf Laban (1879-1958), developed a sophisticated 
philosophy of movement informed by his work as a dance practitioner and choreographer 
that complements and extends the observations on movement and line in the graphic arts 
that we have been discussing.  
Laban is primarily associated with the discipline of dance, but Carol-Lynne 
Moore notes that “he is an anomaly in the field for several reasons.”84 Laban was first 
trained as a graphic artist before devoting himself to dance, and towards the end of his 
career he applied his “theory developed from his dance studies to a variety of novel fields 
beyond dance.”85 For instance, he studied the movements of workers in factories in order 
to aid them in the movement patterns of their daily lives, and he researched the 
connection between habitual bodily movements of individuals and their personal 
psychology. As a result of his studies, he developed a remarkably sophisticated analysis 
of the moving body whose insights continue to be utilized by dance educators, 
practitioners, and even those working in distantly related fields such as physical therapy.  
The two most notable accomplishments that Laban is known for are his developments of 
the first notation system for choreography analogous to a written score in music, and his 
“taxonomy of human movement that provides the conceptual underpinnings for the 
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notation system.”86 Given the range of his movement analysis and his groundbreaking 
innovations in the field of dance, his philosophy of movement is a unique theoretical 
contribution deserving of our attention.  
Like Klee, Laban recognized the vital connection between movement and form. 
He writes: “Forms are closely connected with movement. Each movement has its form, 
and forms are simultaneously created with and through movement.”87 Laban connects 
movement with space, claiming that “movement is the life of space.”88 He goes so far as 
to assert that there is no existence of space separate from movement. Though we may 
experience space as distinct from movement, this is merely a result of the illusion of 
stillness. Laban explains: “The illusion of standstills creates an artificial separation of 
space and movement. Seen from such a point of view, space seems to be a void in which 
objects—occasionally—move.”89 However, he continues, “Empty space does not exist. 
On the contrary, space is a superabundance of simultaneous movements.” “Movement” is 
“a visible aspect of space.”90 Permeated by space and in continuity with it, we participate 
in the “life of space” through our own bodily movements. “From the simplest motion to 
the artistic creation of dancing, the flowing stream of movement expresses dynamic 
space, the basis of all existence. All movement emerges from this infinite abyss and 
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disappears into it again.”91 Laban’s description of the motions of the human body as 
participating in the “life of space” resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s way understanding the 
depth of the visible and the flesh of the world, and it also rings true with Heidegger’s 
conception of being-in-the-world. According to Laban, we are not “in” space conceived 
as an empty container. Rather, our own movements are continuous with the movements 
permeating a living, dynamic spatiality. Thus, our movements arise as part of the greater 
spatial network of which we are part. In light of our discussion of artistic creation that 
recognizes the ways in which creativity transpires between the artist and nature, we can 
see how the art of dance, understood according to Laban’s perspective, illustrates this 
same relationship.  
  Laban had a keen awareness of the form of movement and developed an elaborate 
vocabulary for articulating it. What is most interesting about Laban’s theory of 
movement for our purposes is his articulation of what he calls “trace-forms.” Trace-forms 
are the intangible forms created by the dancer’s moving body. They are like the forms 
resulting from the lines traced by the dancer’s gestures and postures. Laban describes 
these forms as architecture built by the body’s movement. “Movement is, so to speak, 
living architecture—living in the sense of changing emplacements as well as changing 
cohesion. This architecture is created by human movements and is made up of pathways 
tracing shapes in space, and these we may call ‘trace-forms.’”92 Trace-forms involve 
what may be recognized as the drawing of lines. Although, unlike a two-dimensional 
drawing, trace-forms are elusively temporal. Laban asserts that the literal act of drawing, 
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as well as the creative activity of other arts, are in reality the fixing in place of trace-
forms drawn by the body’s movements. “[T]race-forms are fixed through the movement 
of drawing and the shaping of different materials. […] The invention of an architectural, 
plastic or pictorial form is, in reality, a choreutic phrase.”93 In other words, insofar as all 
arts result from bodily movements, they are the record of the movements that went into 
their making. They are the crystallization of trace-forms. Laban, as a trained graphic artist 
himself, used drawing as a tool in his movement analysis. As Moore notes, “Laban 
systematically drew upon his first career in visual art to develop theoretical models of 
human movement.”94 In fact, Laban’s notation system is built upon the representation of 
trace-forms within the “kinesphere,” that is, the sphere around the body delimiting the 
range of its possible movements. Using drawing and dance together, he developed a 
somatic-based choreography that could be recorded using the notation system he 
developed for the taxonomy of human movement. 
The notion of the trace-form articulated by Laban highlights the intimate link 
between embodied movement and the genesis of form through the drawing of lines. 
Trace-forms are created not only by lines drawn by the path of the body’s movement in 
the space around the body, they may also be formed by lines within the body itself.    
Dance theorists studying under Laban and working within the vein of his influence have 
come to identify specific “lines of movement” inhering in the human physiological 
structure. For instance, Imgard Bartenieff identifies at least six patterns of bodily 
                                                
93 Ibid., 115. 
 
94 Moore, The Harmonic Structure of Movement, 42.  
 
 116 
connectivity that may be represented with simple linear diagrams.95 All human movement 
is structured according to these patterns of connectivity since they accord with our shared 
skeletal and muscular anatomy. For example, the head-tail line of connectivity accords 
with the range of motion of the spine and one’s vertical alignment. The head-tail line of 
movement can be pictured as an invisible line running through the spine and extending 
out of it in both directions. It twists and bends in accordance with the movements of the 
spine. All movement engages the head-tail connection in some manner, and certain types 
highlight it explicitly.  
The so-called “lines of movement” identified by Barteneiff according to the 
taxonomy of Laban’s movement theory may be compared to the “in-lines” discussed by 
Cataldi in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s thought. The flexuous in-lines observed by da 
Vinci and analyzed by Merleau-Ponty and Cataldi can be sensed within our own bodies, 
guiding and giving structure to our movements. Though these lines inhere in the body, it 
is not as though they can be physically identified. Just as Merleau-Ponty pointed out with 
reference to Bergson, the “undulating line” that underlies the structure of forms is not any 
one of the lines that are visible in the figure. Even though the lines do not have a positive 
existence, they are felt and observed through our experience of spatiotemporal motion; 
and we experience them as being in things and structuring their movement nonetheless. 
Artists such as Laban himself can make the lines structuring movement visible by 
drawing, and seeing them drawn allows us, in turn, to experience them in ourselves more 
concretely. 
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Klee, da Vinci, and Laban show us how line is an integral part of form, both 
within nature and art. Together, their insights allow Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s 
theories of art to be understood in new and profound ways. For all of the thinkers and 
artists we have discussed, line and movement are essential aspects of creative activity and 
its products. The lines permeating the fabric of space that give shape to things are latent 
until they are drawn out and made explicit in works of art. Artists are needed to perform 
this drawing, but what is expressed in works of art is not simply a subjective state, 
feeling, or idea the artist has in his or her mind. The creation of art happens through an 
attunement to what is prefigured in nature, and artists attune to this prefiguration through 
their bodies’ participation in it. The artist’s body is the key in which art, nature, and 
creativity intersect. The artist performs the drawing of the rift—the activity of generating 
form through the movement of line—through the movement of his or her body in 
collaboration with a field of experience and the materials therein. In the next chapter, we 
will explore the “anatomy” of the expressive body, that is, the way the body enacts itself 
in relation to its world in order to bring life to fuller expression.   
 118 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ANATOMY OF THE EXPRESSIVE BODY IN THE AESTHETICS OF 
MERLEAU-PONTY, NISHIDA, AND WATSUJI  
 
  In the previous section it was shown that, according to Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty, the creation of art involves more than the intentions of individual artists. Rather, 
creation occurs as the drawing of the world and earth in which forms that are prefigured 
in nature are made explicit in works of art. Works of art, in turn, open up worlds in which 
we see nature and the earth more fully than was possible before the work of art had been 
performed. The discussion of line and movement illuminated how forms, both natural and 
artistic, come into being through the engagement of the artist’s body with the patterns and 
rhythms of its surroundings. The artist’s body is the vital link between nature and art; it is 
the site of the creative event. In this section, the relationship between the self and world 
will be explored by examining Merleau-Ponty and Nishida Kitarō’s conceptions of the 
expressive body in relation to Watsuji Tetsurō’s unique conception of climate. By 
showing how artistic media, and nature more broadly, become expressive in the dynamic 
“world-space” of the body, the non-subjectivist account of artistic creation put forth in 
the previous section will be demonstrated further.   
  Merleau-Ponty, Nishida, and Watsuji each offer ways of understanding the self and 
the natural world that transcend the dichotomies traditionally assumed within discourses 
on metaphysics. For each thinker, the self extends into the life-space of our common 
world in ways that suggest nature itself may become expressive through works of art. 
Many artists’ descriptions of their creative processes suggest that artistic inspiration and 
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expression transpire between the artist and the material medium, implying that the artist’s 
subjectivity, as distinct from the so-called “external world,” is not the sole origin of 
expression. Rather, the material the artist works with finds expression through its 
participation in the artist’s vision.  
  For Merleau-Ponty, expression involves giving voice to sense itself. The body’s 
continuity with the flesh of the world allows being itself to be expressed through the 
perception and action of individuals. This, however, presents a paradox as to why 
expression is necessary and how it is possible. The paradox of expression articulated by 
Merleau-Ponty can be clarified and appreciated more deeply when compared to the 
account of expression developed by Nishida. Nishida’s subtle accounts of acting-intuition 
(kōiteki chokkan 行為的直観) and the dialectic of internal and external perception at 
work in his notion of the existential body complement and augment the account of 
expression developed by Merleau-Ponty in significant ways.  
  The affinities between these two philosophers have been widely recognized, and 
numerous comparative studies have shown the striking similarities between Merleau-
Ponty’s notions of the reversibility of flesh and depth of the visible and Nishida’s logic of 
place.1 Both philosophers give accounts of the body and perception that demonstrate the 
inseparability of the self and world, and challenge the dichotomies of dualistic thinking 
that have held sway within the European tradition. Drawing out the similarities between a 
well-known French phenomenologist and a prominent Japanese philosopher is more than 
a scholarly exercise, however. Bringing their writings into dialogue allows the contours 
of their thinking to be brought more fully into relief, enabling us to take their insights 
                                                
1 For example, there are numerous chapters on Nishida and Merleau-Ponty in Merleau-Ponty and 
Buddhism, eds. Gereon Kopf and Jin Park (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009). 
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further. The intersections between their philosophical projects, coupled with their 
different cultural and intellectual backgrounds, allow their ideas to collaborate in 
interesting ways. Their writings on the bodily foundations of expressive action stand out 
as an area where a comparison of their views may be particularly fruitful. For both 
Nishida and Merleau-Ponty, the ability to provide an adequate account of expression lies 
at the heart of the formation of their respective ontologies, and the body proves to be a 
crucial hinge-point in each of their accounts. In their own ways, Merleau-Ponty and 
Nishida each seek to articulate an ontology that can account for the significance of the 
body as an opening onto a textured world of sense and meaning that is continually being 
transformed through expressive activity.  
  When the ideas of Merleau-Ponty and Nishida are combined with the work of 
Watsuji, it becomes clear how the dynamic movement of expression is tied to the 
material, natural world. In light of Watsuji’s conception of human being as 
“betweenness,” the conceptions of expression put forth by Nishida and Merleau-Ponty 
must incorporate the climatic milieu in which life transpires. Though Merleau-Ponty and 
Nishida both recognize the expressivity of nature, Watsuji’s particular understanding of 
the essential relatedness of human beings to each other and to the climate subtending 
culture makes it possible to show how human existence and its various cultural artifacts 
express that which is more than human in ways that they had not fully articulated. 
Moreover, each of these thinkers look to artists to illustrate their ideas. Thus, bringing 
their philosophies together provides an opportunity to further flesh out a theory of artistic 
creativity that does justice to the complexity of creative acts.  
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1. Merleau-Ponty on the “Paradox of Expression” 
 
Throughout his oeuvre, Merleau-Ponty continued to revise and refine his 
understanding of expression. Tracing the development of this concept over the course of 
his life it becomes clear that providing a cogent account of expression was tied to the core 
motivations of his thinking. Nishida offers an account of expression that, almost three 
decades before, appreciates the subtle problematic Merleau-Ponty had probed throughout 
his career. Nishida’s concept of acting-intuition, I will argue, provides a rigorous account 
of the body’s interaction with the world through perception and action that articulates and 
illuminates what Merleau-Ponty referred to as the “paradox of expression.”  
I am not suggesting that Nishida is able to resolve what Merleau-Ponty finds 
paradoxical about expression. Rather, both figures recognize the irresolvability of the 
tension between experience and expression that gives rise to its paradox. As Galen 
Johnson explains, there is a  
“mystery,” “enigma,” or “wonder” that belongs to creative expression 
intrinsically. It will not go away or disappear; rather, it is a constant and ever-
present enigma woven into the fabric of the creative. Fundamentally, this 
paradox has to do with the passage from experience into expression, whether 
it be into the work of art, the work of love, or language itself.2     
 
Our goal, therefore, is not to resolve the paradox, to get rid of the tension that gives rise 
to it. Instead, our task is to understand the reason for this tension, why it is intrinsic to the 
anatomy of the expressive act. This requires us to go deeper beyond thinking about the 
                                                
2 Galen A. Johnson, The Retrieval of the Beautiful: Thinking Through Merleau-Ponty’s Aesthetics 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 163. 
 
 122 
operation of language, for the paradox of expression is a paradox within being itself.3 
Thus, it is an ontological question that requires us to consider the possibility of a 
“sensible idea” and interrogate the relationships that inhere amidst our bodies between 
sense and knowledge.    
Len Lawlor suggests that “Although we cannot say for certain, it looks as though 
Merleau-Ponty was going to utilize in The Visible and the Invisible the notion of 
expression to decipher the chiasm.”4 We can see evidence for this in the chapter “The 
Intertwining—the Chiasm,” where Merleau-Ponty asserts that the body, as part of this 
shared world, is “fascinated with the unique occupation of floating in Being with another 
life.” Applying movement, vision, and touch “to the other and to themselves” it makes 
“itself the outside of its inside and the inside of its outside […] and in the patient and 
silent labor of desire begin[s] the paradox of expression.”5 Expression is a response to a 
desire which we cannot claim as solely our own. Our bodies participate in a longing that 
belongs to the very fabric of being. Expression, then, could be described as heeding this 
desire that is stirring within us.  
In order to understand how expression aids in deciphering the chiasm of flesh, we 
must better grasp how Merleau-Ponty understands the relationship between expression 
and the perception of things. Again, the paradox of expression is a paradox within being. 
For Merleau-Ponty, we are expressive as part of a network of things that is larger than 
ourselves. Thus, we must conceive of expression as originating within being, not just our 
                                                
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingus (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968), 136. 
 
4 Leonard Lawlor, “The end of phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty,” 
Continental Philosophy Review 31 (1998), 15-34. 
 
5 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 144. 
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own cognitive reflection.6 Bernhard Waldenfels observes that a statement made by 
Husserl “which concerns the proper beginning of a phenomenologically oriented 
psychology”7 contains the germ of what Merleau-Ponty came to call the paradox of 
expression. In this statement, Husserl explains that the task of the phenomenologist is to 
bring “still mute experience […] to the pure expression of its own sense.” This statement, 
Waldenfels writes, “guides Merleau-Ponty as a leitmotif in the early Phenomenology of 
Perception, through a philosophy of historical praxis, up to the later ontology’s 
philosophy of language.”8 Merleau-Ponty keeps returning to this statement because it 
engenders what is paradoxical about expression, namely, that expression aims to give 
voice to that which is mute, and yet pregnant with meaning.  
The tension within expressive acts between “still mute experience” and “the pure 
expression of its own sense” is multifaceted and deserves a thorough investigation. This 
tension goes to the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s late thought concerning the relationship 
between the self and world as revealed through an interrogation of perception. In The 
                                                
6 In “Creativity and the Unconscious in Merleau-Ponty and Schelling,” in Framing a Vision of the World: 
Essays in Philosophy, Science, and Religion: In Honor of Professor Jan Van der Veken. ed. Andre Cloots 
and Santiago Sia (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), Patrick Burke develops an interpretation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about expression along these lines, emphasizing the possible religious 
dimensions of his theory in relation to the philosophy of Schelling. Burke explains that for Schelling the 
origin of expression is nature at large, which is itself an emanation of an absolute Subject. Though there 
is no such Subject at play for Merleau-Ponty, Burke highlights what he believes to be a thread of 
Christianity running throughout Merleau-Ponty’s philosophyas a point of comparison. While there are 
Christian metaphors to be found in Merleau-Ponty’s writings, the movements stirring in the artist that 
point beyond him or herself need not be concluded to be the work of God conceived in Christian terms. 
The Christian themes emphasized by Burke are compelling though not ultimately conclusive. The article 
does bring out some key ideas noting the affinities between Merleau-Ponty and Schelling which point to 
role of nature in their theories of creativity. (183-208) 
 
7 Bernhard Waldenfels, “The Paradox of Expression,” in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh. ed. 
Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 89. 
 
8 Ibid., 91. 
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Being of the Phenomenon, Renaud Barbaras traces the development of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thinking about expression from the position put forth in Phenomenology of Perception up 
through his later ontology, explaining that the Phenomenology of Perception reinscribes a 
dualism between perception and expression, and correspondingly, between the natural 
world and the ideality of speech, culture, and knowledge, even though Merleau-Ponty 
was seeking an account of expression that overcame these dualisms. It is finally with the 
development of his ontology, Barbaras notes, that Merleau-Ponty is able to articulate the 
entwinement of perception and the pure expression of mute experience. Overall, the 
project of bringing experience to the pure expression of its own sense, which Merleau-
Ponty constantly affirms, finds its scope and fulfillment only with the ontological 
enterprise. This expression is conceivable only if it is expression of the world itself, in the 
sense that expression proceeds from the world, or in the sense that the world is its own 
expression.9   
What is paradoxical about expression, when we consider it from the standpoint of 
ontology, is its motivation and origin. What we aim to express can only come to light 
through expression. And yet an expression can never fully capture the experience that 
inspires it. In fact, the model or formula for expression that assumes there is first an 
experience that an expression aims to recreate and convey actually distorts what 
expressive acts are. It is only once we attempt to express ourselves that we uncover what 
our experience is. But, if things already carry within them a meaningful significance, that 
is, if sense is already infused in the fabric of experience as Husserl’s statement oft quoted 
by Merleau-Ponty suggests, then why is there a need to bring sense to expression? 
                                                
9 Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, trans. Len Lawlor and Ted 
Toadvine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 64. 
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Furthermore, why are expressions never quite adequate to, or exhaustive of, experience? 
The paradox lies in the fact that expression is creative; it generates meaning at the same 
time it conveys what is already somehow given. By being creative, an expression puts 
forth something new that was not originally present even though it is the result of 
inspiration. Merlau-Ponty says, “in its coupling with the flesh of the world, the body 
contributes more than it receives.” And yet, the body’s chiasmatic relation to the world 
means that our being is more than ourselves. Because we are in a chiasmatic relation with 
the flesh of the world, our expressions both express ourselves and the content that 
originates in the world. Our bodies, as a dehiscence of flesh, collaborate with the sphere 
in which they float such that our creations both exhibit the styles of our individual selves 
and exceed what we consciously intend.  
At stake here is the possibility of a meaningful, aesthetic act that bears forth an 
intention but is not merely a repetition of something pre-given. Expression arises as a 
result of the interaction between oneself and the world incited by perception. Our bodies, 
as the sites whereby perception takes place, open up a depth, the écart that manifests the 
chiasmatic relation. The depth of the field of experience is what enables perception by 
establishing the fundamental difference between oneself and that which one perceives. 
And yet, this depth, and the difference between the self and world that it entails, is also 
traversed by perception. We inhabit the perceptual field; therefore, we are inseparable 
from the things perceived. “That every being presents itself at a distance, which does not 
prevent us from knowing it, which is on the contrary the guarantee for knowing it: this is 
what is not considered.”10 The distance between ourselves and the horizon of objects 
                                                
10 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 127. 
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open to view is required for forms to appear. There has to be a space where perception 
and action can take place. It is this opening—this dehiscence—that allows for the 
apprehension of ourselves and the world. For this reason, the depth required for vision is 
not a distance that creates separation. “[T]he thickness of the flesh between the seer and 
the thing is constitutive for thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not 
an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication.”11 The chiasm of flesh that 
manifests itself through an opening, or dehiscence, instigates both perception and 
expression. They are dual movements of a circuit of exchange between the self and the 
world. This means that expression continues the work of perception to bring forth the 
meaningful significance belonging to sense.  
Perception and expression collaborate as a creative event that both holds open the 
depth of the field of experience and brings us into greater intimacy with the material 
world. Thus, we must recognize how expression emerges from sensibility in which the 
self and world are intertwined. Explaining this idea, Barbaras writes: “Expression is not a 
veil draped over the world, insofar as it is the very becoming of the world. Its creation is 
an unveiling; the divergence that it establishes is just as much a coincidence.”12 Being 
both an “unveiling” and a “divergence,” creativity appears paradoxical. However, this 
apparent paradox is necessary because it captures the chiasmatic relations structuring the 
activities of perception and expression, and indicates how these activities are essentially 
creative. 
                                                
11 Ibid., 135. 
 
12 Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon, 66. 
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In order to more fully understand how expression is emergent from and connected 
to the flesh of the world must we consider the notion of a sensible or aesthetic idea, that 
is, some kind of non-linguistic meaning expressed through a sensuous medium. While 
language is an essential facet of expression, for Merleau-Ponty expression is not only a 
matter of language. The notion of a sensible or aesthetic idea suggests that there is a 
logos of things and of the body that works in tandem with the spoken and written word. 
For Merleau-Ponty, understanding how aesthetic experience can be meaningful requires 
that we “recognize an ideality that is not alien to the flesh that gives it its axis, its depth, 
its dimension.”13 In other words, ideality is not applied externally to sense. It must be 
something arising through the chiasm of the flesh itself. As bodily beings partaking in the 
chiasm of flesh, we feel the desire to make the “still mute experience” more manifest 
through expression, whether it be through speech, painting, or some other medium. Our 
actions are inspired and motivated by the affect that the perception of things has upon us. 
We are bound up in the world’s own striving to express itself. For example, a singer 
performing a sonata gives voice to what the sonata, itself, expresses. Thus Merleau-Ponty 
writes: “We do not possess the musical or sensible ideas […] they possess us. The 
performer is no longer producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself, and others 
feel him to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata sings through him […]”14 Even 
though the performer is needed for the sonata to exist, the sonata only exists by being 
sung; the performer feels as though he or she is at its service. He or she is compelled to 
do it justice, to fulfill what the performance itself demands. 
                                                
13 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 152. 
 
14 Ibid., 151. 
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This example shows that creative expression involves collaboration between the 
self and the sense belonging to things themselves. This collaboration can be best 
understood by exploring the role that the artist’s medium plays in creative expression, 
which will be discussed in detail below. The crucial aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
expression that I am highlighting is its implication that creative acts are not expressions 
of pure individuality. Rather, the intertwinement of the seer and the seen and the role 
sensuous media play in expressive acts imply that expression is subtended by something 
that the subject does not possess. Therefore, there is an element of something other than 
ourselves that inheres in our creations as a result. This otherness implies that expression 
is not simply a matter of an individual’s volition. This, in turn, suggests that there is an 
element of responsiveness and receptivity involved in expression, and this is precisely 
what allows our expression to be understood as expressions of the world of which we are 
a part. “Expression has the form not only of a creative, but also of a responsive 
expression.”15 (The responsive element of expression in turn implies that it has an ethical 
component, which will be of interest when Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics are compared to 
those of the Japanese tradition.) Since there is always something foreign in expression 
that does not belong to the subject, a certain kind of passivity is required in order for one 
to be receptive to it. Galen Johnson describes this subtle idea acutely: 
Merleau-Ponty’s most delicate and difficult philosophical concept becomes, 
rather than intentionality, passivity. This passivity, anonymity, or generality in 
both the artist who paints and the philosopher who thinks and writes means 
that there is a system of exchanges between body and world such that eye and 
hand become the obverse side of things and the inside of an outside in which 
both are enveloped.16 
                                                
15 Waldenfels, “The Paradox of Expression,” 98.  
 
16 Johnson, The Retrieval of the Beautiful, 19. 
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Passivity, anonymity, and generality can be thought of as that which exceeds the 
subjective intentions of the individual. Since one’s expressive act has origins in the 
corporeal dialogue taking place between the body and the world it is engaged with, one is 
guided by the manifold influences of the sedimented layers of the body’s history enfolded 
within the upsurge of the creative event. Therefore the results of an expressive act result 
in more than one intends or can foresee. “[W]hether one meditates first and then creates, 
or if one creates and then meditates upon what has been done—there is a laterality, a way 
of being surprised by the work as if the work itself takes over and overtakes us.”17   
The concept of passivity is so “delicate and difficult” because it exhibits the 
tension at work in the paradox of expression. It attempts to locate that dark source in us 
that inspires creativity, that to which our creative acts are a response. In a working note 
from November, 1959 Merleau-Ponty writes: 
Philosophy has never spoken—I do not say of passivity: we are not effects—
but I would say of the passivity of our activity [… N]ew as our initiatives may 
be, they come to birth at the heart of being, they are connected onto the time 
that streams forth in us 18 
 
Philosophy has, however, spoken of the “passivity of our activity.” This is precisely what 
Nishida’s concept of acting-intuition aims to express. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 221. 
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2. Nishida on the Expressive Body and the Creative World 
The paradox of expression articulated by Merleau-Ponty exhibits the subtly and 
complexity of the relationship between the self and world in expressive action. We 
participate in the dynamic movement of expression that is alive in sense itself. Nishida’s 
account of the self-world relation in perception and action parallels Merleau-Ponty’s 
account in significant ways, and Nishida’s robust knowledge of the European tradition 
invites a fruitful comparison of his philosophy with that of Merleau-Ponty.  
Nishida is the foremost member of the so-called Kyoto School, and his original 
philosophy has shaped philosophy in Japan more than any other since him. As a thinker 
well-versed in the Japanese tradition and various strands of European and American 
thought, Nishida’s philosophy is an impressive fusion of world philosophy. Nishida 
weaves together many strands of influence from across the globe and numerous historical 
periods. In addition to being shaped by his own cultural heritage as a Japanese 
intellectual with a background in Zen, the particular standpoint he developed over the 
course of his life drew on the conceptual frameworks and vocabularies of German 
idealism and phenomenology. To a large extent Nishida’s philosophical project is to 
describe the reality disclosed through the Zen experience using Western philosophical 
concepts and vocabulary.  
The undertones of Zen in Nishida are clearly evident in his way of describing the 
unity of mind and body and the dialectical nonduality of the self and world in perception 
and action. At the heart of Nishida’s worldview is the profound notion of absolute 
nothingness (zettai mu 絶対無), a philosophical re-rendering of the Buddhist concept of 
emptiness known only through the samadhic awareness realized in meditation. Nishida 
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developed his logic of place as an attempt to make the vantage point of emptiness 
philosophically intelligible. What is most germane about Nishida’s logic of place for our 
purposes is its spatial connotations. As embodied beings, our existence is always rooted 
in a spatiotemporal setting. Nishida uses a form of dialectic to describe the relational 
character of self and other inseparable from the field of experience. This field, referred to 
as “place” (basho場所) is the universal in which the self-world relation is dialectically 
manifested.  
According to Nishida, the body is the site of the dialectical universal place. It is 
the place of the self. At the same time, the body’s implacement implies that it is 
seamlessly immersed in a world that is not itself. As the site of the dialectical universal 
place, the body is the focal point of the self’s “contradictory identity” with the world.19 
The body is the locus of the self, though the self is not locatable in it. In an essay from 
1939 given the title “The World as Identity of Absolute Contradiction” by its translators, 
Nishida writes, “Each individual is an unattainable depth, and at the same time, a 
fundamental point of world origination.”20 As a point of world origination, our being is 
continuous with the spatiotemporal world it inhabits. We are situated in the world 
through our bodily existence, but we open out onto the world through our perception of 
it, extending beyond the axis of our embodiment in which we are seated. 
                                                
19 The self-identity of absolute contradictories (zettai mujunteki jikodōitsu 絶対矛盾的自己同一) is a 
technical formulation Nishida often uses to describe the relationship between antithetical terms that are 
mutually determining. This formulation is grounded in the Buddhist concept engi (縁起), the ontological 
principle that maintains that all phenomena are interdependently arisen, existing only through their 
relationship to all other phenomena. 
 
20 Nishida Kitarō, “World as Identity of Absolute Contradiction,” Sourcebook for Modern Japanese 
Philosophy, trans. and ed. David A. Dilworth et al. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 62;  Nishida 
Kitarō Zenshū, 19 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979), vol. 9 p. 317) [Hereafter cited as NKZ followed 
by volume and page numbers.] 
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Nishida’s notion of the body involves a corresponding theory of perception and 
action. For Nishida, in perceiving the world, the subject is projected outward, as it were, 
extending into the space where perception takes place. What we call “internal” 
subjectivity cannot be located anywhere apart from the space that we share with others. 
Of course, each one of us has a vantage point that is uniquely our own, and so we speak 
of an “inner” subjectivity and experience. But we also perceive externally in that what we 
perceive is other than ourselves. What we see when we look out onto a landscape is not a 
private vision, but one that others can see as well. Furthermore, our so-called inner life 
does not take place inside anything. What is said to be perceived “internally” exists 
externally, outside the domain of any one person’s subjectivity, and it is precisely 
through this dialectic of the internal and external space of perception that the historical 
world appears. Explaining this point Nishida writes:  
[T]here is no internal perception apart from external perception. […] The 
world of perception exists as internal-qua-external perception and vice 
versa. As something identical in itself, it may be conceived as a world of 
intuition, which is dialectically self-determining. Our self is submerged in it 
and at the same time is established by it. Herein we have an objective world 
for the first time, the world of things.21 
 
Conceived spatially, subjectivity and objectivity, or internal and external perception, 
occupy the same place, or field, and only through the mutual co-origination of the self 
and world in the dialectical universal place do the self and world become concrete. 
Summarizing this point, Nishida states, “our selves exist as the self-determination of the 
                                                
21  Nishida, Kitarō, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, trans. David A. Dilworth (Tokyo: Sophia 
University, 1970), 189; NKZ 7: 351. 
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active world in which inside is outside and outside is inside.”22 With this, one can already 
hear echoes of Merleau-Ponty.  
According to Nishida, the body is the locus of action and perception through 
which we extend beyond the bounds of our skin such that the limit between the self and 
world cannot be drawn. His model of perception, therefore, implies that the source of 
expression must also be reassessed. If the distinction between self and world cannot be 
definitively drawn, then we cannot say that expression is a movement that begins in the 
subject and ends in the “exterior” world. Since subjectivity can no longer be said to reside 
internally, the source of expression must be understood to arise equally from out of the 
life-space we inhabit. Perception and action also have a temporal dimension insofar as we 
are situated within history. According to Nishida, “Our bodily self realizes itself as a 
creative element in the historical world, and historical life realizes itself through our 
body.”23  
Building upon his view of the body and his insight into the interpenetration of 
internal and external perceptual space and time, Nishida’s concept of acting-intuition (or 
active intuition as it is sometimes translated) provides an apt account of his view of 
expression. Since the self and world arise together as the self-determination of the 
dialectical universal place, our existence is more than our own doing; it is an expression 
of the historical world. Nishida writes, “We are active bodily as the world’s own self 
transformations.”24 He understands our existence to be expressive by nature; and because 
                                                
22 Nishida Kitarō, “The Standpoint of Active Intuition,” in Ontology of Production: Three Essays, trans. 
William Haver (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 82; NKZ 8:132. 
 
23 Nishida Kitarō, “Logic and Life,” in Place and Dialectic: Two Essays By Nishida Kitarō (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 134-5; NKZ 8:325. 
 
24 Nishida, “World as Identity of Absolute Contradiction,” 58. 
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we exist in dialectical relation to the world, our expressive acts are expressive of our 
worlds. Our particular embodiment and the social historical world in which we are 
immersed guide and give meaning to our acts. Therefore, our actions are determined 
simultaneously by our own volition and the world in which we live. Observing this point, 
Kazashi Nobuo writes, “expressive ‘acts’ are grounded in, and originate from, the socio-
historical horizon of being; in this sense, expression is not so much the product of a 
particular individual but that of the field of socio-historical being itself.”25 At the same 
time, however, the social historical world is a product of human activity. So as members 
of a cultural community amidst its own history, we have a hand in making the world that 
shapes us in return. “Activity,” Nishida writes, “must be a productive transaction; and so 
in productivity subjectivity becomes objectivity and makes things, and at the same time 
that which is made makes that which makes. It is one transactional process.”26 In other 
words, our actions contribute to the world’s formation, and the world guides and gives 
meaning to our acts. Thus, the historical world and individuals are bound in an ongoing 
process of development in which they are mutually determining over time. 
Nishida uses the term acting-intuition to describe this dynamic interchange 
because it preserves the tension within the origin of expression. Our projects are active, 
volitional expressions of ourselves. But our action is inspired and guided by our intuition 
of the world through our attunement with it, and so, as with Merleau-Ponty, it has a 
passive element as well. Thus, Nishida combines the terms acting and intuition to 
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preserve the tension between the volitional and receptive dimensions of expression. 
Acting and intuiting are the dual aspects of expression forming one continuous circuit of 
exchange. In Nishida’s words: 
Expression entails the contradictory identity, and dynamic transaction, of 
the conscious act (self) and the world (other). Each conscious act is an 
existential monad of the world’s own self-reflection. Our self-
consciousness does not take place in a merely closed up, windowless self.  
It consists in the fact that the self, by transcending itself, faces and 
expresses the world.27 
 
Even though Nishida curiously adopts the term monad to describe the self as an 
expression of the world, he makes clear that the self is not windowless. The field of the 
self is continuous with the world since the self has no interiority apart from the dialectical 
universal place. Thus, when we act, we intuit the infinite depth of ourselves, which is, at 
the same time, a point of world origination. This might sound as if the world is created 
from out of the self, but since the self is empty of its own independent existence apart 
from the world it inhabits, the intuitive aspect of expression implies that when we act we 
are following the lead of the particular scene at hand. Our actions are creative and 
productive, but only as part of a circuit of exchange whereby the historical world 
determines and is determined by the expressive acts of individuals. 
For Nishida, artistic activity is paradigmatic of embodied activity in general; and 
he often appeals to the artist-at-work as an exemplary form of expression. Thus, art was 
an important theme for him throughout his career even though he never developed a 
particular theory of aesthetics. In Art and Morality (1923), he integrates a variety of 
discussions ranging from the relation between the individual and society, law, the will, 
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consciousness, and behavior such that this work is not explicitly on art and aesthetics. 
Since Nishida did not deal with art in isolation from other related phenomena, Iwaki 
Ken’ichi explains that “We do not find in Nishida an independent ‘philosophy of art.’” 
However, “he always took up the issue of art, together with religion, at important 
junctures of his career as examples with which to validate his thought. Nishida’s 
‘philosophy of art’ is intertwined with his entire philosophical speculation.”28 Relatedly, 
in “Truly Nothing: The Kyoto School and Art,” Jason Wirth argues that according to 
many of the philosophers associated with the Kyoto School, aesthetics is not “considered 
to be an elective problem in philosophy;” rather, it is fundamental and brings to the fore 
“the site of philosophizing itself.”29 From this perspective, it becomes clear why art is so 
central to Nishida’s philosophizing despite the fact that he didn’t develop a specific 
theory of aesthetics.  
Artistic activity, then, is an ideal illustration of the dynamic at work in acting-
intuition. According to Nishida, besides being an active, volitional expression, the artist’s 
work involves the intuition of and attunement to the potentials of a given medium and the 
cultural milieu in which the artist is working. Thus, volitional action and intuitive 
receptivity come together to form one continuous circuit of exchange between the self 
and world during the creative process. Aesthetic creation is a prime example of acting-
intuition for Nishida because, in the deep concentration that it requires, the artist’s 
subjectivity gives way to the object of its making, thereby demonstrating the dialectic of 
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self and world described above. The “transactional process” of acting-intuition finds a 
high point is aesthetic creation wherein the artist’s entire being is involved in the creative 
act. In Art and Morality, Nishida writes, “When the artist is fully immersed in the horizon 
of pure visual perception, he spontaneously moves the organs of his whole body and 
becomes one expressive movement. At this time, feeling wells up within, and the artist 
himself cannot foretell the direction and meaning of his own expressive act.”30 
Aesthetic creation clearly demonstrates acting-intuition because when the artist is 
immersed in the production of an artwork his or her aesthetic choices are in many ways a 
response to the demands of the developing piece such that the artwork is actually 
determining itself through the activity of the artist. The circuit of expression between the 
body and world in the space of the artwork’s coming-into-being takes place through the 
artist’s engagement with a specific medium. The artist intuits the concrete possibilities of 
the material at hand and actively shapes it accordingly. Commenting on Nishida’s 
understanding of the role of the body in the production of art, Yuasa Yasuo31 writes, “the 
body displays an ambiguity in being both subjective and objective in the world as life-
space; now we see this implies that acting and intuiting are moments in an active-passive 
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relational circuit between the body and things in the world-space.”32 In this process the 
artist embodies the spatiality of the artwork such that the artist is inseparable from the 
creative emergence taking place in that world-space. Explaining this notion, Nishida 
writes, “in expression objectivity is subjectivity, or rather subjectivity can be seen in the 
very midst of objectivity. […] It has the meaning of determining and negating the person, 
while at the same time the person finds his true self therein. This is especially so in 
aesthetic creation.”33 
Nishida’s concept of the transactional process of acting-intuition is related to what 
he describes as the movement from the created to the creating (tsukurareta mono kara 
tsukuru mono e 作られたものから作るものへ). We do not create ourselves, but we are 
transformed by our own creative acts since we are involved in a continual exchange in 
which we make things that in turn make us. In an essay from 1938 entitled “Human 
Being,” Nishida writes, “While thing and self are utterly opposed and utterly contradict 
each other, the thing affects the self and the self affects the thing […] the world itself, 
forms itself, moving in active intuition from the made to the making.”34 Nishida’s 
concept of the movement from the created to the creating (or from the made to the 
making) is meant to capture the positional shift in which the individual born of the 
natural-historical world becomes the site of the world’s own self-transformations. The 
“world itself forms itself, moving in active intuition from the made to the making.”35 The 
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movement from the made to the making provides a broader context for understanding the 
dynamic of acting-intuition taking place on an individual level. Collectively we are 
participants in an expressive world. Our individual creative acts are inspired by and are 
responses to the existent meanings given in the world around us, but we also contribute 
the discourses of culture through our own creative acts that bear the mark of our 
individual insight. Our expressive acts are motivated and guided by that which we do not 
ourselves create, although we contribute to the shared milieu that will, in turn, motivate 
and guide the creative acts of others.  
Nishida also suggests in his later work that nature itself must be understood as 
expressive. Earlier it was explained that Nishida’s understanding of the self as a locus of 
world origination involves a view of perception in which the self extends into the space 
where the body is situated. Nishida’s understanding of expression and the movement 
from the created to the creating builds on his view of perception and the body to explain 
how the creative acts of individuals are, at the same time, transformations of the natural-
historical world. He maintains that our action involves becoming things, and he appeals 
to the act of seeing as an illustration. Making reference to the German aestheticist Conrad 
Fiedler, Nishida explains how seeing is a productive activity when it guides the 
movements of the body as a whole. The artist’s vision is paradigmatic of world 
formation, and the eye’s seeing is complemented by the workings of the hands. Nishida 
writes:  
Fiedler […] states that the hand, taking over after the work of the eye is 
finished, causes further development. At this time, the hand becomes one with 
the eye; the entire body becomes the eye, as it were. […] Artistic creation is 
not mere creation; it is a productive seeing.36  
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Connecting the “productive seeing” of artistic creation to his theories of acting-intuition 
and the expressiveness of nature in the movement from the created to the creating, he 
writes, “when the sculptor is sculpting and the painter is painting, each becomes a process 
of seeing only. Plotinus states that nature does not create by seeing, but, rather, that 
nature’s seeing is creation. In this way the artist becomes nature itself.”37 In the dynamic 
circuit of acting-intuition, we become nature by embodying nature’s own creative seeing. 
“The world forms itself,” Nishida writes, by having “dynamically expressive monads as 
centers.”38 As loci of the natural-historical world’s self-transformations, human beings 
embody the movement from the created to the creating in which nature becomes 
expressive. Therefore, according to Nishida’s dialectic, our actions can be understood as 
the expression of nature itself.   
  At this point, the importance of Fiedler’s influence on Nishida’s aesthetic theory 
should be noted. Nishida references Fiedler frequently, especially in Art and Morality, 
and his own aesthetic theory owes much to Fiedler’s insights. Conrad Fiedler (1841-
1895) was a German philosopher interested primarily in the visual arts. While he does not 
offer a rich ontological account of art and nature, his work is significant because he is 
primarily focused on understanding art from the artist’s perspective during the creative 
process. Fiedler was close friends with the painter Hans von Marées and the sculpture 
Adolph Hildebrand, and through his friendship with these artists he was able to gain an 
intimate understanding of their creative processes. It is largely from his observation of 
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and dialogue with these men that Fiedler’s theory of visual art grew. As a result of his 
close work with Marées and Hildebrand, Fiedler put forth the original and insightful 
claim that art is a product of perceptual experience; and the mental operation of 
perception inspiring artistic creation, though not conceptual, is its own type of cognition. 
Fiedler was well acquainted with Kant’s philosophy, and his work built upon and 
furthered Kant’s ideas, taking them in a new direction. Applying Kant’s epistemology to 
the study of visual art, Fiedler argues that in addition to the scientific, conceptual 
comprehension of the world, there exists the perceptual, artistic cognition of the world. 
He claims that both forms of cognition “are separate and autonomous mental 
processes.”39  
Fiedler makes clear that he opposes the theory that art is the imitation of nature as 
if nature were something fixed and external awaiting re-presentation. The theory of 
imitation implies that the artist recreates a second, “ideal” world alongside the real one. 
Fiedler rejects this notion, claiming that art is the creation of the world “made by and for 
the artistic consciousness.”40 Fiedler writes, “Imitation which aims merely at copying 
outward appearances implies that one starts from the premise that there is nature in a 
substantial capital of minted and fixed forms at the disposal of the artist and that the 
copying of these forms is a purely mechanical activity.”41 This, however, is not what the 
artist experiences when he or she attempts to really perceive nature. Instead, one finds 
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him or herself amidst an “endless profusion” and “vacillating confusion [that] man had 
taken for granted as simple and clear.”  
Artistic activity begins when man finds himself face to face with the visible 
world as with something immensely enigmatical; […] In the creation of a 
work of art, man engages in a struggle with nature not for his physical but for 
his mental existence […] Thus it is that art has nothing to do with forms that 
are found ready-made prior to its activity and independent of it. Rather the 
beginning and the end of artistic activity reside in the creation of forms that 
only thereby attain existence.42  
 
From these remarks we can see that Fiedler understands the creation of artworks to 
coincide with a kind of creative perception in which we apprehend nature more fully. 
Fiedler could be interpreted as maintaining a position like that of Nietzsche in which the 
artist creates forms out of sheer chaos, thus running counter to the account of artistic 
perception and creation espoused by Klee, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. However, we 
need not interpret Fiedler as maintaining a strong “Promethean” view as was discussed in 
the previous chapter. Though he claims that there are not ready-made forms to be found 
in nature, it is not, therefore, the case that the artist imposes his or her designs upon 
nature, shaping it into whatever he or she desires. If we understand Fiedler’s position 
through Nishida’s interpretive lens, we can see how artistic creation coincides with 
nature’s generation of itself. Since, for Nishida, expression takes the form of active 
intuition in which nature itself becomes expressive, the artist’s generation of forms, as 
Fielder understands it, can be understood as “nature’s seeing.” Thus, the creative, artistic 
cognition described by Fiedler coincides with nature’s own becoming.   
Fiedler’s aesthetics, when combined with Nishida’s theory of acting-intuition, 
further demonstrates the intertwining of individual creative actions and the expressivity 
                                                
42 Ibid., 48. 
 
 143 
of the world. According to Nishida, “The world forms itself” by having “dynamically 
expressive monads as centers.”43 As loci of the natural-historical world’s self-
transformations, human beings embody the movement from the created to the creating in 
which nature itself becomes expressive. Nishida extends this line of reasoning to suggest 
that the expressiveness of nature, in turn, implies that material is expressive. Nishida’s 
understanding of the co-determination of the self and world in the form of the dialectical 
universal place necessitates that all elements of the world-space are part of the expressive 
body, including physical material. The physical world, according to Nishida, is 
“historical-social matter” which must itself “be possessed of expressivity.”44 In fact, he 
writes, “A materiality that is not possessed of the essential quality of expressive form-
making is nothing more than a thought materiality. […] Historical matter […] is that 
which necessarily moves in expressive activity.”45 In acting-intuition, “our intentional 
acts” develop “from the dialectical self-identity of what is called seeing and what is 
called acting; it develops in terms of expressive form-making.” We exist through our 
historical materiality, and our expressive actions correspond with the self-transformations 
of the historical-social matter. When an artist creates forms, he or she is collaborating 
with material such that the creative act expresses more than the individual’s subjective 
intentions. The act expresses the historical-social-material world of which the individual 
is a creative locus. Nishida declares; “that the self is born of the world has not been 
thought with sufficient profundity.” When we create art, we are performing the creative 
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acts of the natural-historical climate of which we are born. We actualize ourselves by 
performing creative acts, and through those acts we shape the world in return. 
Following this line of reasoning further, Nishida arrives at his notion of historical 
nature. According to Nishida, “the physical world is grounded in the expressive world.” 
Therefore, “Nature is within history.”46 This means that the physical world of nature 
cannot be conceived independently of the ways it is apprehended by historical cultures. 
And since Nishida understands the self and world to be co-constituitive of the dialectical 
universal place, he maintains that nature and history must be similarly co-constituitive. 
Nishida finds a direct connection between the historicity of nature and artistic expression, 
and he frequently appeals to the production of art to illustrate his theory. The mutual 
exchange between self and world in the transactional process of acting-intuition is aptly 
illustrated by the creation of art because the artist collaborates with what is given both 
materially and culturally, taking it up as the medium for the self to become actualized 
through its own activity. Nishida writes: “What is called art, with regard to history-qua-
nature […] is established in conformity with the side of nature; it is the becoming-nature 
of the spirit of the epoch.”47 This means that the artist’s intuition is drawn from nature, 
but not “nature” conceived independently of culture. Therefore, according to Nishida, 
“Nature must […] be thoroughly expressive.”48 The artist is immersed in the world-space 
that includes all the physical and biological elements of nature that are themselves part of 
the expressive world. The process of acting-intuition and the movement from the created 
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to the creating describe the circuit of exchange from which the artist draws, and to which 
his or her work contributes. Since we embody nature’s own seeing, and we are always 
situated within the context of a historical culture, nature, too, has its own history of 
seeing itself through our historical acts. 
 Though Nishida’s conception of historical nature has not received any significant 
attention in the Nishida scholarship in the English-speaking world, it has the ability to 
flesh out his notoriously abstract “logic of place.” Nishida’s logic of place is one of the 
most widely discussed dimensions of his philosophy; and while Nishida maintains that 
his logic aims at providing a truly concrete account of reality, his own elaboration of the 
logic of (place) lacks a clear connection to the sensuously textured world of life. Indeed, 
Nishida’s concept of absolute nothing, in which his logic culminates, seems at odds with 
any sort of concrete determinations that comprise our experience. This, of course, is 
terribly ironic, since absolute nothing, as Nishida conceives it, is the grounding medium 
of all that is, though it is nothing in itself. As John Krummel puts it: “the negativity [of 
the basho of true nothing] is simultaneously the positivity of its self-determination that 
inverts nothing into beings. Because it forms itself, in spite of its formlessness, basho still 
proves to be a positive source of the real.”49 Summing up one of the central goals of his 
philosophizing, Nishida writes: “I want to conceive, at the root of all things a seeing 
without a seer.” This seeing without a seer may be considered the dialectical universal 
place of absolute nothingness whereby the world is actualized through its own self-
determination. 
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The connection between Nishida’s concept of the dialectical universal basho and 
the world of life of which we are familiar becomes more evident in light of our discussion 
of the expressivity of nature. In “Logic and Life,” he states: “the world of biological life, 
at its root, is [...] a world whereby historical nature sees by making.”50 Historical nature’s 
“seeing by making” can be understood as a concrete description of the “seeing without a 
seer” that Nishida seeks. In fact, in the same essay he tells us that that “true life [… is] 
“determination without a determiner.”51 Life is the self-determination of the world in 
which historical nature sees by making, and we, as points of world origination, are the 
loci of nature’s own seeing of itself. Through our creative acts we form our world, and 
the world forms us in return. Therefore, the dialectical universal basho is the very 
movement of life and the proliferation of forms that comprise our world. The process 
through which historical nature sees by making is directly connected to Nishida’s notions 
of the expressive world and the dynamic interchange of acting-intuition in which the 
individual both shapes and is shaped by the natural and cultural world it inhabits.  
Though Nishida does not refer directly to nature in the circuit of exchange 
between the artist and medium, if we view his position in light of Watsuji’s discussion of 
climaticity, we can see how climate in Watsuji’s sense bears upon the dynamic 
interchange transpiring in Nishida’s account of artistic creativity. In fact, by bringing 
their views together, each becomes more concrete. Nishida often says, “we think by 
becoming things, we act by becoming things.”52 If we add Watsuji’s notion of climate to 
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this equation, we can see how the things one becomes through thought and action must be 
understood as part of a climatic setting. When we consider the self becoming things 
during the creative process, we can conclude that the material the artist is working with is 
participating in the genesis of the piece according to the dynamic interchange of acting-
intuition Nishida describes.  
 
3. Watsuji’s Phenomenology of Climate and the Expressivity of Material in 
Japanese Aesthetics 
 
Watsuji is well known for his work in ethics, which is grounded on his 
understanding of ningen [人間], or human being. Human being, according to Watsuji and 
evinced by the etymology of the kanji compound ningen, has a dual-structure, being both 
individual and relational simultaneously. Central to Watsuji’s ethics is the notion of 
“betweenness,” aidagara [間柄], which refers to the shared cultural space of human 
interaction. Conceived in concrete terms, this space must be understood as situated in an 
earthly place structured by social institutions and infrastructures. In this regard, his ethics 
is necessarily embodied, a point demonstrated by Erin McCarthy in Embodied Ethics: 
Rethinking Selfhood in Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies.53 My focus, 
then, will be on the tie between climate, space, and embodiment in Watsuji’s work. This 
tie is also the point of significant intersections with Nishida’s account of the expressive 
world and Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh and his writings on painting. Through an 
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analysis of Watsuji’s conceptions of human being and its climatic milieu, I will show 
how the artist’s comportment toward a medium reflects a view in which nature itself is 
moved towards expression that builds upon Nishida and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of the 
expressive body. Then, I will discuss some examples that illustrate this process in some 
traditional Japanese art forms.  
Watsuji was a professor at Kyoto Imperial University in the 1920-30s alongside 
Nishida, and the influence of Nishida’s dialectical style on Watsuji’s philosophy is 
evident. However, the thinker who had the most influence on the direction of Watsuji’s 
philosophy is arguably Heidegger, with whom Watsuji studied Being and Time in 1927. 
The time Watsuji spent studying and traveling in Europe was quite formative in that it 
spurred him “to reflect more deeply on the unique qualities of Japanese thought” in 
contrast with those of other traditions.54 One such quality is the recognition of the spatial 
relationality of the human being. Watsuji perceived Heidegger’s account of Dasein to 
overemphasize the temporal nature of human existence at the expense of its spatiality. 
For Watsuji, this was a significant limitation since the sharing of space bespeaks for him 
the relation of betweenness central to what it means to be human. Watsuji critiqued 
Heidegger’s emphasis on the temporality of human existence because the temporal 
structure of Dasein is tied to its individual being-towards-death. Thus, Watsuji believed 
Heidegger failed to give an adequate account of Dasein’s inherent relationality. In an 
article from 1974, David Dilworth explains: 
According to Watsuji, Heidegger ultimately lost sight of [the spatial and 
social side of human existence] in the second half of Sein und Zeit when 
he stressed the radical temporality of Dasein’s ‘Being-towards-death.’ In 
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the individual’s experience, Sein is existence for death; but from the 
perspective of the whole of society, while individuals die, mankind lives 
and man’s world continues.55 
 
Watsuji recognized that the temporal and spatial dimensions of human being are equally 
important, and he was right to point out that the relational character of the self has been 
more readily acknowledged within Japanese and other Eastern cultures. On the other 
hand, Western cultures have tended to be more strongly individualist. William LaFleur 
notes that Watsuji observed that even though Western thought in general had no 
difficulty seeing that time is intimately tied to the subjective side of experience, space 
tends “to be thought of as a part of nature or environment and is thus only objectified.”56 
It was primarily this observation that prompted Watsuji to write Fūdo [風土], or Climate 
and Culture, in 1929.  
Watsuji links the spatiality of human being to our immersion in a natural 
environment. In order to address what he found to be lacking in Heidegger’s account of 
Dasein, Dilworth explains that, “Watsuji emphasized existential spatiality and climate as 
equiprimordial dimensions of human existence.”57 According to John C. Maraldo, in 
Climate and Culture, Watsuji sought to show how “human spatiality shapes the 
intentionality of our perceptions and actions, and how climatic zones shape the character 
                                                
55 David Dilworth, “Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960): Cultural Phenomenologist and Ethician,” Philosophy 
East and West 24 (January 1974), 17. 
 
56 William, LaFleur, “Buddhist Emptiness in the Ethics and Aesthetics of Watsuji Tetsurō,” Religious 
Studies, Vol. 14, no. 2 (June 1978), 242. 
 
57 David A. Dilworth, introduction to Watsuji, Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy, trans. and ed. 
David A. Dilworth and Valdo H. Viglielmo, with Agustin Jacinto Zavala (London: Greenwood Press, 
1998), 226. 
 
 150 
of interhuman relations and give rise to distinct cultures.”58 Though Watsuji’s 
anthropological views are riddled with complications, the way his theory of climate 
integrates the natural environment into the phenomenology of lived experience is highly 
valuable and anticipates certain insights of bioregionalism. Robert E. Carter explains in 
his introduction to Watsuji’s volume Ethics [Rinrigaku 倫理学], “By climate Watsuji 
means to include not only weather patterns of a region but the natural geographic setting 
of a people plus the social environment of family, community, society, lifestyle, and even 
the technical apparatus that supports community survival and interaction.”59 In short, 
climate encompasses all that goes into shaping the space in which we live. Therefore, 
climate, as the space of life, is inseparable from human being as ningen and must be 
taken into consideration within any discourse on ethics. 
The spatiality of human being underlies its essential relatedness, both to others 
and to the natural world. Climatic space permeates the self such that the places we inhabit 
are inseparable from who we are. Watsuji’s clearest expression of this may be found in 
the opening chapter of Climate and Culture where he provides a phenomenology of cold, 
or being-in-the-cold, as one might put it borrowing from Heidegger. In describing what it 
means to feel the cold, Watsuji gives a description of the relationship between oneself 
and the atmosphere. He begins by deconstructing the commonplace view that the cold of 
the air is something distinct from ourselves that we feel when it “presses upon us from 
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outside.”60 Rather than conceiving the cold and oneself as two separate things that enter 
into relation to each other, Watsuji maintains that the intentional relationship of the self 
and what it feels arise together in the experience of feeling. Explaining this point, he 
writes: 
It is not true that the intentional relationship is set up only when an object 
presses [in] from outside. As far as individual consciousness is concerned, 
the subject possesses the intentional structure within itself and … “directs 
itself toward something.” The “feeling” of “feeling the cold” is not a 
“point” which establishes a relationship directed at the cold, but it is in 
itself a relationship of its “feeling,” and it is in this relationship that we 
discover cold.61 
 
He goes on to clarify that “it is not the ‘feeling’ of cold that we feel, but the ‘coldness of 
the air’ or [simply] the ‘cold.’” Moreover, feeling the cold “means that we are outside in 
the cold;” but the “basic essence of what is ‘present outside’ is not a thing or object such 
as the cold, but we ourselves. […] That we feel the cold is an intentional experience, in 
which we discover ourselves in the state of ‘ex-sistere,’ or ourselves already outside in 
the cold.”62 In other words, Watsuji’s phenomenology of cold is meant to deconstruct the 
way of thinking that presumes a stark division between the supposed interiority of one’s 
feeling in opposition to an outside world that presses upon our senses, thereby causing a 
sensation. His point is that in order to feel the chill of the air we must already be outside 
in it, and it inside us. There is a mutuality between the self and the air such that the 
supposed interior of the subject coincides with the space we inhabit. 
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After laying out the interdependent structure of the subject and object in the 
experience of feeling the cold, Watsuji goes on to extend his phenomenological 
description to include the whole range of climatic features in connection to the land and 
sea. Summarizing his account, he explains that weather is not experienced in isolation.  
It is experienced only in relation to the soil, the topographic and scenic 
features and so on of a given land. A cold wind may be experienced as a 
mountain blast or the cold, dry wind that sweeps through Tokyo at the end 
of the winter. The spring breeze may be one which blows off cherry 
blossoms or which caresses the waves. So, too, the heat of summer may be 
of the kind to wither rich verdure or to entice children to play merrily in 
the sea. As we find our gladdened or pained selves in a wind that scatters 
the cherry blossoms, so do we apprehend our wilting selves in the very 
heat that scorches down on the plants and trees in a spell of dry weather.  
In other words, we find ourselves—ourselves as an element in the “mutual 
relationship” in climate.63 
 
From this passage we can see that, for Watsuji, “climate” refers to the whole scene of life 
rich with sensory textures and feelings that come together seamlessly to create the mood 
of the space of the betweenness in which we find ourselves. 
Watsuji’s insight into the relationship between culture and climate is profoundly 
astute and reveals him to be a kind of proto eco-phenomenologist. Perhaps Watsuji’s 
most profound insight is his recognition of how thoroughly the individual is permeated 
by the world, both natural and cultural. Watsuji’s account of the relationality of the self 
demonstrates the extent to which the individual exists as the betweenness of human being 
and climate. There is no individual apart from its immersion in the climatic milieu. 
Within the context of our discussion of the creation of art, Watsuji’s phenomenology of 
climate is useful for understanding the ways in which natural phenomena can directly 
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affect the creative process. Watsuji’s recognition of human being’s inseparability from 
climate illuminates how it is possible for elements of nature to become expressive when 
engaged by an artist. Because the individual exists in the space of betweenness, the 
artist’s inspiration and expression transpire in this space as well. Immersed in the space 
of betweenness with all its climatic features, the creative act of the artist expresses all the 
mutually determined elements of the natural and cultural milieu that constitute the place 
in which the act arises.  
  Even though Watsuji’s intentions in Climate and Culture are to elucidate how 
cultures came to be through their relationship to the places in which they arose, his 
concepts of betweenness and climaticity have interesting implications for understanding 
human creativity. Talking about the sorts of food, clothing, and architecture inspired by 
particular landscapes and weather patterns, he writes: “We have discovered ourselves in 
climate, and in this self-apprehension we are directed to our free creation.”64 Here he is 
referring to measures people take to survive and protect themselves from the elements, 
but there is no reason this insight cannot be extended to include the genesis of art. 
Climate poses certain restrictions on human activity, but the imposition of climate also 
provides an opportunity for creative expression similar to the way a material medium 
both limits and prompts the artist’s creativity. Graham Mayeda explains that we discover 
the freedom of our existence in creative response to the limitations of climate.  
Watsuji points out, the essential limitations of climate on human existence 
forces us to express ourselves in distinct ways as a response this climate. […] 
Thus, in climate, we come to understand two things: the climatic nature of 
human existence and the way in which the distinctive climatic existence is the 
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condition of the possibility for human self-apprehension.65 
 
Art is a one of the key modes of self-apprehension produced by a culture. Therefore, the 
art of a culture will inevitably express the climate of that culture since the climatic milieu 
subtends all human activity. 
One way of understanding how climate comes to bear on artistic expression is 
through a consideration of the role of the medium in the creation of art. In her article 
“The Moral Dimension of Japanese Aesthetics,” Saito Yuriko explains that one of the key 
principles that guides Japanese aesthetic design is “respecting the innate characteristics of 
objects.”66 Simply stated, this amounts to bringing out the beauty inherent in the material 
being worked with. It means following the lead of the material, working with its inherent 
properties and forms, thereby allowing it to become expressive of itself. This requires the 
de-emphasis of the artist’s intentions for the sake of responding to the sensuous qualities 
of objects. Saito cites a well-known saying of the famous haiku poet, Bashō, “Of the 
pine-tree learn from the pine tree. Of the bamboo learn from the bamboo.”67 For Bashō, 
this calls for what he refers to as “‘the slenderness of mind,’ as one has to overcome 
one’s personal feelings and concerns in order to grasp and appreciate the qualities of the 
objects for what they are.”68 Following Bashō, we may call this attitude “object centered” 
as opposed to “subject centered.”69 
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An object-centered approach toward art-making implies that the material medium 
becomes expressive through its relationship to the artist. But in order for an object-
centered approach to art-making to be successful, one must be subtly attuned to the 
material with which one is working and the larger milieu in which one is situated. 
Attuning oneself to the milieu involves a degree of self-negation which means that one 
forgets oneself by relinquishing one’s ego in order to allow the dimensions of the life-
space to be intuited. However, this does not render the person absent. Rather, the person 
becomes immersed in the space of betweenness, thereby raising the degree of intimacy 
with the other constituents of the space. This intimacy is what allows for subtle 
communication with and receptivity to the others with whom we share a space. Nishida’s 
understanding of the continuity of the self and an expressive world, developed according 
to the concept of acting-intuition, is helpful for articulating the object-centered 
relationship between the artist and medium discussed by Saito. Watsuji, rather than 
providing a robust account of expressive activity, refers to various traditional Japanese 
arts such as tea ceremony, and renga (a traditional form of linked-verse poetry composed 
by multiple authors) to illustrate this process.  
Attunement to others in the performance of tea ceremony and renga may be 
extended to the non-human components involved in other types of arts such as garden 
design. Watsuji describes how an artist must have a keen aesthetic sensibility to create 
harmony when designing a garden. The balance among the rocks and plants is not simply 
a matter of geometric proportion, he claims, but rather, "an accord of ‘spirit.’” Just as 
there can be an accord between two human beings, “so we can see a similar kind of 
relatedness between a garden’s rocks and its moss or even between one rock and 
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another.”70 Watsuji’s reference to the “spirits” of rocks and other elements of nature is 
not idiosyncratic. It reflects an attitude that has long been a part of the Japanese tradition. 
Graham Parkes explains that the phrase “following the request [of the rock] is used 
frequently in a manual on garden design from the eleventh century to “encourage a 
responsiveness on the part of the garden maker to what we might call the ‘soul’ of the 
stone. […] Rather than imposing a preconceived design on the site and the elements 
there, the accomplished garden maker will be sensitive to what the particular rocks 
‘want’.”71 This not only illuminates what the landscape architect Masuno could have 
meant when he said he enters into dialogue with rocks and plants, it suggest that the 
creation of art requires that the artist “listen” and respond to what the material itself 
demands.  
Another example of the how artistic media become expressive when engaged by 
an artist in the way outlined by Nishida, Watsuji, and Merleau-Ponty may be found in the 
writings of the prominent artist and calligrapher, Morita Shiryū (1912-1999). Morita 
describes how he collaborates with his brush when he paints calligraphy. The brush with 
which he paints is the “other” that allows him to be. He is not a calligrapher without his 
brush, and his brush is not a brush apart from its being a tool that enables one to paint. In 
other words, both the brush and the calligrapher depend on the other to be what they are. 
The reasoning structuring the relationship between Morita and his brush is analogous to 
the relationship between the self and climate articulated by Watsuji.  
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Because there is no self by itself and no brush by itself, no relationship comes 
about between some prior ‘me’ and some prior ‘brush.’ Rather, we must say 
that what exists is a whole we may call ‘I and my brush.’ […] Let us call this 
single totality place. […] This shell called ‘I’ must split open, this hull must 
fall off, for the self to be released into a world that is formless and infinite. 
The self, released and unified with a place, becomes the totality of ‘I and my 
brush’.72 
 
Morita’s description of the release of the self into the world such that it is unified with its 
place provides a perfect example of Nishida’s account of expression whereby the 
individual becomes a locus of the expressive world.  
More than exemplifying Nishida’s account, Morita is expressing elements of Zen 
integral to the Japanese art of calligraphy. Nishida was quite familiar with the relation 
between Zen and traditional Japanese arts such as calligraphy, and, as has I have noted, 
there are many elements of Zen inflected in Nishida’s philosophy. Wirth notes that Zen 
calligraphy “is not merely calligraphy by Zen practitioners, nor is it simply calligraphy 
with Zen content […] The ink is alive, rife with Dharma energy.”73 It is a practice that 
requires training so that the artist can embody the proper orientation toward the materials 
and the level of concentration (samadhi) required for the ease and spontaneity that gives 
Zen calligraphy its special quality. Continuing his discussion of calligraphy quoting from 
Nishida, Wirth writes:  
[I]n Nishida’s words, “The artist thinks through his technique” (AM, 103). 
“The artist does not think idly without taking up his brush. Only when he 
takes up his brush and faces the canvas does it become clear how he should 
paint, and an infinite direction opens up before him” (AM, 104). The brush 
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becomes the manner in and through which the artist thinks, and thinking itself 
becomes expressive, much in the vein that Paul Klee spoke of his work as 
“musing with a line.”74 
 
Morita gives us a first-hand account from the perspective of an artist of how the artist and 
medium come together in a creative event allowing the total milieu to become expressive 
through the engagement with material. His account, as illuminated by Wirth, 
demonstrates the permeability of the self and world in artistic expression described in 
different ways in the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty, Nishida, and Watsuji.  
 
4. The Expressivity of Nature: Parallels between Nishida, Merleau-Ponty, and   
    Watsuji  
 
Nishida’s account of artistic expression and the existential body resonates deeply 
with Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh and his descriptions of the act of painting. Both 
philosophers describe a self that extends beyond the skin through the acts of perception 
and expression. Actually, it would perhaps be better to speak of this extension in terms of 
the world’s permeation of the self. It is not as if the world becomes engulfed by or 
infused with subjectivity. Rather, quite the opposite. Subjectivity is divested of interiority 
such that self exists only as the field in which it is immersed. In light of Watsuji’s 
understanding of human being as betweenness, immersed in a climatic milieu, it is clear 
that the self and its actions are inseparable from the natural-historical world that 
constitutes it. 
The extension of the self into the perceptual field in the thickness of the gaze in 
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Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh problematizes the commonplace view that the subject, 
or the seer, resides inside the mind and the mind inside the body in a way similar to 
Nishida and Watsuji’s accounts of perception. The body is one with its milieu in that 
things are “encrusted in its flesh” through vision. Because the body sees, “it holds things 
in a circle around itself” such that its surroundings are a “prolongation of itself.”75 For 
Merleau-Ponty, as we saw in Nishida and Watsuji, blurring the boundary between the self 
and world implies that the source of artistic expression must be understood to arise 
equally from out of the life-space we inhabit. This insight may be taken further in order 
to show how nature itself becomes expressive in the creative acts of human beings. 
Merleau-Ponty takes up this subject explicitly in “Eye and Mind” where he 
describes how the painter enters into a corporeal dialogue with the world and things. 
Merleau-Ponty explains that the painter labors to “circumscribe and project what is 
making itself seen within himself.”76 Making a similar point in his earlier piece, 
“Cezanne’s Doubt,” he quotes Cézanne as saying that when he paints, “‘The landscape 
thinks itself in me […] and I am its consciousness.’”77 The seer, according to Merleau-
Ponty, inhabits the life-space of the landscape perceived, and this implies that nature may 
be understood to play an active role in creative expression. Ecstatically immersed in the 
depth of vision, the artist is inspired by the landscape in a visceral way. Emphasizing the 
latent spatial connotations of the term in-spiration, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we take 
the meaning of the word literally. He even suggests that the movements of inspiration and 
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expression in the creative process form a circuit that could be thought of as “respiration 
in Being” itself.78 The circulation of breath both figuratively conveys and literally 
underlies the exchange present during the course of an artist’s inspiration and expression. 
Conceiving the creative process as Being’s own inhalation and exhalation supports the 
view that the origin of creative acts exceeds the individual subjectivity of the artist. 
Indeed, nature itself is expressed and expresses itself through the artist’s lived body.  
Drawing from and building upon the writings of Klee, Merleau-Ponty takes this 
insight further, commenting directly on the continuity of human expression and the 
expression of nature in general. 
In the immemorial depth of the visible, something has moved, caught fire, 
which engulfs [the painter’s] body; everything he paints is an answer to 
this incitement, and his hand is “nothing but the instrument of a distant 
will.” Vision is the meeting, as at a crossroads, of all being. “A certain fire 
wills to live; it wakes. Working its way along the hand’s conductor, it 
reaches the canvas and invades it; then, a leaping spark, it arcs the gap in 
the circle it was to trace: the return to the eye, and beyond.” There is no 
break at all in this circuit; it is impossible to say that here nature ends and 
the human being or expression begins.79 
 
The “fire” that “wills to live” is what incites the artist to create. The artist is moved to 
paint, to sculpt, to play instruments and explore the potential of a sensuous medium. The 
“distant will” that the artist intuits is a will that is alive in both the artist and the medium. 
It is part of the fleshly fabric that unites them. Following Nishida we can say that this 
distant will wells up from the infinite depths of the self, finding expression through the 
things we become when we act. 
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  In a working note from 1959, Merleau-Ponty articulates an understanding of the 
world as a field in which there is a movement where the human becomes nature and 
nature become human, bearing a chiasmatic structure analogous to Nishida’s movement 
from the created to the creating within the dialectical universal place. “It is not we who 
perceive, it is the thing that perceives itself yonder—it is not we who speak, it is truth that 
speaks itself at the depths of speech——Becoming-nature of man which is the becoming-
man of nature——The world is a field, and as such it is always open.”80 The distance 
required for vision discussed above that both holds open the depth of the visible and 
binds the seer and the seen together takes on a new twist here. Saying that the thing 
perceives itself at a distance from itself demonstrates how the thing makes itself visible in 
us when we are conceived as coextensive with the field of the world’s own disclosure. 
There is also a temporal dimension of the vortex embodied in the individual’s relation to 
the field of the world’s disclosure. Through time the expressions of others become part of 
the fabric of the historical world in which we find ourselves. Barbaras explains, “There is 
a common world constituted by sedimented meanings, that is, by acts of earlier 
expression.81 In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty writes: “Life becomes ideas 
and the ideas return to life, each is caught up in a vortex in which he first only committed 
measured stakes, each is led on by what he said and the response he received, led on by 
his own thought of which he is no longer the sole thinker.”82 Merleau-Ponty expresses a 
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similar idea in his lecture course on nature. Referring to the aesthetics of Schelling, 
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
Nature starts in the unknowable and finishes consciously. Inversely, art starts 
from certain conscious thoughts and finishes in something that can be 
perpetually taken up again. […] this idea is germinating in the Critique of 
Judgment, in which Kant shows that the “understanding is at the service of the 
imagination,” and suggests that art consists in the reconciliation of passivity 
and activity […] 83 
 
 
Here Merleau-Ponty articulates Nishida’s insight precisely. Creative acts draw on what is 
given within our natural and cultural milieu and add to them such that they become 
imbued with diverse expressions of meaning that, in turn, guide the creative expressions 
that will occur in the future. 
Nishida, Merleau-Ponty, and Watsuji are philosophers who recognize the 
importance of the thinking through body, and aesthetics is of central importance for them 
as well. As thinkers keenly aware of the interrelation of self and world, they both gives 
accounts of expression that acknowledge the necessary ambiguity between the active and 
passive dimensions of creative acts. In an essay from 1936 entitled “Logic and Life,” 
Nishida writes: 
Many people think of expression as merely subjective because they are 
looking at the world simply as an object. Be the world [itself] must be 
expressive when we consider the fact that we are in the midst of the world as 
operative elements […] our bodily self becomes active as a creative element, 
and the flow of historical life permeates our body. Herein lies the origin of the 
creative act.84 
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Merleau-Ponty expresses a parallel idea in the compiled course notes from his lectures on 
nature from the late 1950’s. Reflecting on the philosophy of Schelling, he writes: 
A poetic consciousness recognizes that it does not possess its object totally, 
that it can understand only by a true creation, and that it creates clarity by an 
operation that is not deductive but creative. Poetic consciousness, overcome 
by its object, must get hold of itself again, but without ever being able to 
separate itself from its history. There is an act of faith in the meeting of 
passivity and spontaneity, of which the effort of art is the best “document.”85 
 
Expression proves to be paradoxical because what is expressed has its source in that 
which transcends the individual in spite of the fact that it takes an individual, whose body 
is a locus that opens onto a historical landscape, to bring life to expression. Who we are is 
established through a world that is itself constituted by the sedimented acts of others and 
the creative climates that sustain us.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Art has always been a part of human life. And yet, a full understanding of artistic 
inspiration and what transpires during the creation of art continues to elude us. When one 
enters a prehistoric cave, like Lascaux for instance, and views its sophisticated rendering 
of bulls, horses, and reindeer, one cannot help but wonder what inspired the people who 
painted them. Why did the early humans of the Magdalenian era some 20,000 years ago 
paint, and what was their relationship to their art? We can never know this. But we must 
ask ourselves: Were they so different from us when we pick up a brush before a canvas? 
Was art for the Magdalenians radically different from what art is for us today? In “Eye 
and Mind” Merleau-Ponty states that “the very first painting in some sense went to the 
farthest reach of the future.”1 The meaning of a work of art, he implies, is never 
complete. Therefore, he continues, artworks always “have almost their entire lives before 
them.”2 When we come before a prehistoric etching or painting in a cave, its meaning is 
still alive for us even though we can never know what it may have meant to the artists 
who created it. The world Lascaux opens up is one that will be forever foreign to us. But 
we can still visit it so long as the work exists. We can stand before the paintings of 
Lascaux on the very ground where its creators stood and experience them for ourselves. 
The example of Lascaux is ironic since it is no longer open to visitors. Instead, an 
exact facsimile has been made to recreate the experience of the cave for tourists. There 
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are many other caves in southern France near where Lascaux is situated, however, that 
still are open to the public. I had the opportunity to visit many of them in the summer of 
2007, and that experience has stayed with me as I have pursued my dissertation research. 
For many reasons, prehistoric cave art is an excellent case for thinking about the nature of 
artistic creation and the relationship between art and nature. First of all, it is among the 
earliest examples of art in existence, and so it is very close to the origin of art in the 
historical sense. Thus, it offers an occasion to think about the primordial origins of 
artistic creativity.  
Cave art is also a fruitful site of inquiry because it so clearly unites art with 
nature. Entering a cave, one is enveloped by the earth. The space of the cave is the earth 
itself, and the paintings that cling to its walls integrate its textures and contours. The cave 
has an earthen smell, and its temperature is distinct from that of above ground. Thus, 
entering a cave is an experience very different from entering the uniform white-walled 
rooms of a museum, though the caves’ “curators” still call its various alcoves “galleries.” 
One’s awareness of entering the earth is especially true at Rouffignac where the cave 
contains numerous chambers that stretch for several miles. For accessibility, a small 
electric train has been installed to take visitors to its far reaches where there are charcoal 
outlines and etchings of various animals. At the end of one of the long chambers a room 
contains what is called “the Great Ceiling” which features several drawings of horses, 
ibex, bison, and wooly mammoths. Within this room there is also a well-like pit so deep 
that one cannot see to the bottom. In it depths (not accessible to visitors) there is a crude 
charcoal sketch of a human face. Depictions of humans are far less common than those of 
animals, and one cannot help but wonder about the significance of the placement of the 
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drawing. Why was this face drawn in such a deep and dark location? In Lascaux the only 
depiction of a human is also in a pit. Why were the human figures drawn in the least 
accessible places? Is it due to the power of the image? If so, what kind of power was the 
image thought to have? We can only guess, but for roughly 20,000 years the face in the 
pit of Rouffignac has been there, peering into the darkness deep within the earth. The 
strangeness of this prehistoric drawing and its placement epitomizes the mystery of 
creativity.  
Imagine walking barefoot for miles underground with only a torch to see by and 
maneuvering through narrow crevices that would inspire sheer terror in a claustrophobe. 
That kind of journey inevitably would bring one into a profound intimacy with the 
features of the cave. Recall how Nishida, Merleau-Ponty, and Watsuji understand the self 
to be coextensive with the space it inhabits. The cool, dark, dampness of the underground 
terrain defines the climatic milieu of the cave. In that pared-down environment, charcoal 
and ochre mixed with animal fat and the shapes and textures of the rocky earth become 
the artists’ media.  
Heidegger says, “to create is to cause something to emerge as a thing that has 
been brought forth.”3 Cave art perfectly exemplifies this given its use of the natural 
features of the cave. Take, for instance, one of the etchings in Combarelles cave. For the 
most part, this cave’s narrow and smooth tunnels are comprised of yellowish limestone. 
Near the end of one of the corridors, a shiny, mica-like, oval-shaped stone is embedded in 
the limestone. Its glimmering quality stands out against the rough, matte texture of the 
rest of the wall. This unique stone serves as the eye of an exquisitely etched profile of a 
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lioness. For the artist who etched that profile, torchlight surely caught the stone, 
suggesting an eye. The artist then etched the profile around it so that the shiny stone was 
perfectly placed to serve as the animal’s eye. To create this image, the artist had to let the 
lioness emerge. By etching that profile, the artist drew out something prefigured in the 
cave wall, but it took the vision of the artist to see a lioness in the cave. In this way, the 
artist’s vision gives birth to art latent within the earth.  
  Cave paintings frequently utilize the natural features of the cave as a relief 
underneath the painting to accentuate the form of the image. Since the walls of a cave are 
never perfectly flat, and often feature many cracks and protrusions, these add a sculpture-
like component to the paintings. These forms are highlighted by the shadows they create. 
Think of humans in a fire-lit chamber, the flicker of light casting shadows created by the 
undulations of the cave wall. The shadows suggest running horses or the arc of a bison’s 
back. At Font de Gaume, the only cave with polychrome paintings that still can be 
visited, the guide explains that the electric light we now use to look at the paintings 
creates a much different effect than does the light of fire. Electric light does not move, 
nor does it cast the same degree of shadow. When the tour guide demonstrates this 
difference for a moment, the effect is striking. Under the natural fire light the paintings 
seem to become animated, which, in turn, seems to animate the cave itself. The way cave 
art incorporates the natural features of the cave leads one to speculate that in some cases 
the prehistoric artists may have been prompted to draw and paint what they did because 
they saw images in the cave wall the way we commonly see images in the shapes of 
clouds or the grain of wood. The cave becomes alive when it partakes in visibility. We 
seers, as loci of the world’s own self-expression, as Nishida would put it, draw out forms 
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from moving light and shadow. Fissures and cracks in the cave walls create lines that add 
to the emergent composition. Seeing forms emerging from the cave walls, the world and 
earth’s early artists began to draw out the rift-design.  
Cave art is an expression of the caves as they were experienced by the early 
people who visited them. It is fitting that the images they saw emerge from the walls 
were mostly of animals. The cave, as a natural formation, suggested other natural forms 
like those of animal bodies. For us visiting the caves today, the paintings seem 
harmonious with the landscape. They were created from locally obtained material; thus, 
they are entirely composed of earth tones that match the colors of the land. And since 
they are immobile “installations,” each is inextricably linked to the history of its 
particular place. The decorated caves depict the land’s animals of the past and present in 
the colors that arise from the materials of that place. This makes the art seem to have 
been almost “naturally” occurring, as if it was birthed by the place itself. If we think of 
the prehistoric peoples who painted them as part of the “climate” of the locale, in 
Watsuji’s sense, then the art indeed was birthed by its place. Following Nishida, we could 
say that cave art is an expression of historical nature, of “nature’s seeing.” 
Throughout this dissertation I have developed what I am calling a non-subjectivist 
account of artistic creation that emphasizes the active role that materials play in the 
creation of art. I have also shown that a non-subjectivist account of creativity has 
implications for how we understand the concept of nature. By analyzing the concept of 
nature as seen in the relationship between artist and medium within the creative process, I 
have provided a way of thinking about artistic expression that recognizes the active, 
expressive character of artistic media and, more broadly, of nature itself. This view 
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challenges traditional conceptions of nature and material that hold sway in dominant 
philosophical and scientific discourses. Demonstrating the expressive capacity of material 
when it is taken up by an artist suggests that nature is neither reducible to a set of 
physical laws underlying and determining human activity, nor is it simply a socially 
constructed concept. When viewed aesthetically from the standpoint of an artist, meaning 
and value arise in the interactions between ourselves and the landscapes we inhabit. Our 
bodies, which exist in continuity with nature, express a chiasm in being within which 
meaning arises. Following Merleau-Ponty, we can say that the world is the flesh of the 
visible with which we seers are intertwined through all our senses; and the fact that we 
sense leads us to create art in which sense is expressed further.  
The most significant aspect of a non-subjectivist account of artistic expression is 
the recognition that human creativity is always in response to a climatic milieu. The 
dialogue taking place between artist and medium during the creative process 
demonstrates how nature both permeates and limits human production. This means that 
artistic activity is determined largely by the material constraints of a medium. At the 
same time, the constraints of a medium offer the artist opportunities that impel him or her 
to create. The material with which the artist works provides the foundation for artistic 
expression, but it also resists being subsumed by conceptual meaning. The materiality of 
the medium is what prevents the sensuous meaning of artworks from being fully 
translated into linguistic concepts, a key point revealed by Kant’s third Critique. 
Moreover, through the generation of artworks, the meaningfulness of a climatic milieu is 
furthered and intensified through the sensuous character of a medium derived from it. 
Therefore, completed artworks, which utilize natural materials, open up the possibility for 
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the meaningful significance of nature to be more fully appreciated in general.  
The recently coined notion of the “anthropocene” suggests that the entirety of 
nature exists in the purview of human influence. While the pervasiveness of the impact 
that humans have had on the Earth and its ecosystems cannot be denied, we should be 
cautious not to reinforce a reified distinction between humans and nature that is implied 
in this notion. If we understand human activity along the lines of Nishida’s account of 
acting-intuition, then we must recognize how our actions are expressive of the historical 
world, which includes nature. Being born of the world, the self is not entirely its own, and 
neither are its actions. When we create, we are performing the creative acts of the natural-
historical climate that gave rise to us. As fundamental points of world origination, we 
enact the world’s seeing of itself through our creative acts.  
Describing early humans going deep into the earth to create images that seem to 
emerge from the cave walls is one way to talk about how nature becomes expressive 
through art. But if we zoom out and view the Earth from space, the expressiveness of 
nature in human life is equally apparent. The famous “Blue Marble” photograph of the 
Earth taken in 1972 had an immense impact on the way human beings understood 
themselves in relation to the cosmos. In the vast emptiness of space, we are utterly 
dependent upon the Earth. Our bodies are so completely inseparable from our 
surroundings that our muscles and bones immediately begin to atrophy in the absence of 
the Earth’s gravity. Everything we do on the surface of our planet is part of an ecological 
exchange that exhibits, in Nishida’s words, the movement from the created to the 
creating. And, as Watsuji teaches us, human culture is an expression of climate.  
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  Recognizing the deep entwinement of nature and human life at the level of 
creative acts allows us to understand human civilization in continuity with the natural 
world. However, this thought immediately presents an obvious problem: If human life is 
ultimately an expression of nature, this seems to preclude the possibility of human life 
ever being at odds with nature. Thus, someone might conclude that air pollution, for 
example, is “natural.” This conclusion, however, is misplaced because it oversimplifies 
the subtle dynamic between the self and world that Merleau-Ponty’s paradox of 
expression, Nishida’s account of acting-intuition, and Watsuji’s notion of climate 
articulate. We must be careful to distinguish the normative connotations implied in 
calling something natural from the simple fact that all things occur within the scope of 
the natural-material world. The strength of the accounts of Merleau-Ponty, Nishida, and 
Watsuji lie in their demonstration of the ways in which life is always lived in response to 
the world in which we find ourselves, but our continuity with nature need not imply that 
we are determined by nature. We exist through a dynamic interchange in which we build 
upon that which has been given before us. Though our actions are always in relation to 
the natural-cultural climate in which we live, we must also acknowledge the seminal role 
we play in shaping our world. We are loci of the world’s own expression at the same time 
that we are actively expressing ourselves. This insight highlights the radical responsibility 
we have for the world in which we live, which demands that we continually ask ourselves 
afresh: What kind of world do we want to create? The non-subjectivist account of 
creative action that I have developed urges that we choose to listen to what materials 
themselves are drawn to express rather than imposing our own all too often misguided 
wills upon the natural world.  
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Experiencing materials as expressive may seem like a radical perspective. 
However, this notion rejoins with Hegel’s description of how the material of an artwork 
shines with a vibrant radiance that displays its inner soul. We need not subscribe to 
Hegel’s metaphysics of spirit, however, to appreciate the living character of media; the 
aesthetic experience itself bespeaks the vibrancy of materials shaped by artists. 
Art has the ability to change the way we perceive the world. Robert E. Carter, in 
The Japanese Arts and Self Cultivation, puts this well: 
Art moves one beyond surface living, to living in three-dimensions. Its 
purpose is to render one whole, able to see things holistically. […] Anyone 
who stands by a Rembrandt or a Van Gogh, or is enveloped at a concert by 
the music of Bach or Beethoven, or who enters a Japanese garden risks 
such a transformation. […] Suddenly the world is an enchanted world, and 
as with all enchantment, one is taken out of oneself, one forgets oneself to 
be placed in a richer and more congenial and more profound world.4 
 
In early drafts of “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty closed the essay by stating, “The 
painter is as far from despair as from self-importance, and one must wish for humanity 
many persons who, like him, contemplate the world with solidarity and transform it.”5 As 
the interconnectivity of our world continues to increase, it becomes increasingly 
necessary for us to acknowledge the ways our creative acts are shaping the world, and 
ourselves in return. Artists who cultivate an attunement to and reverence for a material 
medium bring to the fore the life inherent to their medium and throughout the natural 
world, and this awareness has the potential to positively transform how we conceive of 
nature and understand human being’s place in the cosmos. As beings born of this world, 
                                                
4 Carter, The Japanese Arts and Self-Cultivation, 54. 
 
5 This sentence was the last line in earlier drafts of “Eye and Mind” but was omitted in the published 
version. This line is analyzed by Johnson in The Retrieval of the Beautiful, 20. 
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we express ourselves through media that are, in turn, expressive of themselves in the 
dynamic interchange of the creative climates in which we live. 
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